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ABSTRACT

The 15 papers presented in this conference report explore changes in Appalachian mountain life over the preceding three decades; the persistence of old problems, economic and cultural; and alternative paths for the future. Opening remarks by Wendell Berry focus on the value of community and on the survival of a community in an externally controlled economy. Other participants describe the persistent relationships between "bad economics" and bad local politics, the demise of the mountain farm, the crisis in the coal industry, the feminization of poverty, environmental assaults on national forest lands, and the decline of organized labor in Appalachia. Some papers propose alternative development strategies for Appalachia based on the concept of a sustainable society and on deliberate developmental efforts, reshaping economic development to overcome geographic determinism, particularly with community efforts. One paper considers the role of the local liberal arts college as a resource for progress through rural adult education; another profiles the Appalachian economy and places it in the national context. In his introduction, Ronald D. Eller comments that the current Appalachian economic crisis may foreshadow the permanent "Appalachianizing" of other regions of America as well. Contributors include Wendell Berry, Karen Armstrong-Cummings, Salim Kublawi, Cynthia Duncan, Ben Poage, Curtis Seltzer, John G. McNutt, Guy L. Osborne, Michael V. Carter, Arthur C. Butler, Richard A. Couto, Ann R. Tickamyer, Joe Szakos, Albert J. Fritsch, Michael J. McDonald, Bruce Wheeler, Raymond S. Ferell, and John Calhoun Wells. (DHP)

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THE LAND AND ECONOMY OF APPALACHIA

Proceedings from the 1986
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THE LAND AND ECONOMY OF APPALACHIA

Proceedings from the 1986 Conference on Appalachia

October 30-31, 1986

University of Kentucky

Sponsored by the Appalachian Center

Ronald D Eller, Director

Dedicated to

HARRY MONROE CAUDILL

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INTRODUCTION

Ronald D Eller
Director of the Appalachian Center
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The economy of the United States is once again undergoing rapid change. Ours is an era---like that late nineteenth century and the 1930s---when changing political and economic relationships are altering the way Americans live and work. Today the structures of an older industrial economy are crumbling as industry and manufacturing migrate abroad and a new a high-tech, communications-based society emerges in its place. The impact upon American sub-regions and workers has been diverse, with the Northeast, Sun-belt South, and West sharing new growth, while the rural heartland of the United Sates suffers recession and decline. In the past six years, the nation has generated more than ten million new jobs, and yet it has sustained the highest rates of unemployment in three decades. These are years of contradiction and fundamental change in which the patterns and conditions of the future are being shaped.

Appalachia too has been altered by this change. Just as the industrial revolution transformed mountain life and the depression thirties brought on the welfare state, the transition to a post-industrial economy has had a lasting impact upon the region. Appalachia, still struggling with the contradictions and inequalities of the industrial era, has been deeply affected by the recent recession, by federal budget cuts, and by the structural transformation of the national economy. Prospects for economic growth and environmental protection have been dampened, if not reversed. The future is uncertain, and everywhere communities are searching for alternative solutions to old and new conditions. It was this search that brought more than 130 Appalachian leaders and scholars to the University of Kentucky in the fall of 1986 for the purpose of examining the current status of environmental and economic issues in the region. The Conference on the Land and Economy of Appalachia explored the changes in the mountains in the last three decades, the persistence of old problems, the complexity of new conditions, and alternative paths for the future. The papers presented at the Conference provide the basis for this volume.

It has been twenty-five years since Harry Caudill wrote ***Night Comes to the Cumberlands***, the classic biography of political and economic depression in eastern Kentucky which helped to focus national attention on the plight of Appalachia. Much has changed since 1962. The War on Poverty has come and gone. Health care, educational facilities, mine safety, and transportation have improved; and new water systems, retail centers, and public buildings have transformed life in regional "growth centers." But much has remained the same. Unemployment rates are among the highest in the nation. Political corruption, lax enforcement of environmental standards, and the neglect of human services in rural areas persist. The school drop-out rate in many central Appalachian counties approaches 50%, and many measures of health are again on the decline. Despite improvements in the poverty rate, Appalachians are twice as likely to live in poverty as other Americans, and the percentage of population below the poverty level is on the rise. Twenty-five years later, Appalachian communities face many of the same challenges that Caudill identified in the 1960s. Today, these challenges are complicated by new political and economic realities.

The Conference on the Land and Economy of Appalachia presented an opportunity for scholars of the 1960s and those of the 1980s to share their perspectives, frustrations, and hopes, as well as to learn from each other the lessons of the past and the problems of the present. Caudill's presence as Honorary Chairman, along with that of many activists from that period, provided the historical foundation for the conference. Many speakers referred to Caudill's struggles for strip-mine legislation, tax reform, and federal relief programs. But most presenters focused their attention on current conditions and policy implications.

Wendell Berry's opening remarks set the stage for others by drawing attention to the political, economic, and cultural meaning of "community" and by questioning the survival of community in a rural America whose economy is externally controlled. Other participants described the persistent relationships between local politics and "bad economics," the demise of the mountain farm, the crisis in the coal industry, the feminization of poverty, environmental assaults on national forest lands, and the decline of organized labor in Appalachia. Some

offered strategies for alternative development and provided examples of community-based action and successful reform. Others were less optimistic about regional solutions to externally determined conditions. All were convinced that the region faces a new crisis demanding new initiatives, renewed commitment to old struggles, and alternative approaches to redefined problems.

The linkages between the 1960s and the 1980s are evident in the essays which follow. Appalachia is still a land of contradictions and tragedies. The $15 billion in federal assistance which poured into the region in the last two decades brought marginal improvements to the land and people of the region, but incomplete programs, technological change, and economic trends have reversed that progress. As some commentators have observed, the current economic crisis in the mountains may foreshadow the permanent "Appalachianizing" of other regions of America as well. It remains to be seen whether a new generation of mountain leaders can learn from the past and develop an alternative future for the region.

March 20, 1987

DOES COMMUNITY HAVE A VALUE?

Wendell Berry

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Community is a concept, like humanity or peace, that virtually no one has taken the trouble to quarrel with; even its worst enemies praise it. There is almost no product or project that is not being advocated in the name of community improvement. We are told that we, as a community, are better off for the power industry, the defense industry, the communications industry, the transportation industry, the agriculture industry, the food industry, the health industry, the medical industry, the insurance industry, the sports industry, the beauty industry, the entertainment industry, the mining industry, the education industry, the law industry, the government industry, and the religion industry. You could look into any one of those industries and find many people, some of them in influential positions, who are certifiably "community spirited."

In fact, however, neither our economy, nor our government, nor our educational system run on the assumption that community has a value---a value, that is, that *counts* in any practical or powerful way. The values that are assigned to community are emotional and spiritual---"cultural"---which makes it the subject of pieties that are merely vocal. But does community have a value that is practical or economic? Is community necessary? If it does not have a value that is practical and economic, if it is not necessary, then *can* it have a value that is emotional and spiritual? Can "community values" be preserved simply for their own sake? Can people be neighbors, for example, if they do not need each other or help each other? Can there be a harvest festival where there is no harvest? Does economy have spiritual value?

Such questions are being forced upon us now by the loss of community. We are discouraged from dealing with them by their difficulty in such a time as this, and yet these questions and others like them are indispensable to us, for they describe the work that we must do. We can only be encouraged to see that this work, though difficult, is fascinating and hopeful. It is homework, doable in some part by everybody, useful to everybody ---as far as possible unlike the massive, expensive, elitist projects that now engross virtually every government of the world.

But before I go any farther, let me make clear what I mean by community. I will give as particular an example as I know.

My friends Loyce and Owen Flood married in October, 1938, and moved to a farm in hilly country near Port Royal, Kentucky. She was seventeen; Owen was eighteen.

Loyce had graduated from high school and had been to college for a short while. Although she had been raised on a farm she did not know a great deal about being a farmer's wife on a small, poor hillside place. She and Owen had little money, and she had to learn quickly the arts of subsistence.

Fortunately, they were living in a neighborhood of households closely bound together by family ties or friendships and by well-established patterns of work and pleasure. This neighborhood included, in varying degrees of intimacy and interdependency, nine households, all more or less within walking distance. The women kept house individually, but all the big jobs they did together: housecleaning, wall papering, quilting, canning, cooking for field crews. Though Loyce looked up to them and called them "Miss Suzy," "Miss Berthy," and so on, most of them were still fairly young, in their late thirties or early forties. They were a set of hearty, humorous, industrious women, who saw whatever was funny and loved to make up funny names for things.

They became Loyce's teachers, and now, nearly fifty years later, she remembers with warmth and pleasure their kindness to her and their care for her. They helped her to learn to cook and can, to work in the hog killing and in the field (for at planting and harvest times, the women went to the field with the men); they looked after her when she was sick; they taught her practical things, and things having to do with their mutual womanhood and community life. Although she had

more formal schooling than any of them, she says now, "Everything I know I learned from those people." And the men were as kind and useful to Owen as the women were to Loyce. "They took us under their wing," she says.

The men farmed their own farms, but, like the women, they did the big jobs together. And when they worked together, they ate together. They always had a big dinner. "They never shirked dinner," Loyce says, "that was one thing sure." In hot weather, chicken would be the only fresh meat available, and they ate a lot of chicken. The women were perfectionists at making noodles.

By our standards now, these people were poor. The farms ranged in size from thirty-seven to perhaps a hundred acres. But only the thirty-seven-acre farm was entirely tillable. The others included a lot of "hill and holler." Then, as now, most of the money made on the produce of that place was made by manufacturers and merchants in other places; probably no household grossed more than $1000 a year. And the subsistence economy was necessarily elaborate and strong. The people raised and slaughtered their own meat, raised vegetable gardens, produced their own milk, butter, and eggs. They gathered the wild fruit as it ripened. They canned and dried and cured and preserved. They spent little money. The cash for the household came mainly from the sale of cream, and each farm kept three or four milk cows for that purpose. Loyce remembers that her weekly cream check was three dollars; they budgeted half of that for groceries and gasoline for the car and half for payment on a debt.

These people worked hard, and without any modern conveniences or labor savers. They had no tractors, no electricity, no refrigerators, no washing machines, no vacuum cleaners. Their one luxury was the telephone party line, which cost fifty cents a month. But their work was in limited quantities; they did not work at night or away from home; they knew their work, they knew how to work, and they knew each other. Loyce says, "They didn't have to do a lot of explaining."

Their work was mingled with their amusement; sometimes it *was* their amusement. Talk was very important. They worked together and talked; they saw each other in Port Royal on Saturday night and talked; on Sunday morning they went to church early and stood around outside and talked; when church was over, they talked and were in no hurry to go home.

In the summer they would get fifty pounds of ice and make ice cream, and eat the whole freezer full, and sometimes make another, and eat that. In the winter they would all go to somebody's house at night and pop corn, and the men would play cards and the women would talk. They played cards a lot. One of the households had books that could be borrowed. Loyce's private amusements were reading and embroidery. She does not remember ever getting lonesome or bored.

* * *

There are, as I see it, two salient facts about this neighborhood of 1938:

1. It was effective and successful as a community. It did what we know that a good community does: It supported itself, amused itself, consoled itself, and passed its knowledge on to the young. It was something to build on.
2. It no longer exists. By the end of World War II, it was both reduced and altered, and the remnants of its old life are now mainly memories.

The reasons why it no longer exists are numerous and complexly interrelated. Some of them are: increased farm income during and after the war; improved roads and vehicles; the influence of radio and then of television; rising economic expectations; changing social fashions; school consolidation; and the rapid introduction of industrial technology into agriculture after the war. Thus, the disappearance of this community into the modern world and the industrial economy is both a fact, and to a considerable extent an understandable fact.

But we must take care not to stop with the mere recognition and understanding of facts. We must go ahead to ask if the fact exists for our good, if it can be understood to our good, and if its existence is necessary or inescapable. After establishing that a community has died, for example, we must ask who has been served by its death.

Such a community as I have described has often been caricatured and ridiculed and often sentimentalized. But, looked at in its facts, as my friend recalls them, it escapes both extremes. The people were manifestly equal to their lot; they were not oafish or stupid. On the other hand, they were not perfect; they were not living an idyll. The community was not immune either to change or to the need to change. Anyone familiar with the history of farming on Kentucky hillsides knows that its practices could always have been improved.

But another fact that we must now reckon with is that this community did not change by improving itself. It changed by turning away from itself, from its place,

from its own possibility. Somehow the periphery exhausted and broke the center. This community, like thousands of similar ones, was not changed by anything that *it* thought of, or by anything thought of by anybody who believed that community had a practical or an economic value. It was changed, partly to its own blame, by forces, originating outside itself, that did not consider, much less desire, the welfare or the existence of such communities. This community, like any other, had to change and needed to change, but what if its own life, its own good, had been the standard by which it changed, rather than the profit of distant entrepreneurs and corporations?

* * *

We are left with questions---that one and others.

Is such a community desirable? My answer, unhesitatingly, is yes. But that is an answer notoriously subject to the charge of sentimentality or nostalgia. People will ask if I "want to turn back the clock." And so I am pushed along to another question, a more interesting one: Is such a community necessary? Again, I think, the answer must be yes, and here we have access to some manner of proof.

For one thing, the place once occupied by that community is now occupied by people who are not, in the same close, effective sense, a community. The place is no longer central to its own interest and its own economy. The people do not support themselves so much from the place or so much by mutual work and help as their predecessors did; they furnish much less of their own amusement and consolation; purchasing has more and more replaced growing and making; and less and less of local knowledge and practical skill is passed on to the young. In 1938, the community and its economy were almost identical. Today, the community is defined mostly by the mere proximity of its people to one another. The people belong, often to their own detriment, to a *national* economy whose centers are far from home.

For another thing, we now have before us the failure of the industrial system of agriculture that supplanted the community and the ways of 1938. There is, so far as I am aware, no way of denying the failure of an agricultural system that destroys both land and people, as the industrial system is now doing. Obviously, we need a way of farming that attaches people to the land much more intimately, carefully, and democratically than the industrial system has been able to do, and we can neither establish good farming nor preserve it without successful communities.

It is easy to suppose, as many powerful people apparently have done, that the principle of subsistence on family farms and in rural communities will be bad for the larger economy, but this supposition has proved to be a dangerous and destructive error. Subsistence is bad for the industrial economy and for the paper economy of the financiers; it is good for the actual, real-world economy by which people live and are fed, clothed, and housed. For example, in 1938, in the time of subsistence, there were three thriving grocery stores that were patronized by the neighborhood I have been talking about---one at Drennon's Lick and two at Port Royal. Now there is only one, at Port Royal. The "standard of living" (determined, evidently, by how much money is spent) has increased, but community life has declined, economically and every other way. In the neighborhoods around Port Royal, we now have many modern conveniences, but we buy and pay for them farther and farther from home. And we have fewer and fewer people at home who know how to maintain these conveniences and keep them running. Port Royal, in other words, now exists for "the economy"---that abstract accumulation of monetary power which engrosses corporations and governments and which does not concern itself at all for the existence of Port Royal.

* * *

For many years, I think, the people of rural America have been struggling with the realization that we are living in a colony. It is an irony especially bitter for Americans that, having cast off the colonialism of England, we have proceeded to impose a domestic colonialism on our own land and people, and yet we cannot deny that most of the money made on the products that we produce in rural America---food and fiber, timber, mineable fuels and minerals of all kinds---is made by other people in other places. We cannot deny that all of these fundamental enterprises, as now conducted, involve the destruction of the land and the people. We cannot deny that there is no provision being made and no thought being taken in any segment of the rural economy for the long-term welfare of the people who are doing the work. Indeed, we cannot deny that our leaders appear to take for granted that the eventual destruction of lives, livelihoods, homes, and communities is an acceptable, though not a chargeable, cost of production. The washed-out farm and bankrupt farmer, the stripmined mountain and the unemployed or diseased miner, the clear-cut forest and the depressed logging town---all are seen as the mere natural results of so-called free enterprise. The pattern of industrial "development" on the farm and in the forest, as in the coal fields, is that of combustion and exhaustion---not "growth," a biological metaphor that is

invariably contradicted by industrial practice.

The fault of a colonial economy is that it is dishonest: it misrepresents reality. In practice it is simply a way of keeping costs off the books of an exploitive interest. The exploitive interest is absent from the countryside exactly as if the countryside were a foreign colony. The result of this separation is that the true costs of production are not paid by the exploitive interest but only suffered by the exploited land and people. The colony, whether foreign or domestic, becomes unstable, both as an ecosystem and as a community because colonialism does not permit the development of strong local economies. The economy of a colony exports only "raw material" and imports only finished goods. It buys and sells on markets over which it has no control; thus, both markets drain value from the colony. The economy of a colony is thus as far as possible from E. F. Schumacher's just (and safe) ideal of "local production from local resources for local use."

The way that a national economy preys on its internal colonies is by the destruction of community---that is, by the destruction of the principle of local self-sufficiency not only in the local economy but also in the local culture. Thus, local life becomes the dependent, and the victim, not just of the food industry, the transportation industry, the power industries, the various agribusiness industries, and so on, but also of the entertainment, the education, and the religious industries---all involving change from goods once cheap or free to expensive goods having to be bought.

That the economy of most of rural America is a colonial economy became plain as soon as the local economies of subsistence lapsed and were replaced by the so-called "consumer economy." The old local economies of subsistence, which in America were often incomplete and imperfect, were nevertheless sources of local strength and independence, and, as I have suggested, they were a beginning on which we could have built. Their replacement by the "consumer economy" has brought a helpless dependence on distant markets, on transported manufactured goods, on cash, and on credit.

* * *

Even as cursory a description of one of the old local subsistence economies as I gave at the beginning of this essay reveals that its economic assets were to a considerable extent intangible: culture-borne knowledge, attitudes, and skills; family and community coherence; family and community labor; and cultural or religious principles such as respect for gifts (natural or divine), humility, fidelity, charity, and neighborliness. Such economies, furthermore, were mainly sun-powered, using plants and the bodies of animals and humans as "solar converters." By means of neighborhood, knowledge, and skill, they were turning free supplies to economic advantage. Theirs was an economy that took place, largely, off the books. The wonderful fact, then, is that those emotional and spiritual values that are now so inconsequentially associated with the idea of community were economic assets in the old communities, and they produced economic results.

This finding can be corroborated by an example that is contemporary, though somewhat more removed from my own acquaintance and culture. David Kline and his family, who are members of one of the Amish communities in the hilly country of eastern Ohio, have a farm of 123 acres that, even in the present hard times, is successful, both economically and agriculturally. It is one of the farms that, in my own thinking about agriculture, I have used as a standard.

Of the Klines' 123 acres, seventy-five are arable, twenty-nine are in permanent pasture, ten are forested, five are in orchard and gardens, and four are occupied by buildings. The major money-making enterprises of the farm are a dairy of twenty-three Guernsey cows (with about an equal number of heifers), and seven brood sows and a boar. The field crops, raised mainly to be fed on the place, are hay, corn, oats, and wheat. There are also the orchard and gardens, fifty laying hens, fifty pullets, fifty roosters for the table, and seven hives of bees. The farm combines commercial and subsistence enterprises, and its subsistence or household economy is obviously strong, producing some marketable surplus. In addition to the family's subsistence, this farm has been grossing about $50,000 a year, and netting $25,000 to $30,000. In 1985, the gross was $47,000, and the net $25,000. In the midst of an agricultural depression, this is a startling accomplishment. Again, it is an economic result that is only somewhat computable; it is accounted for also by the cultural, family, and community coherence that is still maintained by the Old Order Amish, whose way of life, including their technology, makes possible the maximum utilization of natural (and therefore cheap or free) energy and fertility. A *full* accounting of David and Elsie Kline's economy would have to consider, as well, the extensive substitutions of natural and cultural gifts for purchased supplies.

That David Kline is also an excellent conservationist and a naturalist, who may delay a hay-cutting in order to allow bobolink fledglings to leave the nest, makes him even more useful to us as an example. For a part of the Amish understanding of good work, built into their technology and their methods, is this respect for

nature. Farming, to the Klines, is the proper husbanding of nature, a stewardly care for the natural integrities and processes that precede and support the life of the farm.

David once attended a conference on the subject of community. What is community, the conferees were asking, and how can we have it? At some point, late in the proceedings, they asked David what community was and what it meant to him. He said that when he and his son were plowing in the spring he could look around him and see seventeen teams at work on the neighboring farms. He knew those teams and the men driving them, and he knew that if he were hurt or sick, those men and those teams would be at work on his farm.

Conditioned as we all are now by industrial assumptions, we must be careful not to miss or to underestimate the point of David's reply: It is a practical description of a spiritual condition. With the Amish, economy is not merely a function of community; the community and the economy are very nearly the same. We might, indeed, call an Amish community a loving economy, for it is based on the love of neighbors, of creatures, and of places. The community accomplishes the productive work that is necessary to any economy; the economy supports and preserves the land and the people. The economy cannot prey on the community because it is not alienated from the community; it *is* the community. We should notice too that David has described the economic helpfulness, the charity, that is natural to the life of a community---and free to members---that has been replaced, among most of the rest of us, by the insurance industry.

* * *

But let us go a little further and speculate on the relation between a subsistence-based family economy, such as the Klines' and a local---say, a county---economy. It is easy to assume, as I have said, that a subsistence-based family economy would be bad for the larger economy of the locality or county. But let us put beside the Kline farm an industrial Ohio farm of 640 acres (or one square mile), and let us say that this farm grossed $200,000 and nets $20,000. (I think that those are safe figures for our purpose, for midwestern industrial farmers have often found it impossible to net 10% of gross. This square mile of land is *one* farm, farmed by *one* family, and therefore dependent on large-scale equipment. For years, as the people have been leaving the farms and the farms have been getting larger, the suppliers and servicers of farm machines, which have also been getting larger, have been withdrawing toward the larger towns. Now industrial farmers must sometimes drive astonishing distances for parts and repairs. For the farmer of a large industrial farm, the economic center has thus moved far beyond the local community, and we must suppose that a large percentage of his operating costs goes outside the local community.

But a square mile of even reasonably good land would contain five farms more or less the size of the Klines'. If we suppose that the families would average three children each, this would increase the human population of the square mile from five to twenty-five. Such an increase in population implies a reduction in the scale of equipment, which in turn implies an increase of business for local suppliers and mechanics. Moreover, the population increase implies an increase of business for local shops and businesses of all kinds. If we use the Klines' farm economy as a base and suppose that the five farms average $50,000 a year gross and $25,000 a year net, then we see that they increase the gross income of the square mile by only $50,000. But individually, the five farms each would net $5,000 a year more than the large farm, and together they would increase the net income on the square mile to $125,000, an increase of net over the large single farm of $105,000.

This comparison is not entirely speculative; Marty Strange says, for instance, that in Iowa, in the years 1976 - 1983, small farms achieved "more output per dollar invested" than large farms. "In fact," he says, "the larger the farm, the lower the output per dollar invested." However, since my comparison must be at least partly speculative, I can hope only to suggest a possibility that has been ignored: that strong communities imply strong local economies, and vice versa---that, indeed, strong communities and strong local economies are identical.

Does this mean that, as local economies grow strong, there must be a concomitant weakening of the national economy? I do not think so. Strong local economies everywhere would, it seems to me, inevitably add up to strong national economies and to a strong world economy. The necessary distinction here is between temporary and permanent economic strength. A national economy may burgeon at the expense of its local economies, as ours has been doing, but, obviously, it can do so only for a while. The permanence of a national economy, we may be sure, would not be measurable by "gross national product," which may, after all, involve local net deficits of, say, topsoil or underground water. It would have to be measured by the health of its communities, both human and natural.

If these communities are given no standing in the computations, then all costs and benefits to and from the community are "externalized," and a business may show a profit to everybody else's loss. The cost of community

to each of its members is restraint, limitation of scale. Its benefits, within acceptance of that limitation, are the many helps, human and natural, material and otherwise, that a community makes freely or cheaply available to its members. If an appropriate limitation of scale is not accepted, then the community is simply replaced by large-scale operators who work in isolation and by the dispossessed and excluded poor, who do not stay in place but drift into the cities where they are counted, no longer as "surplus" farmers (or miners or woods workers) but as "unemployed."

If the human and natural communities are given no standing in the computations, then the large farm or other large enterprise acts as a siphon to drain economic and other values out of the locality into the "gross national product." This happens because its technology functions on behalf of the national economy, not the local community.

The bait that has opened communities to exploitation and destruction has always been ready cash for local people. But there has never been as much cash forthcoming to the local people as to people elsewhere---not by far. The supply of ready cash has tended to be undependable or temporary, and it has usually come as a substitute for things more permanent and dearer than cash, and harder to replace, once lost.

The only preventive and the only remedy is for the people to choose one another and their place over the rewards offered them by outside investors. The local community must understand itself finally as a community of interest---a common dependence on a common life and a common ground. And because a community is, by definition, *placed*, its success cannot be divided from the success of its place, its natural setting and surroundings: its soils, forests, grasslands, plants and animals, water, light and air. The two economies, the natural and the human, support each other. Each is the other's hope of a durable and a livable life.

STRATEGIES FOR A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE IN APPALACHIA

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Introduction

In 1985 Kentucky's industrial development program landed Toyota, Inc. in the gently rolling farmlands of Scott County, Kentucky. Even though some citizens questioned the $125 million incentive package, the 1986 Kentucky General Assembly approved the deal without major intensive examination. The siting process is stalled somewhat by current labor disputes, but state leaders generally hail the Toyota development as Kentucky's economic boon of the decade, if not the century, and most have enrolled in Japanese classes---or at least have learned to use chopsticks.

This paper is not about the pros and cons of a $125 million incentive package, or whether or not prime agriculture land should be converted to a Japanese Detroit, or even if Natural Resources Cabinet Secretary Charlotte Baldwin should have been named in the lawsuits ensuing from the Toyota environmental permits. This paper will examine, instead, the state development process at work in Kentucky, and in most of our Appalachian states. An analysis of the fundamental omission of natural resource management, as part of economic development, will be presented. And finally recommendations for a more holistic, natural resource-based strategy for sustainable development are proposed.

Granted, the examination is not from the perspective of a long-term financial investor in industrial development, nor even from the perspective of a state official who traveled far and wide to seek out these investments. This paper is presented from the perspective of a former state official who spent many years dealing with development decisions that were not sustainable, that often resulted in ecological failures, municipal bankruptcies and even plant closures. And so it is from this perspective of what did not work, and what *did*, that these thoughts are presented.

Sustainable Development: The Concept

First, what is sustainable development? Over a decade has elapsed since the concept of sustainable development was discussed at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment. In examining the multiple forces at play in development issues, the U.N. General Assembly made a call for new approaches to development which would include "imaginative research in alternative consumption patterns, technological lifestyles, land-use strategies, as well as institutional frameworks and educational requirements to sustain them."

So what does this high-sounding language from the U.N. mean to anyone in Sandy Hook, Kentucky? The U.N. Declaration led to a series of reports, conferences and programs which have made major changes in the development practices and funding for U.N. programs, development projects and aid programs, worldwide. The concept of sustainable development is a necessary, supportable, and essential global theme with direct applications in Appalachia. It is necessary because the fragile resource base is already greatly stressed and cannot support a traditional, narrow economic development strategy.

The sustainable development concept is defined as "a development strategy that manages all assets---natural and human resources, as well as financial and physical assets---for increasing wealth and well-being." The concept brings together the need for economic output and growth with the wise management of productive resources for the long term.

The World Resources Institute brought together a panel of international business leaders, environmental organization spokesmen, and academicians to discuss the problems facing developing countries. The panel finalized a report in 1984 which examined the role of multinational corporations in environmental and natural resource management in developing countries. The report outlined four basic tenets for sustainable development:

1. The use of nonrenewable resources in a technically efficient fashion, for example, to increase the recoverable portion of ore deposits and fossil fuel reserves;
2. To use the earnings from nonrenewable

resource exploitation to build the productive capacity of the country though physical and human capital investment;

3. To protect and maintain the productivity of renewable resources---soils, forests, fisheries---for future use;

4. To protect and maintain the valuable (but non-marketed) services provided directly by environmental resources, including clean air, potable water, and recreation opportunities and amenities.

Again, these principles are somewhat esoteric and seemingly unrelated to new and ongoing development projects and programs. In order to underscore the need for such a development concept, a review of current environmental issues facing states, and the nation, is in order. What natural resources do we want to protect and manage?

Our Natural Resources: Assets for Economic Growth

Natural resources, along with financial capital, physical infrastructure, and a healthy, trained and motivated work force, are important economic development assets. They will determine the future health of any economy.

This paper will focus primarily on Kentucky, being a largely rural and sparsely populated state. Its natural resources assets and the overriding environmental and economic issues are fairly representative of central Appalachian issues.

Kentucky encompasses 25,862,000 square acres of land, located in the south central United States, just west of the Allegheny Mountains. About six million acres of the almost 26 million is classified as prime farmland. It is bordered largely by water and mountains.

The state has 40,000 miles of inland streams and waterways including almost 2,000 miles of commercially navigable waters. Kentucky has vast and varied groundwater regions with alluvial valleys and sand and gravel aquifers in the West. In the remainder of the state, groundwater occurs in extensive karst regions. In these areas its travel resembles flowing surface streams, disappearing through springs into underground caverns and creating sink holes and surface depressions. Farther east, the groundwater resource is limited by the steep elevations of eastern Kentucky mountains.

Kentucky has 11.9 million acres of commercial forest land, 47% of the state's land area. One half of the commercial forest is in the eastern third of the state. Kentucky's temperate climate produces moderate temperatures in both winter and summer. Generally, precipitation is ample, and except for the recent drought, there is usually no pronounced dry season.

With this vast array of renewable resources, Kentucky's natural resource management policies, or lack of them, generally revolve around a single nonrenewable resource---coal. The state has approximately 34.2 billion tons of coal underlying the soil in the eastern and western provinces. In addition, the state has deposits of gas and oil which are also commercially extracted.

Loss of Prime Farmland: Soil erosion and resulting sedimentation is the most important overall problem with Kentucky's land base loss. Additionally much of the better farmland is developed for other uses, forever destroying its productive capacity. Even though cropland and pastureland have contributed over 60% of Kentucky's total erosion, other land disturbing activities can have a more significant impact over a shorter period of time. Extensive coal mining can contribute quickly to soil loss, as can road building and construction. A total of 141 million tons of soil are lost from Kentucky's croplands annually. The 62% of this agricultural soil erosion often carries fertilizers, pesticides, or herbicides, adding to the decrease in water quality.

Water Management Needs: Just as the productive quality of the land is dependent on its wise stewardship, the quality of water depends on its management and use. The lack of a statewide natural resource policy has resulted in a series of conflicting, and often competing, state water programs which favored the larger, metropolitan areas of the state. Since industrial development is based on a viable support structure, local water and sewer projects are critical. Current policies favor the urban areas, leaving rural communities to fend for themselves.

Lack of clear state guidance on water programs enabled federal programs to partially fill the policy vacuum. The federal Clean Water Act and Safe Drinking Water Act were aimed at addressing problems in high population areas---funding large municipal wastewater treatment systems and technical assistance and monitoring of large drinking water plants. The most obvious pro-urban bias was the lack of any federal or state program to address groundwater, the source of drinking water for 95% of all rural Americans.

Examples of the policy deficit abound. Up until July, 1984, Kentucky had received over $550 million in federal dollars for cities to build and maintain wastewater treatment plans. Because of plans to phase out the

federal money, many rural Appalachian communities will never see the first federal dollar for plants. Yet they will be required to comply with state and federal laws for wastewater discharges. As of this date, the State of Kentucky has no plans to address this problem---for urban or rural Appalachia. Drinking water projects are critical to community health and growth. Small drinking water systems in eastern Kentucky often rely on surface streams, poorly protected springs, or even untreated groundwater. Microbial contamination continues to be a problem because contaminated drinking water systems can rapidly spread disease.

Acid mine drainage continues to be a major contributor to poor stream quality in eastern Kentucky's Appalachian area. In a study of stream segments by the Kentucky Natural Preserves Commission, 30 were degraded or severely degraded. Some streams were totally devoid of aquatic life. Most streams classified as degraded are impacted by surface and underground mining, although in some cases, agriculture, stream channelization, and oil and gas operations were significant impacts.

Coal Development and Land Ownership: Because of the extensive and varied natural resources, and the lack of efficiency with which these resources were developed, the state was, for many years, compared to the developing and colonial countries. The nonrenewable natural resources were extracted and exported by the local population, with little return for the sacrifice. A U.S. government-sponsored study, in 1981, of land ownership in Appalachia, confirmed the analogy to a colonized nation. The report demonstrated that 80% of the mineral hectares and 75% of the surface hectares, in the 80-county study, are owned by absentee landlords. Not only is the land and mineral base highly concentrated, but of the top 50 private owners, 46 are corporations.

The conclusions presented by the researchers supported a call for land reform.

1. The greater the concentration of land and mineral wealth in the hands of a few, the greater the degree of absentee ownership, the less money generated by the coal production remains in the counties giving up their resource wealth.
2. That little land is owned by, or accessible to, local people.
3. That because of the above, many problems plague Appalachia: inadequate local tax revenues and services, an absence of economic development and diversified job opportunities, losses of agricultural lands, insufficient housing, a lack of locally controlled capital, and a rate of out-migration proportionate both to corporate ownership and to concentration of land and mineral wealth in the hands of a few.

Waste Management Systems: Proper solid waste management systems are essential to community growth and development. Any community growth results in an increase in the amount of solid waste generated, thus expanding the current waste management method. Statewide, Kentucky generates over 4.6 million tons of solid waste annually. This waste must be stored, collected, and disposed of properly to protect public health and the environment and to minimize the economic and social costs associated with indiscriminate dumping. Only two-thirds of Kentucky's citizens subscribed to a collection service in 1984, and 13% regularly disposed of waste (approximately 900 tons daily) illegally in open dumps or by open burning. Only 30 of Kentucky's 120 counties provide a systematic means of collecting waste in the rural areas where 51% of Kentucky's population lives.

Kentucky's ability to manage its waste is complicated by the fact that the volume of waste currently being generated is estimated to increase by 35%, or 1.2 million tons, by the year 2000. This increase is expected to occur largely in rural areas. The cost of constructing additional landfills to meet this need is estimated to be $35-40 million. Compounding this problem is the fact that within the next five years half of the existing landfills will be full and will need to be replaced. The siting of new landfills will be extremely difficult due to technical limitations (fractured aquifer formations in eastern Kentucky, steep terrain) and public opposition.

A key factor in the maintenance and expansion of waste collection systems will be economics. The cost of providing the simplest waste collection system can cost a rural county from $80-$200,000 per year. Collection systems in rural areas will increasingly use small (6-12 cubic yards) collection vehicle and convenience centers where individuals can bring their waste. A rule of thumb for an economically sized landfill is around 50 tons per day, capable of serving 25,000 people. Only 38 counties in Kentucky have a population this large.

Solid waste management will compete for scarce public dollars and will be particularly visible in smaller cities and Kentucky rural areas where growth is expected.

Industrial Waste Issues: And what about hazardous waste generation? Many communities, seeking to expand their industrial base, welcome the opportunity to

locate chemical industries, paint manufacturers, machinery and transportation equipment manufacturers in their area. Though these industries may be model corporate citizens, the location of such industries places demands on the community which many rural areas are ill-equipped to support. Among these are: proximity to hazardous waste transporters, treatment and disposal facilities; transportation systems sufficient to support transport of tanker trucks hauling both hazardous materials and waste products, and emergency and service personnel for accidents, malfunctions, and equipment failure.

The re-authorization of the federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, which sets out a regulatory program, again filled a policy vacuum by encouraging the siting of hazardous waste treatment facilities, such as incinerators, because the law placed a ban on land disposal of hazardous waste. This federal law, whether by default or design, again relegated to rural America the waste problems of urban success. And because of locational considerations, Appalachia is prime territory for the fallout of this strategy.

To summarize the effect of this law, RCRA essentially outlawed the land filling, or burial, of hazardous waste by developing strict landfill design criteria and banning a large volume of waste from land filling. This encouraged other waste management alternatives such as hazardous waste incinerators. The rural slant on this issue becomes apparent when one examines the air quality standards for obtaining a permit for such an incinerator. Locating a facility in an urban area would be challenging, since most urban areas have approached their attainment levels for a number of air contaminants and can permit few new facilities within their areas. In addition, local opposition has been and continues to be intense against such facilities in densely populated areas. Thus, the Appalachian region---given its proximity to Charleston, West Virginia's chemical complex, those at Greensboro, North Carolina, and other developed areas----can expect a number of hazardous waste incinerator siting attempts. The challenge here, as with all development strategies, is to determine if the facility is consistent with a region's plan for sustainable development.

And what if the development project was not sustainable? What if the industry dumped its wastes in ravines, vacant lots, and abandoned buildings? These too are development costs which must be considered.

The clean-up of uncontrolled and abandoned hazardous waste sites continues to require a substantial commitment of public monies. Up until 1984, the federal EPA had spend over $4 million dollars for the investigation and clean-up of abandoned hazardous waste sites in Kentucky. Many were in rural areas where landowners were unaware of the materials being dumped. The state of Kentucky had spent almost a half million dollars on these sites also. The total state and federal money required to clean up the sites known in Kentucky is estimated to be over $34 million.

Kentucky has incurred similar, though much more extensive, costs for the clean-up of abandoned coal mine sites. These areas, mined before the passage of Public Law 95-87, the Federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, are slowly being recovered and reclaimed at the cost of millions of dollars.

Deterioration of Capital Assets: The extent of natural resources in the Commonwealth of Kentucky is quickly tempered by a review of the current stresses placed upon them. The air, land and water of the Commonwealth of Kentucky are supporting a growing population of inhabitants. As the population increased from 74,000 in 1790 to over 3.7 million today, changes in the resource base have occurred. These stresses on the resource base have been addressed in a piecemeal fashion by local, state and federal agencies, with no comprehensive natural resource plan.

Most people consider these issues to be strictly environmental problems. They are not. These are fundamental economic problems which stress the limited natural resource base. Natural resources are part of the capital stock of every community in Kentucky and Appalachia. They should be managed as such and should serve as important magnets for real, sustainable development.

The costs of development---both the ongoing costs to enable jobs and education for people as well as the maintenance costs associated with unsustainable development---must be considered. Once a more holistic picture is available, clearer choices concerning development strategies can be discussed.

Investing for The Future: Exemplary State Programs

What are the political problems associated with a state or regional sustainable development program? In Kentucky, as with many Appalachian states, these are real and formidable and must be addressed by any entity hoping to advance the concept of sustainable development.

Lynton Caldwell, the principal author of the National Environmental Policy Act and a chief proponent of sustainable development programs, has outlined

two necessary conditions. These are: (1) a politically effective constituency for such a policy and, (2) people in decision-making positions in the local and state governments who have an incentive to favor long-range ecological sustainability over short-range considerations. These two conditions must be supported by a third underlying element. The community must support a value system which encourages people to act together, and act cooperatively, on their common behalf.

Anyone with frequent interaction with state and local leaders throughout the Appalachians might be quick to point out that these three conditions are not just rare, but nonexistent. Before the idea is dismissed too quickly, however, skeptics should examine those areas where entire state development policies have changed.

Although short-sighted politicians and apathetic constituencies have seemed the norm, a few resource-rich areas have grappled with the enormous challenge of investing in their natural resource assets.

Many areas have started with a "futures study" or growth strategy group. North Carolina, Georgia, Texas, Pennsylvania and even, recently, Kentucky have engaged in discussions about the long-term needs of the states. Similar patterns emerge in these growth policy studies. Texas, for example, cited three top investment needs for sustainable growth---water development, alternative energy resource development, and improved agricultural productivity.

As a result of this growing awareness, many states have begun to reexamine the role that resources currently play in the state economy and their potential for long-term growth. Most often, this discussion produces a higher level of attention to renewable resources, especially alternative energy sources, agricultural soils, timber, water, fisheries, and recreational resources.

Cases in point are Vermont, which acknowledged the enormous economic value of sport fishing and developed an economic program to raise and stock fish and purchase access to fishing and hunting areas. Pennsylvania is reexamining its management of timber to increase its economic value to the state, as is Maine. The governors of the northern Midwestern states are developing cooperative plans to protect and make greater economic use of the freshwater of the Great Lakes.

California pioneered the resource investment concept to ease the state through the transition from consumptive use of both nonrenewable resources (especially energy and renewable resources) to a greater reliance upon sustainable use of renewable resource assets. Although the program has had its problems, the state succeeded in accomplishing the following:

* It linked resource investment needs and long-term economic growth.
* It channeled a significant amount of state funds into a diversified array of resource investments, such as a Forest Resources Development Fund, a Renewable Resources Investment Fund, and an Energy and Resources Fund, which provided a portion of the state's oil and gas revenues, to be invested in programs to enhance fisheries, water quality protection, forests, and parkland.
* It generated both tangible and intangible economic benefits for residents, both current and future, throughout the state.

A special consideration for a resource-based development policy in Appalachia must be severance taxes. Although severance taxes have been around for years, the management of the tax base has in recent times become linked to the overall community development plan for a region. States with a severance tax have two advantages. First they can, and do, channel portions of the severance fund revenues to enhance the productive capacity of other natural resources in the region. Montana, for example, uses some for alternative energy research, park acquisitions and cultural preservation, renewable resource development, water resource projects, county planning, and soil conservation projects. Another advantage states can realize is the establishment of a permanent trust fund with investments into enterprises supporting a variety of human and resource development initiatives---from education and training institutes to more traditional uses.

Short-Term Investment: Since most economic development strategies are short-term oriented, the role of sustaining natural resource management should not be overlooked. During the 1970s, some key natural resources increased in cost and became less available. This activity produced many new industries---renewable energy, resource conservation technology, waste recycling, and new approaches to agriculture and forestry. The potential for expansion in these areas is large, but there are often major barriers. States and local development officials can reduce these barriers by addressing the unavailability of capital to small businesses, assisting with the vast legal and accounting documentation, and targeting investments.

Vermont, Georgia, and Minnesota have each targeted state monies to the commercialization of wood energy by a variety of methods. Financing wood-waste

pelletization plants and funding pilot projects to heat state buildings and institutions are some of the activities.

Strategies for Sustainable Development through A Natural Resource-Based Development Policy

Whether undertaken at a local, regional, or state level, economic development policies in Appalachia can and should be revised to consider a broader, sustainable approach. The region's rich natural resources---forests, water, fisheries, and mineral deposits---perform a dual role in the creation of advantages for the region. Rather than replicating California's Silicon Valley of high-tech or Michigan's auto manufacturing regions, the region should outline a process of strategic planning at a number of levels.

In recent years there has been a dramatic increase in state and local (both county and regional) economic development programs. The concept of sustainable development should be discussed with the key decision makers in these programs as part of both a political process and an educational process.

Several principles outlined for international development programs should be made a part of development programs, at any county or regional level, both governmental and non-governmental. These are:

1. ***Attending to basics:*** Attention to the basics means decentralizing as much of the program planning as possible, involving a variety of community organizations, and changing priorities to emphasize the least-cost options and basic services for all. A number of the critical components for development simply have not been addressed, often because those affected have not had power or a voice in the process. These include attention to low-cost health and family planning, safe drinking water, and opportunities for small credit programs. Initial small sums of capital, infused into the economy, should be encouraged as part of an overall development process.

2. ***Management of shared resources:*** A sustainable development strategy addresses the management of renewable resources---groundwater, forests, etc.---for the common good of the entire community. Through this strategy, free and unlimited access to the resource, such as industrial withdrawal of groundwater, would require permits with specific limits and alternatives.

3. ***Proper resource pricing:*** Scarce resources are treated truly as scarce, not free. The best demonstration of this principle has been the aftermath of the OPEC oil producers, who combined to restrict output and raise prices. In the U.S., total energy consumption fell by 2% between 1972 and 1983, even though the GNP rose by more than 30%. Using this principle, the cost of water would rise dramatically. A large body of research shows that each 10% rise in the price of water generates about 6% savings in water use.

4. ***Designing for efficiency, not magnitude:*** Like natural systems of production and consumption, society must demand engineering designs which are developed for total resource recovery. The changes that have come about in industrial recycling are a good example. Since the national restrictions on disposal of waste have grown, process improvements in the U.S. have saved industries millions of dollars.

5. ***Building management capacity:*** Much can be gained by providing information, technical personnel, legal and administrative mechanisms in place to help local communities plan and guide resource use. Instead of centralized, overly bureaucratic processes, partnerships between the public sector, schools and universities, and community organizations should be established. State and local government officials should be encouraged to make the greatest use of the variety of natural-resource, health, and planning professionals available to the community.

Summary

Using the basic tenets and principles of sustainable development, an appeal should be made to state and local governments throughout the Appalachian region to redefine the development strategy for a concept of resource-based growth. The key part of any strategic planning effort is examining the current role of resource-based economic sectors and their potential for contributing to overall economic development. The process should develop a Strategic Plan for Sustainable Development in Appalachia---maximizing our sustainable resource yield and increasing reliance on renewable resources. The possibility of assuring sustainable development for the region is not subject to quick fixes and industrial relocations. It is a concept, however, that should be placed on the agenda for discussion with every elected state and local official who promises "economic development" in the region's future.

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THE ECONOMY OF APPALACHIA IN THE NATIONAL CONTEXT

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** All views, opinions, and projections in this paper are those of the author only and not of the Appalachian Regional Commission.*

A. National Patterns

During the last six years there have been profound and rapid changes in the national economy. From 1980 to 1985 the nation's population increased by twelve million people, a growth of 5.4% in five years. From 1980 to mid 1986 national employment increased by 9.7 million jobs, an increase of 9.8%. Moderate economic forecasts for the nation as a whole by the Bureau of Labor Statistics project an increase of 14.5 million jobs between now and the year 1995. This is a remarkable performance for the United States by any standard. The ability of the national economy to continue to create jobs has been, and is projected to be, strong and healthy.

While growth in the aggregate has been high, there have been wide disparities in employment growth, as well as overall economic performance, among the nation's regions. A recent study of the nation's counties by ARC staff showed most of the recent growth in economic performance has been concentrated on the East Coast, the West Coast, and in scattered metropolitan areas and recreational and retirement communities. Comparing the economic performance of the nation's counties in 1970 with the current situation showed a definite reversal of the demographic and economic trends in the 1970s which had favored rural areas (for the first time in 70 years) over urban and metropolitan areas. Recent growth has been more concentrated in counties that are metropolitan but not encompassing the central cities as well as rural counties adjacent to the metro-counties with an accelerating urbanization trend.

In addition to the above, there are the following patterns:

* The much-discussed sunbelt/frostbelt dichotomy is too simple to explain current regional patterns. There appear to be two types of sunbelts. One type is a broad geographic area showing an economically depressed sunbelt extending from Texas in the west to Alabama in the east, and from Louisiana in the south to Kentucky in the north. Here the decline in economic performance is primarily due to decline in agricultural product prices, decline in oil and gas prices, decline in coal prices, and decline in the level of activities in manufacturing such as petrochemicals, leather goods, apparel, wood products, and fabricated metals.

* The second type of sunbelt, which is a prospering area, includes Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, middle and east Tennessee, North Carolina, and parts of Virginia. Here, growth is associated with expansion in construction, manufacturing, trade, banking and finance, and all types of businesses and personal services.

* Another way of looking at the sunbelt is by separating the rural counties from the metropolitan counties. An extensive study by the Southern Growth Policies Board in 1985 showed marked differences in growth and profound discrepancies in economic performance between metropolitan areas and counties adjacent to metropolitan areas on the one hand, and rural or non-metropolitan counties on the other hand. Most of the economic decline was in the rural counties, and was related not only to a decline in agricultural employment but also due to a decline in manufacturing employment in those rural counties.

* There are at least two frostbelts: the prosperous areas from Boston southward to Washington, D.C., have been experiencing high economic performance recently. On the other hand, the old industrial heartland, stretching from Pennsylvania west to Michigan and Wisconsin has been performing weakly. Thus, there are both better performing and poorer performing counties in the South and in the North.

* It is evident that the benefits of the recovery and prosperity in the United States are not being enjoyed to the same extent in all areas of the country. Some regions are clearly endowed with a higher number of better performing counties than are other regions.

* In each region of the country, the metropolitan

areas are outperforming the rural areas. The decade of the seventies saw a short-lived surge in growth in rural counties and small towns, which was a reversal of the farm-to-city movement that started at the beginning of the century. By 1980 the trend reversed and outmigration from rural areas was again the norm.

* The regions lagging behind can be identified as a "wedge" stretching from New York state down a straight line to New Orleans, Louisiana, and up in a northwest direction to Montana. That wedge contains more than 20 states and most of Appalachia. Within that wedge, however, there were many prospering counties, especially those SMSA (Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area) counties surrounding a central city.

* The effect of the decline in manufacturing employment in the United States is markedly evident. Areas that depend on traditional manufacturing have been shaken by the dwindling relative role of manufacturing as an employer in the U.S. economy. Those areas, including parts of Appalachia, that are still heavily dependent on basic industries, shoes, and wood products as a source of manufacturing growth are also experiencing difficulties.

B. Profile of the Appalachian Economy

1. Population: Table 1 (see page 18) shows the 1980 and 1985 population of the United States, the Appalachian region, and the Appalachian state parts. While the nation gained 12.2 million people (5.4%) between 1980 and 1985, the region gained only 349,000 people (1.7% growth) for the same period.

The table shows eight Appalachian state parts gained population and five states lost population during the 1980-1985 period. Appalachian Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina and Tennessee gained population varying from a growth rate of 16.1% for Appalachian Georgia to 1.0% in Appalachian Ohio. Appalachian North Carolina and Georgia grew faster than the United States as a whole.

Five Appalachian state parts lost population during this period, Appalachian Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia and the State of West Virginia. The highest rate of population decline was in Appalachian Pennsylvania.

2. Employment: Table 2 (see page 19) shows the total employment change profile from 1980 to 1986 of the region. While the nation gained 9.7 million jobs between 1980 and mid-1986, or a 9.8% increase, the region increased by only 182,000 jobs or 2.2% over the 1980 level. Only five Appalachian state parts gained employment during this period: Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Tennessee, with Appalachian Georgia gaining 19.1% from 1980 to 1986. Four states grew faster than the U.S. average, Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina and Tennessee.

The remaining eight Appalachian state parts had a net decline in employment, with Pennsylvania losing 75,000 jobs and West Virginia 61,000 jobs during this period. In relative terms, West Virginia declined in employment by 8.5%, followed by Appalachian Kentucky which declined by 7.1%.

Most of the losses in employment were in counties that specialize in coal mining, apparel, shoes, furniture and other wood products, chemicals, fabricated metals, machine tools, glass, transportation equipment, agricultural products, and certain textile products.

Most of the employment gains were in specialized manufacturing, construction and real estate in second home counties, high technology and space, retail trade, finance, and all types of health, educational, personal, and professional services which are predominantly near large cities.

3. Unemployment: Unemployment is presently a problem for a large part of the Appalachian region. Not only cyclical and seasonal unemployment hit the region hard in the early 1980s, but structural unemployment seems to be persistent in about a fifth of the region's counties, with unemployment rates exceeding twice the national average. On the other hand, there are counties in the region that are outperforming the nation in employment.

In May of 1986, 90 counties in the region had unemployment rates below the national average. These were distributed as follows:

Appalachian State Parts	*No. of Counties*
Alabama	3 (total 35)
Georgia	27 (total 35)
Kentucky	2 (total 49)
Maryland	1 (total 3)
Mississippi	0 (total 20)
New York	4 (total 14)
North Carolina	21 (total 29)
Ohio	1 (total 28)
Pennsylvania	10 (total 52)
South Carolina	3 (total 6)
Tennessee	8 (total 50)
Virginia	3 (total 21)
West Virginia	6 (total 55)

At the other end of the spectrum there were 176

Table 1
Population 1980 and 1985 and
Population Change - 1980 to 1985
U.S., Appalachia and Appalachian State Parts
(in thousands)

Areas	1980	1985	1980-1985 Difference	1980-1985 % Change
United States	226,550	238,739	12,189	5.4
Appalachian Region	20,239	20,588	344	1.7
Appalachian State Parts:				
Alabama	2,430	2,511	81	3.3
Georgia	1,104	1,282	178	16.1
Kentucky	1,077	1,102	25	2.3
Maryland	220	216	(4)	-1.8
Mississippi	483	496	13	2.7
New York	1,083	1,072	(11)	-1.0
North Carolina	1,218	1,286	68	5.6
Ohio	1,262	1,275	13	1.0
Pennsylvania	5,994	5,888	(106)	-1.8
South Carolina	793	832	39	4.9
Tennessee	2,074	2,142	68	3.3
Virginia	554	550	(4)	-0.7
West Virginia	1,950	1,936	(14)	-0.7

Table 2
Employment 1980 and 1986 and
Change from 1980 to 1986
U.S., Appalachia and Appalachian State Parts
(in thousands)

Areas	1980 Employment	1986 Employment Average	1980-1986 Difference	1980-1986 % Change
United States	98,569	108,233	9,664	9.8
Appalachian Region	8,155	8,337	182	2.2
Appalachian State Parts:				
Alabama	960	1,079	119	12.4
Georgia	498	593	95	19.1
Kentucky	381	354	(27)	-7.1
Maryland	89	86	(3)	-3.4
Mississippi	201	200	(1)	-0.5
New York	447	436	(11)	-2.5
North Carolina	552	611	59	10.7
Ohio	489	483	(6)	-1.2
Pennsylvania	2,417	2,342	(75)	-3.1
South Carolina	368	392	24	6.5
Tennessee	819	901	82	10.0
Virginia	220	207	(13)	-5.9
West Virginia	714	653	(61)	-8.5

counties with unemployment rates more than 150% of the national average (and 65 counties with rates more than twice the national average) distributed as follows:

Appalachian State Parts	*No. of Counties*
Alabama	16 (total 35)
Georgia	0 (total 35)
Kentucky	37 (total 49)
Maryland	0 (total 3)
Mississippi	14 (total 20)
New York	0 (total 14)
North Carolina	2 (total 29)
Ohio	22 (total 28)
Pennsylvania	18 (total 52)
South Carolina	0 (total 6)
Tennessee	22 (total 50)
Virginia	13 (total 21)
West Virginia	32 (total 55)

It should be emphasized, however, that persistent unemployment for the last five years has been in those counties located in Central Appalachia, the Ohio Valley, Appalachian Mississippi, and Appalachian Alabama as well as some industrial counties in Appalachian Ohio and Pennsylvania. Most of these counties are classified as rural nonfarm. The problem of persistent unemployment in most of these counties seems to be due to the slow recovery of many of the traditional industries in the region as well as a slow rate of development of new employment opportunities in the nationally emerging industries plus slower rates of growth in services and trade.

C. Employment Projections

1. Total Employment Projections in 1995: Taking the BLS moderate growth scenario of total employment for the nation to 1995 and extrapolating the region's total employment as a shifting share of that national figure results in a moderate total employment projection for the region of 9,078,000 jobs by 1995 or a net increase over mid 1986 of 741,000 jobs. This will be an increase of 8.9% in the next nine years, compared with the nationally projected increase of 13.4%.

The 1995 level of projected total employment and the net increase from 1986 to 1995 are given in Table 3 (see page 21).

As Table 3 shows, Appalachian Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina and Tennessee are expected to account for a net increase of 448,000 jobs or 60% of the total net growth in the next nine years. These four Appalachian state parts now account for 38% of the total employment in the region. These four Appalachian state parts are increasing their employment in manufacturing as well as services, trade and other growing sectors. These states are also urbanizing rapidly.

North and Central Appalachia are expected to slowly recover and increase in overall employment during the next nine years.

The three quarters of a million job net increase is expected to be distributed as shown in the attached map. The map reveals the following:

* 32 counties in the region will have a net increase in jobs exceeding 5,000 in the next nine years; all but one county are in SMSAs.
* 128 counties will have employment growth between 1,000 and 5,000 jobs. 55 of these are in SMSAs.
* 165 counties, mostly in Central Appalachia and Ohio will have no change in total employment or an increase of less than 500 jobs.

2. Projections by Sector: Table 4 (see page 22) shows employment projections by sector for the region as whole. The main features of the table are the following:

* The region is expected to lose 70,500 jobs in manufacturing; most of the losses will be in non-durable manufacturing.
* The region may gain 131,000 jobs in transportation, communications, and public utility sectors.
* The region may gain 275,000 jobs in the trade sector in 15 years from 1980 to 1995, with two-thirds of the total gain in retail and one-third in wholesale trade.
* The region may gain 148,000 jobs in the finance, insurance, and real estate sector.
* The largest gain may be in the service sector, particularly in health, personal, and professional services.

D. Implications of the Forecasts

The implications of the forecasts are that the region will follow the national trend of the shifts in population, employment, and industrial diversity, but lag slightly behind them. In addition, the movement of people and jobs to areas around the large SMSAs, those with access to the central cities and to all the services and amenities of urban living, will persist in the nation and the region. These forecasts take into account the profound forces affecting the nation's economy. One only has to look back to 20 years ago and compare the current Appalachian experience to realize how much the region has

Table 3
Employment Projections 1995 and
Change from 1986 to 1995
U.S., Appalachian Region, and Appalachian State Parts
(in thousands)

Areas	1980 Employment	1986 Employment Average	1980-1986 Difference	1980-1986 % Change	1995 Employment	1986-1995 Difference	1986-1995 % Change
United States	98,569	108,233	9,664	9.8	122,760	14,527	13.4
Appalachian Region	8,155	8,337	182	2.2	9,078	741	8.9
Appalachian State Parts:							
Alabama	960	1,079	119	12.4	1,230	151	14.0
Georgia	498	593	95	19.1	695	102	17.2
Kentucky	381	354	(27)	-7.1	366	12	1.0
Maryland	89	86	(3)	-3.4	91	5	5.8
Mississippi	201	200	(1)	-0.5	214	14	7.0
New York	447	436	(11)	-2.5	463	27	6.2
North Carolina	552	611	59	10.7	689	78	12.8
Ohio	489	483	(6)	-1.2	515	32	6.6
Pennsylvania	2,417	2,342	(75)	-3.1	2,479	137	5.8
South Carolina	368	392	24	6.5	431	39	9.9
Tennessee	819	901	82	10.0	1,018	117	13.0
Virginia	220	207	(13)	-5.9	213	6	2.9
West Virginia	714	653	(61)	-8.5	674	21	3.2

a Regional employment projections are based on national employment projections by the Bureau of Labor Statistics; moderate employment projections scenario.

Table 4
Employment by Sector
Appalachian Region
1980 and Projections to 1995

Sector	1980	Percent of Total	1995	Percent of Total	Change 1980-95
Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries and Mining	427,400	5.3%	363,400	4.0%	-67,900
Construction	490,400	6.1	472,500	5.2	-17,900
Manufacturing	2,335,500	29.1	2,289,600	25.2	-70,500
Durable	1,303,800	16.2	1,353,800	14.9	35,400
Nondurable	1,031,700	12.9	935,800	10.3	-105,900
Transportation, Communications and Public Utilities	569,500	7.1	708,700	7.8	131,500
Wholesale Trade	288,200	3.6	372,500	4.1	80,300
Retail Trade	1,214,600	15.1	1,426,500	15.7	196,500
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate	319,400	4.0	472,500	5.2	148,000
Services	2,049,200	25.6	2,607,682	28.7	530,300
Government	324,900	4.0	372,500	4.1	43,600
Total	8,019,100	100.0%	9,086,000	100.0%	968,900

1995 projections are based on a projected Regional unemployment rate of 7.5 percent and that Appalachia's share of national employment will be 6.91 percent.

advanced in its economic performance, economic diversification, and the reduction of the number of counties with high levels of poverty. But the Appalachian region is now facing new challenges.

In the last ten years we have seen the emergence of global competition in global markets as a result of: 1) high rates of economic growth in some countries, notably Japan and other southeast Asian countries;[1] 2) application of advanced technology, (a large part of it exported by the United States in the past) to new manufacturing, trade and services processes abroad;[2] and 3) new financing strategies. The results have been an increase in labor productivity of other nations as well as an enhancement of their competitive advantage.

A recent study by SRI (Stanford Research Institute) entitled *Investing in the Future* describes the driving technologies that are currently transforming the U.S. economy:

1. Information technologies such as microelectronics, computer hardware and software, and telecommunications;
2. Factory automation and office automation;
3. New materials;
4. Bio-technology; and
5. Health and medical technologies.

These technologies are creating new wealth, new job opportunities, and new entrepreneurial opportunities.[3] In addition, SRI highlights changes in consumer values and lifestyles. The consumer, they say, now demands a better and more durable specialized and customized product. Finally, SRI notes a restructuring of American companies that means that companies are continuously seeking optimum location for different types of operations. SRI stresses a new trend toward decentralization and "unbundling."

SRI outlines five key factors which "...appear to differentiate the attractiveness of regions to firms competing on an international level." These factors are:

1. Access to technology;
2. Skilled and adaptable labor force;
3. Adequate physical and social infrastructure;
4. Availability of capital;
5. An entrepreneurial climate.

For Appalachia to continue to develop it must be competitive in these five elements. It is my proposition that many parts of the Appalachian region are or can be competitive in all five. The question is not whether they are available; it is rather to what degree, how fast, and in what location. Most of the ARC investments in the region have been and presently are geared toward upgrading all these five elements.

The Appalachian region has 34 standard metropolitan areas within its boundaries and has over 50 around it. In addition to these, it also has numerous centers of technological advancement in its public and private laboratories, universities and colleges, and other related facilities.

The region has a large pool of labor. Granted, a portion of it is not trained for the new and emerging challenges, but it can adapt a large portion of it to the new tasks ahead through training and retraining. A most promising trend is that many Appalachian governors have been leaders in educational improvement, and they are fully aware that this is a matter of strategic economic importance.[4]

The region has a near-adequate physical infrastructure to capture and sustain new opportunities. The Appalachian corridor system alone, now two-thirds complete, has been a major factor in promoting jobs and access to jobs.

In recent years Commission programs have tried to help states and localities address the need for capital formation for business development. Commission studies have not found any barriers within the region that prevent it from attracting capital for worthwhile private investment.

The last factor, an entrepreneurial climate, is crucial because it is the one that puts all the four previous factors together to foster economic development. Several programs in Appalachian states have proven to be very successful in creating opportunities for entrepreneurs to emerge.

There is a critical role for the public sector involvement in the new emerging challenges for the Appalachian region, especially at the local and state levels. The private investments which are going to generate new job opportunities in Appalachia need a stable environment, adequate infrastructure, and a flexible labor market with commitments for investments in upgrading labor skills to meet the new challenges. The public sector, the states, and multi-county units have the power and opportunity to do that.

There are several possible futures for the Appalachian region. But since rapid change seems to be the constant factor, adaptation to change is certainly an important component of any new strategy for change. A most

significant factor is the quality of the labor force. Through proper education and training, the labor force can flexibly adapt to new technologies more rapidly than physical capital or physical infrastructure, which are slow to change. Thus, from the public perspective, any community's economic future will depend heavily on proper training for the emerging industries and services in the region wherever they may occur.

Notes

[1] Last issue of ***High Technology*** shows that Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, and Hong Kong have a net export balance of $38 billion with the United States.

[2] These four nations mentioned above are not only manufacturers of labor intensive goods but developers and exporters of high technology products such as new materials, micro chips, telecommunication equipment, and pharmaceuticals.

[3] AmeriTrust Corporation, "Investing in the Future: A Prospectus for Mid America", September 1986.

[4] ***High Technology***, issue of November 1986, states that South Korea in 1962 had a per capita gross national product of $80.00 and the World Bank regarded the county as a very poor prospect for investment. Today its per capita gross national product is $2,300, and with a growth rate of GNP of 7% annually, it may surpass Great Britain by the end of the century. This was primarily done as the article indicates by investment in human resources.

MYTHS AND REALITIES OF APPALACHIAN POVERTY: PUBLIC POLICY FOR GOOD PEOPLE SURROUNDED BY A BAD ECONOMY AND BAD POLITICS

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I am going to talk about the bad economy, bad politics and good people in Appalachia. The bad economy feeds the bad politics, and together they hold back people who could do much more for their region. In the 25 years since Harry Caudill wrote ***Night Comes to the Cumberlands***, we have tried to address the economic problems without facing the political problems, but you cannot achieve development on any scale this way.

Harry Caudill has fed an inaccurate and convenient stereotype by characterizing the Appalachian people as backward, ignorant, and lazy. In doing so, he has spread myths about Appalachia. But he has always faced the reality of corrupt local politics that characterize the region. His energetic efforts to improve the region have been based on a gut-level understanding of the way the bad economy and bad politics are tangled up together and prevent greater economic progress. He has always started from the premise that politics shaped everything else in the mountains. That is why his Southern Mountain Authority's first task was consolidation of the small counties that were political fiefdoms doling out jobs through patronage. That is why he proposed job creation through *federally* administered public works. Many of his ideas to improve the Cumberland Plateau were right on target in 1962, and, I will argue, are still right on target.

This conference is a chance for all of us concerned with conditions in Appalachia to take another critical look at Appalachia's land and economy, reassessing the issues Harry Caudill and others raised in the early 1960s. Although 25 years later we find ourselves considering the same issues---in an abstract or intellectual sense---I think we do so with a deeper understanding.

We understand better how to separate the myths about Appalachia from the reality, and we understand better how to come up with pragmatic strategies for regional development. People in the mountains know the limits of the coal economy, and they know the limits of branch plant attraction as a source of jobs for them. But there is a new, progressive spirit, several layers deep, in people who know the importance of education.

First, I am going to tell you briefly what MACED does and how we see our job as developers. Then, from the perspective of an economic developer, I am going to argue that an inaccurate depiction of mountain people as lazy and backward handicaps development efforts and gets everyone "off the scent" of the real problems. The real problems are a bad economy and the bad politics it has fed over the years.

I will describe what people living in the coal fields have told me over the last year about the way the coal economy affects their own livelihoods and their children's futures. You will agree that the Appalachians I describe are good, hard working people. But they endure more than a bad economy. I will describe what people tell me about the stultifying effect of bad local politics. Politics affects who gets what few jobs there are, and immobilizes efforts to improve education and other aspects of community life that are crucial to development.

Finally, given this combination of good people, bad economy, and bad politics, I will get back to why some of Harry Caudill's development ideas are still right for today, and why they may get a better hearing in the mountains now.

MACED's Conception of Development

Our concern at MACED is economic development. We think of economic development as fundamentally a process of redistribution. By this we mean redistribution of economic benefits and opportunities to the people left out by the natural flow of a market-driven economy. Notice that we say *people*, not *places*. What drives a small community economic development organization like ours is expanding economic opportunities for poor people. In Appalachia there are so many poor

people concentrated in one area that it is a poor place. But we do not see our job as developing every county or every hollow. Our job is to rechannel economic benefits and economic opportunities to the *people* who are left out.

Over the last 10 years we have tried a variety of strategies to rechannel the economic main stream---starting in 1975 with technical and financial assistance to small, locally-owned businesses and cooperatives, and later expanding to what we call *sectoral interventions* (trying to change the way particular important economic sectors affect low) income people, like timber, banking and credit, even coal). Work on coal and water has led to policy analysis. Over this last year, we have become involved in a drive to raise the educational climate in southern and eastern Kentucky. It is not just a cliche that expanding economic opportunities requires improving the quality of education and other public services; it is also true. We find, on a day-to-day basis, that a vital education system is the most critical element in development.

Needless to say, we do not have it all figured out. But we, like everyone else in this room, have learned a lot, just by being out there and trying to figure out how to make some tangible difference. The question is how to accomplish some actual *redistribution*, given the lack of consensus supporting that notion---or any notion---of development.

The evolution of our development strategy has flowed from our staff's changing understanding of what the obstacles are. Bill and I were laughing the other day because we realized that what we really thought was important about development now, after 11 years, could have been gleaned from two classics about the region that Gurney Norman gave us in 1975 when he helped us load the last box onto the U-Haul we were to drive from northern California to the coal fields. Gurney handed us two well-worn books to help us "get oriented:" John Campbell's ***Southern Highlander*** and Harry Caudill's ***Night Comes to the Cumberlands***.

Campbell recognized in the early 1900s that the mountaineers were the quintessential rural Americans---not ignorant, but *isolated* and in need of better institutional supports, like schools, to take control of their lives. From improved education, improved economic opportunities would follow. Harry Caudill, in his anguish about the ruinous exploitation he saw around him, characterized his fellow mountaineers as defeated---backward and ignorant. But he came up with some sensible ideas for improving the mountains that make even more sense in the late 1980s.

Ignorant, Amoral, and Lazy People?

Harry Caudill described a troubled regional economy that depended on coal, subsistence farming, and welfare. He saw coal as the region's curse, ruining both the land and the spirit of mountain people. According to Harry, "the more intelligent and ambitious people moved out," leaving a region filled with poorly educated people, disabled, unskilled, and unemployed, "subsisting on the generosity of the welfare state."

> ***The mountaineer has become depressingly defeatist in attitude. Company domination and paternalism and two decades of uninspired Welfarism have induced the belief that control of his destiny is in other hands (1964:392).***

Everywhere he looked, he saw exhaustion---"exhaustion of soil, exhaustion of men, exhaustion of hopes." He predicted that, unless the nation took heed, 80% of its inhabitants would one day be welfare recipients.

Harry Caudill's images of Appalachia swept across the nation in the early 1960s, shaping public perception of the region as backward and exploited. In the ***New York Times Book Review***, Harriet Arnow described his book as "the story of how this rich and beautiful land was changed into an ugly, poverty-ridden place of desolation, peopled mainly by the broken in spirit and body, the illiterate, the destitute and morally corroded." Like John Fetterman's ***Stinking Creek*** and Jack Weller's ***Yesterday's People***, ***Night Comes to the Cumberlands*** left the world with the idea that those who stayed in the mountains were lazy, broken people who no longer had the will or wherewithal to pull themselves out of poverty.

In 1964, Herman Lantz published an article in ***Blue-Collar World*** entitled "Resignation, Industrialization, and the Problem of Social Change: A Case History of a Coal-Mining Community." He argued that the problems of coal communities went much deeper than their economic impoverishment, that "apathy and hopelessness about change and making life different or better" plagued the area. Indeed, he saw resignation stifling economic potential, leaving a community "largely dependent on miners' pensions, Social Security, and public assistance." He cited Harry Caudill.

While people might acknowledge that a bad economy and ruthless coal operators had caused underdevelopment, they really believed that the problem *persisted* because the people had an inferior character. These biases thrived in urban areas to which Appalachians migrated, and local social problems were attributed to the "hillbillies." The reality, disclosed by studies of

who was in trouble, was that Appalachians were not disproportionately trouble-makers. But the stereotypes persisted.

These perceptions about mountaineers are alive and well today. In 1982, Ken Auletta wrote an article in the ***New Yorker*** on the underclass, and in it he described white Appalachian poverty as no different from that described by Fetterman in 1967: the "rural populace in the countless hollows have adopted the welfare rolls as a way of life." Kentucky poet and scholar Jim Wayne Miller recently reminded a conference of physicians that if there are any differences between Appalachians and other Americans, it is that they still might have rural values "of individualism and the importance of family in a traditional way."

But most observers do not have Jim Wayne Miller's insightful perspective. On October 28, 1986, the ***Wall Street Journal*** carried a front-page article describing the violent, immoral local politics of Clay County. The headlines included "Appalachian clan is prolific, accustomed to violence."

Unlike Harry Caudill, the reporter did not make the crucial connection between a bad economy and bad local politics. People outside of rural areas honestly do not recognize that a dearth of jobs in an undiversified economy makes public jobs---like in education and local government---valuable commodities that are assigned according to political loyalties rather than on the basis of merit.

Without this understanding of how scarce jobs are and how bad politics flourish when jobs are scarce, people attribute local political corruption to the particular *character* of Appalachian "clans." ***Wall Street Journal*** readers and ***New Yorker*** readers are going to continue to think of Appalachia's problems as problems of character, not economics. And these mistaken perceptions limit public commitment to enlarge economic opportunities for people in the region.

Those of us in this room know better. Since ***Night Comes to the Cumberlands***, we have all done a lot of thinking and writing about the region's poverty problems. Some have organized health clinics, others have worked with welfare recipients, and many have been the backbone of social and environmental movements to improve the mountains. Many of us have tried a variety of economic development projects and strategies, ranging from humble pig and garden coops of the first community development corporations to massive highway construction by the federal government.

In 1960, when Harry Caudill and Herman Lantz saw rampant welfarism, people living in Appalachia earned almost the same proportion of their total income as people outside the region---77%, compared to 79%. Today the difference is 65% in Appalachia, 66% outside Appalachia. Then and now there was a slightly higher dependence on government assistance in Appalachia, but not less dependence on work.

Those of us who have worked in the mountains know that the region's problems do not stem from character flaws. What we have here are economic problems.

We have seen the coal industry boom in the 1970s, drawing people willing to work in the mines back to the coal fields again. Coal executives have told us that no one in the world works like the American coal miner. Plant managers say the same thing about their workers in eastern Kentucky. We have seen the lines of people waiting at the door of a new plant offering minimum wage jobs to make greeting cards or overalls. There is no doubt in our minds that people want to work. The problem is finding work.

Hard Times Again

Once again, hard economic times plague the coal fields. Coal jobs are evaporating before people's eyes, and every mountain household and community feels the effect. Not just coal is bad, of course. Tobacco is bad, and rural manufacturing plants are laying people off, moving plants overseas or further south to capture still lower wages. Just since 1980, Kentucky as a whole has lost over 20,000 manufacturing jobs.

But coal is the life blood of Appalachia. And while coal production continues to climb slightly, and the largest companies start to report profitable quarters, coal employment continues to decline. Since more productive mining, not decreased demand, drives these reductions, they clearly represent structural changes in the coal industry, rather than one more bust in a boom/bust cycle.

Of course, boom and bust conditions have plagued the Appalachian coal fields for over a century. Sometimes people have stayed and just barely scraped by, and other times there has been massive outmigration. During the 1950s and 1960s, when mechanization in the coal mines brought dramatic reductions in coal employment, over a million people emigrated from Central Appalachia in search of work (Brown, 1972). Everyone I have interviewed has either personally worked outside the coal fields or has had a family member who left for Pontiac or Ford, and then returned.

The coal boom of the 1970s brought people back

home from northern cities to work in the mines. At first trailers were set up next to parents' homes; later homes were built. Times seemed good in the coal fields, even for young people. Kids getting out of school could work in the mines. But today there is no work.

Raymond Bradbury of Martin County Coal described the difference between the early 1970s and the present for us in an interview a year ago:

> *We are at the point of saturation in the mining industry in Martin County. The youngsters who were getting out of high school in the early 1970s have now been working for my company for ten years. They were the fortunate ones. The ones who graduated in the latter 1970s and early 1980s: the jobs (for them) aren't there now* (Seltzer and Duncan, eds., 1986).

Coal counties in Kentucky and West Virginia have among the highest unemployment rates in the nation. In 1980---before the coal downturn of 1982---almost one fourth of coal-field families had no one working, and over one third of coal-field teenagers were not working, looking for work nor studying in school. Appalachia's coal employment declined from a high of 188,000 in 1978 to 129,000 in 1984, a loss of 59,000 jobs in six years. Eastern Kentucky lost 10,000 jobs and West Virginia lost over 23,000. Fewer coal miners are mining more coal, and the trend is likely to continue.

> *This county has always thrived on coal and will continue to depend on whatever coal there is..... Used to be we had plenty of coal and plenty of coal mines. You couldn't hardly sit on your porch here for the steam engines pulling coal. The future is bleak because the coal is down.....*

Independent coal operators are cutting back, laying people off, ending health plans, and seriously considering closing up shop and moving to a city:

> *A friend of mine is just barely making it now. He is a real good person.....he's had a real hard time making it now. It has wore him down. I've been praying for him. He's got dirty coal---he's in the same coal we're in---and it is a depressed market. Where can he go? Lexington? What can he do? Maybe his wife can get a job as a nurse, he could do odd plumbing jobs.....*

Unemployed miners have especially hard times:

> *You go talk to somebody in the office and they tell you they ain't hiring none. They ask you how old you are and you tell them. And they say "Check back with us in a week or two." And you do, and they tell you the same old thing again.*

Nobody expects their children to be able to stay in the coal fields and find work. The question is whether the parents can stay, and what the children need to make it outside the mountains:

> *I need to get my kids out of here. If I can, I'm going to. Because I figure at the rate it's going it's going to be a ghost town in 10 years. Hell, it's already dried up. There is a dark cloud hanging over this county..... I want to move closer to the interstate, where there is a lot of factory type work, and maybe get into business down that way.*

Most people want to stay in the mountains, if they can only find work. People say "It's home" or "It's where I'm from." One businessman said:

> *It's a paradox. Nobody wants to leave here, but damn it, we can't get anybody to do anything to improve the place..... I guess it's just home, and all those emotional things tied to home come into play..... I know everybody here and their brother. I know the area. Just the familiarity with the people and the place.*

Over and over people told us these things about living in the mountains, even as they deplored the quality of schools, the garbage problem, the way everything depends on who is on whose side. And everyone we talked with said local political problems are exacerbated by the lack of work.

Politics and Jobs, Jobs and Politics

Jobs are scarce in the mountains, and the scarcity affects who gets both private and public jobs. One 40-year old unemployed coal miner told us how much things had changed over the last few years. He had worked in the mines 15 years before being laid off 3 years ago:

> *Eighteen, nineteen years ago---it was easy to get a job then. During the coal boom there was a lot of work available. You could just about take your pick.....Now, you know, people around here just can't buy a job. If you work for somebody, you're going to have to pay them.*

Others told us that all jobs go to friends and families of those doing the hiring:

> *If you're not tight with the people that own it, you're not going to get a job. The people that have the authority to hire will make sure that their*

friends or their families get the jobs because they know there are none anywhere else. I know if I had the authority, I'd hire my brother before I'd let him work in a 'scab mine'.

Independent coal operators, looking for coal reserves, figure their only chance to mine coal without being a subcontractor is if they "can marry into it." Most of those with whom I talked were already married, so they were not optimistic. A young woman described how politics permeates job giving and getting:

Politics are too involved in all the hiring up here. They need to get the politics out and get people in who would concentrate on the good of this place, not on 'who owes who what'.

For such a small place, there is a lot of politics going on. A lot of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours." There's a lot of people with a lot of pull, but you have to know which ones are on the same side.

Others distinguished between state and local jobs and federal jobs. Federal jobs are not subject to the political machinations that determine who works in poor rural counties:

I knew a lady that was trying to get a job at the food stamp office, and they told her she had to go to the Democratic party chairman and to another political figure to get letters. She had to switch her politics, to have a chance at the job. In a federal job---like social security---I don't think it has anything to do with politics. The social security office has a new supervisor who is black and from out of state, and that never would have happened in state politics.

A disabled coal miner told us that "anymore, even the odd jobs are hard to find." But "odd jobs" are all that a lot of people have. Unemployed miners who were accustomed to making $12 to $14 an hour just a year ago are now working as custodians, messengers, shade tree mechanics, drivers, carpenters. Wives are selling Avon, taking care of other people's kids, hoping to get work in a store through connections. Any one who has work feels fortunate to have that opportunity. This scarcity translates directly into exacerbated corrupt local politics that puts a brake on progress.

Twenty-five years ago Harry Caudill described the way schools were bogged down in politics:

.....school politicians....fortify themselves with massive dispensations. As a rule the school clique is interwoven with the courthouse political machine..... These powerful allies are thus so well-financed and entrenched that they are extremely difficult to overturn and their foremost objective is political perpetuation (1962:336-70).

He described how state and national politicians depended on the votes local school and other government officials could deliver.

Parents MACED interviewed about education problems figured the biggest problem facing their communities was corruption in the schools:

.....the biggest problem you get into with the school board is the fact that they control more jobs and more people and more people's lives than any other thing in this county. They have the employees, and anytime you have that type of situation in a low economic area, you have a beautiful setup for bribery, corruption, and political power plays. And that is what happens in eastern Kentucky.

Word is that a school board seat in eastern Kentucky costs $100,000. You hear that figure often. I asked a knowledgeable community leader why it would be worth that much, and he said "Why, to have power over jobs"---not just in the schools but throughout the county. He had been offered $20,000 recently to deliver a certain community. He refused this time, but he told us how he would have done it, based on how he handled a governor's race in 1959:

The way I work is I pick the families, and I'll get 30 people working for me over there. So I've got 30 people working for, say $40 a piece. They're all working for the same thing. They all have families. You get them out of big families, you know. I had families I relied on, whom I had taught how to do this.

He went on to describe in great detail how he picked the families, covered both sides of the families, and built a little movement of votes for his candidate.

Buying elections not only fills local institutions with corruption that puts loyalties over school quality. It also absorbs the energy of those in the system who would prefer to work on the content of their job. Teachers told us that even the well-meaning school administrators had to devote all their energy to surviving, and had none left for educational leadership. People say they cannot come in "and relax, and pay attention" to their jobs. They have to be alert to how the political winds blow, how they are changing, who's in and who's out.

In 1962, Caudill described outmigrants with high school degrees that were "officially" deemed useless by factories in California, and who proceeded to fail the tests given by the factories, proving they were right. Several weeks ago a businessman told me, with alarm and regret, that he had young adults---20, 21, 22 year olds---come in to his business who "can't even write their names." "It's ridiculous," he said. But the "totally ridiculous" part is that "these kids have graduated from high school!" He said it came from the "past history of the county schools":

It speaks for itself. Hell. Nobody has to tell any lies on that subject. It's right here.

Many people had examples of how their own education, or that of family members, had been inferior when they had to measure up outside their own communities.

Besides low educational quality in the present, this corruption also prevents those who want change from getting involved. One businesswomen told us, "nice people don't get involved in education." Education is regarded as dirty and corrupt, and best left to politicians. Time and time again, people described the local politics as an iron grip, a big wheel that turns and turns, a pall lying over the community that you can't escape. They don't like it, but they don't see a way out either.

Despite this gloomy assessment, we find that people of all walks of life value education. They know it is the most important issue in their depressed communities, and, as parents, they want the best for their kids.

People want change, they want improvement.....I think they are just hindered in getting to those points by this political mess. It seems to be clouding the atmosphere in which we live and work.

Business and professional people are not just concerned about their own kids---there's an urgency because they hire these people. They don't want a bunch of yo-yos working for them.....

People of all income levels value education for their children and see it as their only hope. They are proud when their children do well in school, and they go to a lot of trouble to be sure their own kids get the dedicated teacher, the special class for the gifted or the dyslexic, or other special opportunities.

A laid off coal miner and his wife, neither of whom had finished high school, told us proudly how their son would read with a flashlight in bed at night. The father hopes both their boys will become school teachers, and the mother told us how they have been chosen to compete on quiz teams and in reading contests.

A young woman on welfare described her father's pride in her when she returned to school to get extra training for a good job:

My father hates the idea that I draw a welfare check, period. And when I decided to go to school, he would come and pick me up early in the morning, and he would have a smile on his face the whole time we was going. He's the quiet type; he doesn't talk a lot at all. He just smiles. And when he'd see me getting discouraged or something---'cause you do---he would say, "Oh, hang in there, honey. You can do it. He's real proud, he is.

People seek out special opportunities for their children, sometimes aggressively. Both middle class, educated parents and low-income parents told us at great length of their struggles to get their handicapped children into the special programs they need. One mother told us she had stayed at home, not even driving a car, getting out only to go to the store a couple of times a month, until her son started school and had trouble learning. Then:

I went through pure hell trying to get my child into a program where he could learn something. Well, that's been four years, and I'm still not there yet. I've got him in a program where he's learning something, but it's private, it's not public. I searched and I searched and I called and I wrote and I went everywhere in the world.

People with high achievers are equally aggressive about getting their children special assistance. A laid off coal miner told us of the interest he takes in his daughters' education:

I stretch them. I push them to do a lot more than what the classroom wants them to do. I've got two kids that's probably going to go to college if there's any way I can possibly get them there. My youngest daughter is real, real intelligent. And she's a bit lazy but, you know, I push her. And I've had her in every special, you know, advanced class I can get her into to stimulate her mind and make her keep working. But as far as anything else goes, that's about all I can do, you know, besides in the summertime, make her read some books through the summer. Because reading is probably the key to all education; if you can't read you can't do anything.

Education and other community public goods matter not just for the place, and its attempt to secure a

future, but for those *people* who should be the real beneficiaries of the economy in general and development efforts in particular.

Wanted: Good Policy

It is 1986, and the government is retrenching. More and more social and economic responsibilities are being thrust upon state governments. We need to be pragmatic now---massive federal programs were not enough before, and they are diminishing as we speak. Even if coal expands, we know it does not solve the region's employment problems. Plant competition is stiff, and the big fish that governors catch like to go to the most desirable communities in the state. Places that are pretty well developed already.

But this does not mean we give up.

There are things we could do tomorrow that would make a big difference to people in the mountains---the "old poor," or people who have been left out of the stream all long, as well as the "new poor," the people who have just been tossed out of the stream and are flipping around on the banks.

A good state government would do things like:

1. Actually improve education. (We know what this means. Other states have made great strides. We need educational leadership, and we need it yesterday. I know you all will vote *yes* on Amendment I.)
2. Provide financial and other assistance to those who want to go back to school or get new training and those who want leave isolated places for growing areas of the state. Kind of a family scholarship.
3. Provide real help to local civic leaders in the "natural" growth centers like the London/Corbin area to develop their facilities, and to provide good linkages to surrounding areas.
4. Work with those more isolated areas that want to develop better tourism facilities.

But ideas like these would work best if local politics were cleaned up. Otherwise, every effort is like swimming against the tide. The first step toward achieving this is to consolidate counties. Anyone who has tried to work to improve Kentucky by working with local governments tells you that a primary obstacle to getting things done efficiently and effectively is the plethora of small counties, each with its own judge and magistrates and political battles. Which gets us back to Harry's ideas in the early 1960s.

With the TVA as a model, he proposed the establishment of a Southern Mountain Authority which would modernize the people, institutions, and economy of the Cumberland Plateau. First, he would have it consolidate counties to make local government more efficient and less politically corrupt. Second, he would have it "resettle" much of the population, facilitating both the provision of services and jobs. Third, he would build this resettlement around sensible land stewardship. Finally, he would have the Authority expand and improve education.

Wise civic leaders and state policy makers who care about the future of the people in the mountains should do just what Harry suggested 25 years ago: consolidate counties, assist "resettlement" or outmigration, and improve education. Really improve it. The time is right. The people are ready. We need bold leadership to carry it forward.

And, importantly, I think they might find more resonance today than they did in 1962. As one businessman told me,

> *Sure, there is a status quo---people that wouldn't change things around here for anything.....But now young people are getting into key management positions. We will be making the decisions, and we* are going to determine whether the quo remains status, or whether something is done.

Facing Reality, But Debunking the Myths

Our explanations for poverty directly shape our policy to alleviate it, whether we are talking about poverty in the Chicago ghetto or the coal fields of Appalachia. Today there is a renewed national debate about welfare, and we are once again debating whether poverty is primarily a problem of culture or a problem of inadequate economic opportunity. Journalists' accounts of how the poor live and make choices---like Charles Murray's ***Losing Ground***, Ken Auletta's ***The Underclass***, Nicholas Lemann's ***Origins of the Underclass***, Leon Dash's "Chronicles of Teenage Pregnancy"---have rekindled the notion that there is a distinct culture of poverty. This summer the ***New Republic*** ran a cover story entitled "The Work Ethic State: The Only Cure for the Culture of Poverty."

It is discouraging to see the same debates about poverty today that we had in 1960. Then, as now, we mix up myths and realities. It is discouraging to see the ***Wall Street Journal*** telling the nation that Appalachia is

violent and corrupt, and leave it at that. Blame the character of the Appalachian people again, and leave it at that.

Clearly there is a problem of politics in the mountains. We should face that reality and deal with it straight on. Actually the problem is found in most isolated rural places. People working in the Mississippi Delta tell you the same stories. We found people complaining about local political problems in non-coal and non-Appalachian counties when we were talking to people about education. I think it is a rural phenomenon, caused and fed by limited economic opportunities over a long period of time.

The other reality is that people want to work. Kids need work. Let's, as a state and a nation, consider public employment again. Let's look at a youth service corps, that mixes together kids from all sorts of places and backgrounds, broadens horizons, builds personal expectations and public commitment. But people who care about rural development and Appalachian development need to work on the political at the same time that we work on the economic. In Kentucky, let's consolidate some counties as a start!

THE RURAL/FARM CRISIS IN KENTUCKY APPALACHIA

Ben Poage
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The National Problem

An inscription on the United States Department of Agriculture building in Washington, D.C. says:

> *It is the hard-working farmer who ought to have the first share of the crops.*
>
> Second Timothy 2:6
> (RSV)

The pure justice of this statement combined with the irony of its location set the illogical parameters of the crisis in which rural communities and family farmers find themselves trapped today. The American dream of justice is etched unnoticed on a building occupied by an administration whose leader asserts that "farm foreclosures and bankruptcy are a part of the solution" to the rural crisis. The urban industrial revolution has arrived in rural America. Big, technologically sophisticated, and heavily capitalized farming is in. The small and middle-sized family farm, along with the rural community it symbiotically relates with, are out. Since 1980, high interest rates, the growing strength of the dollar, and government programs that increasingly favor the large producer have combined with a cyclically bad weather pattern to forge the toughest economic conditions in rural America since the Great Depression. Nationally, farm families and community-based businesses face land values declining more than 50% from pre-1980 appraisals. Debt service loads grow, even to where the interest exceeds net income. The value of crops consistently fails to meet the costs of production. If this trend continues, over 80% of currently existing farms will be gone by the year 2000 and almost all Black-owned family farms will be gone by 1990. If this loss cannot be stopped, over $500 billion in land, machinery, farm buildings, and livestock will pass from the hands of working farm families into the hands of corporations, banks, other lenders, and wealthy individuals, making the "landed elite" in our country richer than any feudal lords the world has ever known---a far cry from the premise our country was founded upon where land and labor always preceded capital, and the right to own land was as sacred as the right to free speech.[1]

Food and the Economy: Since the late 1970s the nation has been jolted by newscasts and headlines documenting the economic squeeze that is forcing thousands of farm families off the land; by stories of angry farmers stopping the forced sale of machinery and land through organized protests; by a massive government payment-in-kind (PIK) program that paid off handsomely to large landholders, but did little to stop farm losses.

The PIK Program was the last gasp of a very sick Federal Farm Policy, a policy which has not responded to the half-hearted attempt at resuscitation in the 1985 Farm Bill legislation, a policy which has allowed major marketing corporations to make a huge profit from cheap food stuffs, but has not allowed the commercial family farm operator to cover even costs of production.

In 1973, a loaf of bread cost the consumer 27¢, and the farmer got 4¢ of that cost; in 1986, the farmer still gets 4¢ per loaf, but the consumer pays $1.00.[2] *Low farm prices do not mean cheap food.* In the last 10 years, food prices have increased more than twice as fast as farm prices, while the costs of farming over the same period have gone up 102%.[3]

> In dollar terms (using 1984 prices and costs as an example), this means that corn that costs a highly efficient farmer $3.30 per bushel to produce, is sold for only $2.55, and the best wheat farmers are getting only $3.50 per bushel when it cost them $5.00 to grow it. On an annual corn harvest of 8 billion bushels, this means that U.S. farmers will lose another $6 billion dollars this year (1984). Since each dollar of farm income is "multiplied" at least 3 times throughout our economy, this will mean a total loss (in 1984) from corn alone, in the range of $25 billion.[4]

Such "multiplied" and "massive" losses in the economy make the old saying, "Depressions are farm-led and farm-fed," take on a new meaning. The Food and Agri-

cultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) of the University of Missouri and Iowa State University, has linked a ***Farm Journal*** survey (FAPRI farm income projections to farm loan losses) and the Wharton Econometric Model of the U.S. Economy, to project the following:

> *If current farm income conditions prevail, and no financial assistance measures are initiated, or financial programs are offered, but commodity support programs are eliminated (as the Free Market emphasis of the 1985 Farm Bill intends), the loan losses could rise sharply to $20 to $25 billion. (Comment in parentheses added by author.)*
>
> *Loan losses of $20 to $25 billion are expected to increase short-term interest rates by 75 to 125 basis points, reduce national employment by 175,000 to 275,000 jobs, reduce total GNP by $30 to $50 billion over eight years, and increase the federal debt by $14 to $21 billion by 1993.*[5]

Moreover, this crisis is not confined to the United States, but is being experienced in almost every country in the world, with devastating political, economic, and environmental impact. As Mark Ritchie, a founder of the North American Farm Alliance puts it:

> *.....low farm prices are forcing many farmers to extract every possible bushel of production from the soil to pay interest on their loans and to survive. Tremendous soil erosion and water pollution problems are resulting from the fence-row to fence-row farming. Worse still, this drive to increase production to "stay afloat" financially is the main cause of the tremendous problems we face in balancing supply and demand. Surpluses are being created as a result, which are then used as a rationale for further lowering prices, to be more competitive on the world market.*
>
> *.....But, the most serious threat to "eliminating world hunger" takes place among farmers in Third World countries who are caught in the middle of these price wars. There are numerous instances where cheap U.S. grain exports dumped on a country totally destroyed a thriving local farm economy, creating a long-term dependency on increasingly expensive food imports.*
>
> *It is a cruel irony that farmers in "industrialized" countries and farmers in the Third World are both seriously, perhaps fatally, damaged by low commodity prices. It will take serious government and citizen's effort to better understand these issues and to formulate cooperative strategies for solving these problems. Nothing could be more damaging to the worldwide efforts for peace and justice than a return to a feudal system of monopolized control over the land and our food-producing resources.*[6]

People and Community: In the last few years, the "farm crisis" has begun to take on the character of something much bigger and broader than an economic problem limited to the confines of the farmstead. Uncertainty about the future and the stress associated with the fight for survival has put family, neighbor, and community relationships on edge. Ripple effects of a faltering farm economy have been first felt in small town business and then in city factories that provide farm equipment and supplies; many rural banks teeter on the edge of collapse, and an increasing number have gone under. In many places across the America countryside, rural life is now characterized by the breakdown of relationships and the fracturing of community.

Moreover, the impact on rural families has often been severe. Financial stress takes its toll in strained and broken marriages; in spouse and child abuse; and in the misuse of alcohol and drugs. Grief and depression over threatened or impending loss of a farm or small business---over displacement from the land---is no longer uncommon and, in all too many cases, has led to suicide. Dr. Rex Campbell, rural Sociologist at the University of Missouri says, "The suicide rate for farmers is higher than for any other single occupation."

The tension within families, however, is often exceeded by the tension among families and individuals whose relationships have deteriorated and polarized as a result of the crisis. It is still not unusual to hear disparaging remarks and criticisms by government officials, lenders, other farmers, and even church leaders regarding those farmers in trouble, saying, in an apparent classic case of "blaming the victims," that they were simply "poor managers." They "over-extended" or "they shouldn't be in agriculture anyway." William and Judith Heffernan, Rural Sociologists at the University of Missouri, recently completed a study[7] indicating that families who had been forced out of farming did not regard their local churches or clergy as important sources of support.

> *.....when we asked families who had been forced from farming for financial reasons how much support they felt they received from their church, as well as several other groups in their community, they gave the lowest evaluation to their church. Forty-four percent felt their church not only did*

not offer them support, but in fact condemned them. Another 11% said their church offered them no support, but ignored them instead.[8]

Moreover, a kind of economic cannibalism is becoming rampant both in communities, as more financially stable farmers or non-farm investors buy out those going under, and as one state's agricultural economy becomes victimized by another. For example, an official of the West Virginia State Department of Agriculture expressed "great happiness" at the prospect of buying Iowa corn at less than $1.00 per bushel (1/3 of the cost of production), seeing it as a great windfall for the poultry industry in his state.[9] Non-farm investment in farm land is also growing at an alarming rate. An example of this form of economic cannibalism was illustrated in the October, 1986 issue of the ***Progressive Farmer***. It reports that; "According to U.S.D.A. non-farm buyers took 30% of the farms transferred last year. In the previous year, they took 24%. The article goes on to say, "The large number of foreclosures estimated at 20% or more, has enticed large investors. Merrill Lynch is reported to be thinking about an investment scheme that would sell shares in thousands of acres of foreclosed farmland."

Additionally, the crisis is creating a growing threat to the financial viability of rural local governments. According to a report by the U.S. Senate Sub-Committee on Intergovernmental Affairs, published in June, 1986, declining farm incomes and farm property values are eroding the local tax base, and at the same time, demands for publicly provided services are increasing, creating a squeeze between falling revenues and rising costs of government.

Under these circumstances, rural governments are forced both to cut services and to increase taxes, or else face large budget deficits. In either case, the strategies required to deal with this situation are likely to diminish the quality of life in rural America.

Past individual hurt, community fragmentation, and leader insensitivity, a long-range human and social cost of unprecedented proportions looms threateningly on the horizon; the wholesale return of tenant farming. Such an event flies in the face of every democratic principal our country was founded upon; it is tantamount to land reform in reverse. Over the last 50 years, our country has led the world in assuring that Third World peasants have the right of land ownership, but in this decade we have decided that land ownership is not at all important for our own farmers. A recent article in ***The Washington Post*** quotes a USDA staff report, The National Farmers Organization, and the Farm Bureau;

Some of those farmers who have to give up their land will return to it as renters, the government said. Since some farm operators will be unable to own the land they farm, the tenant farmer may re-emerge with an improved social and economic image from the low-income tenant farmer image of the 1930s.

It is unfortunate, but it's probably true that more of our individual owner-operators, the kind of farm family that's been the backbone of our agriculture for years, will lose their farms and be forced to become tenants or lose their livelihood," said Charles L. Frazier, a spokesman for the National Farmers Organization.

What has happened is the emergence of the idea that it's not feasible to own all the land that you farm," said Ross Korves, an economist with the American Farm Bureau. "There is no social stigma to renting land.[10]

It is especially uncomfortable to hear this "new company line" from a powerful lobby and trend setter like the Farm Bureau.

I asked him why he had to go away, why the land was so important. For it he would work the long, hot summer pounding steel; Mama would teach and run the farm; Big Mama, in her sixties, would work like a woman of 20 in the fields and keep the house, and the boys and I would wear the threadbare clothing washed to dishwater color: but always the taxes and the mortgage would be paid. Papa said one day I would understand.[11]

The Crisis in Kentucky

Nationally, the middle-sized or full-time family farm is the part of the farm sector being hardest hit by the crisis. In Kentucky it is the small farm. The top chart on the next page illustrates the Kentucky and the national experience.

Kentucky follows only North Carolina in numbers of family farmers and because of the politically insular nature of the tobacco program (72% of Kentucky's farmers depend on burley tobacco to provide at least 50% of their gross farm income), Kentucky has yet to experience the farm crisis, as midwest grain farmers have experienced it since 1980. Moreover, as Hal Hamilton, Coordinator of Kentucky's Community Farm Alliance indicates below, the causes for the approaching disaster in Kentucky "are materially different:"

Change in the Number of Farms, 1978-82



*Gross Annual Sales
Source: Census of Agriculture, 1978 and 1982

Kentucky Average Farm Income (per farm unit)
1980, 1984, and % CHANGE 1980-84

	1980	1984	% CHANGE
GROSS FARM INCOME	31,179	30,476	-2.3%
NET FARM INCOME	8,914	5,235	-41.4%

Source: USDA Economic Indicators of the Farm Sector

- *Speculative farm expansion was more restricted in the 1970s in the upper south. There is not quite the same degree of debt load borne by farmers.*
- *FmHA limited resource farm loans have been more accessible to small farmers in the upper south. Delinquency rates for these loans remain among the lowest in the nation, although even here, they approach 30%.*
- *Production is on smaller average farm units with less capitalization in the upper south. (Farms in Kentucky average 140 acres compared with over 400 acres nationally.) Operating loans have been accessible through independent local banks.*
- *Agricultural production has been more diverse in the upper south. Production patterns combine livestock, dairy, feed grains, and tobacco in ways that have limited fence-row to fence- row plowouts.*[12]

Hal goes on to say, however, "Despite all these differences with the midwest, the upper south burley belt now finds itself extremely vulnerable to foreseeable political, social, and economic forces. This is because the region's agricultural linchpin, the burley tobacco program, may suddenly be pulled. What tobacco farmers face is a loss of power over their own lives because the tobacco companies have internationalized. Tobacco farmers now face systemic injustice familiar to third world peoples long dependent upon multinational corporations.[13]

It therefore appears that Kentucky will soon join the nation in moving rapidly toward a two-tiered structure of agriculture where American agriculture will be dominated by huge corporate farms managed from afar, monopolized food production will increase consumer food

prices, and small town American will either become gentrified bedroom communities for urban centers or wither away.

In spite of tobacco program protection, Kentucky farmers are feeling serious effects from the cost price squeeze. The second chart (on the previous page) illustrates a serious loss in net farm income from 1980 to 1984. Moreover, when the *% of change* between 1980 and 1984 in realized net income per county is measured, the loss in the *cash* position from the farm business is even greater than net farm income loss. (Net farm income includes the value of inventory changes). The map and chart following the endnotes illustrate a 47% loss for the state and an identical loss for the Appalachian counties.[14] (see pages 44 - 46).

This severe reduction in income combined with lowering land values has put an increasing number of farms out of business statewide, more than 1,000 farms were lost last year.

In 1985 the Federal Land Bank Association (FLBA) and the Production Credit Association (PCA) foreclosed on 238 farms as compared with 89 in 1981. Moreover, FLBA, PCA and the Farmer's Home Administration (FmHA) had 273 combined bankruptcies in 1985 as compared with 94 in 1981. Additionally, as of March 31, 1986, 1,507 loans were delinquent in the three agencies.[15]

In order to make it at all, most of Kentucky's farm families work early mornings, evenings and nights on the farm and sandwich in a part or full time job during some part of the day. According to a ***Lexington Herald-Leader*** article:

> *State agriculture officials estimate that more than 70% of Kentucky's farm families have at least one member working off the farm. And they say it is the outside income that enables many of the state's 99,000 farmers to continue to work the land.*
>
> *"What they're doing is subsidizing the farm operation with another source of income," said Thomas Ilvento, a rural sociologist at the University of Kentucky. "With the kind of small-scale farming that is done here, off-farm jobs have always been important. But now it's becoming crucial."*[16]

While off-farm employment may be an option for central or western Kentucky farm families, it continues as a much more difficult option in the job deficit counties of eastern Kentucky.

Unique Problems in Kentucky Appalachia

Although the 49 Appalachian counties produce only 20% of the state's total receipts in crops and livestock, these, largely family farms, are a very important segment of the region's economy. At least 20 of the 49 counties are almost solely dependent on agriculture as the principal source of income and jobs, and it produces significant income (over $5 million annually) in more than half of the Appalachian counties. These figures do not take into account the enormous quantities of home and community consumed food which these traditionally "subsistence" and "self- sufficient" farms produce. The Kentucky Appalachia farm sector counties are woven from the economic fabric of the family farm. The school system, the banks, Main St. businesses and the churches are spun inseparably together in an economy supported by burley and beef. An economy that is held together by the very fragile thread of government subsidies. In a region already riddled with hungry people and facing an ever- increasing decline in coal related jobs, in a Region totally lacking in off-farm job opportunities, and with measurable unemployment averaging almost 20%, the critical necessity of not only retaining but strengthening the family farm cannot be overstated. Yet, two specters haunt the Appalachian family farm; first, a decline in "self sufficient" or "subsistence" farming and, second, the flipside of the first, an increasing reliance on tobacco as a cash crop.

The Decline in "Self-Sufficient" Farming: Marketing statistics show a pronounced shift away from diversified and balanced, subsistence, or labor-intensive farming into heavier cash crop,or capital intensive, production. From 1979 to 1984, crop sales rose 21% in the 49 Appalachian counties, while livestock sales rose barely 1%. Moreover, in the 35 most Eastern and most mountainous counties, livestock sales actually declined 3% during this period.[17] This indicated an increasing dependence on subsidized tobacco (which makes up almost 60% of all Kentucky crop production) for farm income and an increased and more costly dependence on petro-chemical fertilizers, since a declining animal population indicates a declining availability of natural manure for fertilizer.

Additionally, when the realized net income statistics for the 49 Appalachian counties are broken down into *Farm Sector Appalachia* (20 Appalachian counties with a history of annual cash receipts, prior to 1980, from all marketings, exceeding $9 million per county) and *Other Appalachia* (29 counties, primarily in the coal sector), a 57% loss is shown for the farm sector counties, but only a 9% loss for the other Appalachian counties. (See map and chart at the end of this paper.)

The map illustrates a loss in realized net income in 65 of the 71 non-Appalachian counties, but a loss in only 39 of the 49 Appalachian counties. Four of the non-Appalachian counties surrounding Lexington and Clark County in farm sector Appalachia show some gain in realized net income because of continuing growth in the horse industry. Oldham County, north of Louisville, shows a gain for the same reason.

The gain in the other nine Appalachian counties (not in the farm sector) averages 23% but reflects an actual cash increase totaling only $2.7 million, or an average of $304,000 per county. This is not surprising, since the 29 counties listed under *Other Appalachia* produce only 3% of all agricultural marketings in the state.

The small dollar increase, however, does not negate the fact of a gain in an otherwise bleak picture and raises an immediate question as to the cause. The cause is quite possibly the result of the trend discussed earlier, the trend from livestock (or subsistence) toward cash (or crop) farming. Traditionally, livestock have been used largely for home consumption, and cropping (with the exception of tobacco) was geared toward producing feed for these animals. With the reduction in livestock production, land, labor, and some capital have been freed up for the more intensive cultivation of tobacco and other cash crops.

Additionally, during the '70s, a younger workforce in-migrated with the hope of finding work in the short lived coal industry boom. Most did not, but, nonetheless, they stayed in the region, and many contributed to the aged labor pool previously involved in farming, giving some revival to that lagging industry, but also pushing it toward the cash economy the younger workers were used to.

It is interesting that a similar phenomenon has been observed, in data from the same source, for the counties in the Missouri Ozarks.

In analyzing the long-run implications of this trend, the shift from labor-intensive to capital-intensive farming in an area of surplus labor and deficit capital appears to be questionable economics. Moreover, a shift from subsistence to cash in this farm economy calls into question the delicate "social/ecological balance" in the farm sector counties and in the farming communities of the coal-producing counties. Can the very limited resource farms of Appalachian begin to sustain the expectations of individuals seeking enough cash return to finance even a moderate middle-class lifestyle? Finally, can the land itself endure the "soil mining" necessary to produce a cash crop, year after year?

The Increasing Reliance on Tobacco: Reliance on tobacco as a cash crop means reliance on a very shaky tobacco price subsidy and today, farmers and community leaders talk of *when* those subsidies will be withdrawn, not *if*.

We are caught, in Kentucky, between a political knee-jerk defense of the tobacco program and anti-smoking forces which have tried to abolish the tobacco program---without understanding what that would mean for our rural "tobacco" producing counties. But neither blind allegiance nor attacks on the health hazards of tobacco will do anything to support the ultimate beneficiary of the program; the small family farmer. *Our goal should not be to save tobacco---but to save those whose livelihood depends on tobacco.* We must take steps now, not to support artificially the growing of tobacco, but to establish a state and federal farm policy which will provide for the kind of family farmers---Kentucky Appalachian farmers---who have traditionally benefited from the tobacco program.[18]

Yet, policy at the Land Grant College level in Kentucky is still moving "rapidly" toward the industrialization of agriculture. With apparently little thought toward the multitude of "fraction acreage" tobacco bases throughout the state, but especially in the Appalachian counties, the University of Kentucky is fine-tuning two machines for harvesting Burley tobacco in a project funded by a $600,000 grant from the Phillip Morris Company. The ***Lexington Herald-Leader*** reports "mechanization is on the verge of cutting the time and labor involved in one of Kentucky's most important farm chores---harvesting tobacco," and "this could bring a drastic change in the amount of labor involved at harvest."[19] If such policy results in making tobacco production much more cash intensive, and much less labor intensive, what will happen to the small Appalachian grower?---a grower who can now compete with the flatland Kentucky farmers, because tobacco growing is still labor-intensive for everyone, and the small Appalachian tobacco grower can still market his labor, the only input he has for the enterprise, at some profit.

These two specters raise a third haunt, the haunt traditionally confined to the coal producing sector in Appalachia, the haunt of *who controls the land.*

Who Controls the Land? The shaping and control of American agriculture---especially in the post-World War II period---has increasingly been in the hands of those who do *not* work the soil. Today, questions about who controls the land find their answers not among the people and communities of the countryside but among the people of the cities and suburbs. Today, financial

and political decisions made in urban power centers have as much impact on the vitality of agriculture as the weather itself. This is true internationally as well as domestically. A study-report recently written by the head of the Swedish Red Cross for Earthscan says:

> The famine in Ethiopia is caused not by the lack of rain that triggered it, but by agricultural practices and deforestation that produced soil erosion, by population growth, and by *political decisions* such as an emphasis on cash crops and a failure to develop adequate distribution systems. (Italics added.)

Every nation and every society has a fundamental stake in how its land is controlled and by whom. A democratic society especially needs to be vigilant to assure that control over its land does not fall into the hands of a few, thereby weakening the most fundamental social and economic relationships and structures of the democracy. Such a society must, in fact, take special care to assure that land is justly and widely distributed and that the rights of minority landholders and other small and medium-sized farmers are protected and enhanced. Unfortunately, 20th-century America cannot claim an enviable record in maintaining this vigilance or in protecting these rights.

> Land ownership in America is concentrated in very few hands. Only 3% of the population owns 95% of all private land. In the Southeastern United States alone, the paper and timber industry acquires 250,000 acres each year. Just two paper and timber companies, Georgia-Pacific and Weyerhauser, together own over 12 million acres---more land than black America owns collectively. Such a concentration of ownership breeds monopoly, feeds inflation, undermines competition, and thus results in higher prices, and, perhaps most important, controls the political and economic destiny of our society. (Joseph Brooks, a past President, Emergency Land Fund).[20]

The implications of continuing land loss and land concentration for rural America and for all America are serious and drive to the heart of the democracy itself. In the long run, those who control land and its production control people. When such power is highly concentrated, the quality of life deteriorates, and the survival of democracy itself, which depends on dispersed power, is at risk. As Jerry Hart of the Kentucky Fair Tax Coalition writes in a recent article of the Presbyterian Hunger Program's newsletter *HANDLES:*

> Where land ownership is most concentrated, the lack of adequate housing is greater, the loss of agricultural land and small family farms is greater, economic diversification is more limited, out-migration accelerates, and most other quality of life standards are below those where the land is more equitably distributed.[21]

We must recognize that land is one of the most basic social properties and responsibilities of any society. Even though it may rightly be owned by individuals, its use, control, and preservation for the whole of society and succeeding generations is the responsibility of all people and of the democratic institutions that should represent them.

One eastern Kentucky banker, when asked about the most critical problem facing his community, said, "We don't own our own coal." Will the answer next year or the year after be *We don't own our own land either*!?

The Future

We must engender the common, or should we say the *uncommon,* vision to face the future of family farm agriculture at two levels simultaneously; first, the short-run human and economic needs, and second, the longer-term organizing needed to address political issues. A problem within the governmental, or popular, debate of these issues is the lack of any vision, either short- or long-term. What this means, however, is that as we (those of us outside the popular debate, and organized) can go directly to the people, both rural and urban, and we can solicit and build on their visions---thereby finding the vision needed to give life and substance to the debate.

Our vision must deal with immediate needs, as well as longer-term concerns. We must address human support needs for counseling, job training and relocation, direct relief, and refinancing. In many cases, assistance with refinancing means keeping FmHA true to its own rules.

Longer-run needs include more and better farmer organizing, the developing of farmer/worker/consumer linkages, and dealing with the legislative process, again and again. I would be remiss if I did not say that many of us in "the Church" today are struggling very hard to make that institution responsive to both the short- and long-run needs of this crisis, responsive at the local as well as the regional and national levels. Some progress is being made, but we have a long way to go, as do our legislators. The 1985 Farm Bill, for example, was

described by Dr. Harold Breimyer, Professor and Extension Economist Emeritus, of the University of Missouri, as "the last chance for the family farm," yet before the ink was dry on that omnibus legislation (adopted by Congress on December 18, 1985), most farm groups were saying it lacked the radical reforms necessary to really solve the problems of the family farmer. As in the past, the '85 legislation is a series of commodity bills loosely linked together, with each commodity lobby being accommodated by targeted price supports, but without the kind of holistic vision needed to make real change.

Moreover, it is being criticized from both the farm and the non-farm sectors as potentially the most costly farm bill yet enacted. The Center For Agriculture and Rural Development at Iowa State University, for example, talks about creating dependency on the government, saying that "By 1988 about 75% of U.S. net farm income will come from government payments.[22] A Farm Journal editorial on the same subject makes the point that "under the new 'market oriented' bill, farmers actually get less income from the market and more from the government.[23]

A recent Associated Press article includes the following statements:

> *The cost of crop subsidies, which was $4 billion in 1981, is expected to soar to near $30 billion this year---the nation's faster growing spending program.....*
>
> *The agricultural lawmakers sold their 1985 farm bill as needed to save the struggling family farmers.....*
>
> *But nobody talked about the huge farming operations that are receiving astronomical subsidies under the new bill.....*
>
> *The Associated Press has reported this summer on how large producers, particularly of cotton, rice and milk, will commonly receive payments in excess of $1 million. A single California cotton grower was due to receive upwards of $20 million.....*
>
> *"I think we have just begun to uncover what I think is going to be a major national disgrace with regard to the last farm bill," said Sen. J. James Exon, D-Neb.*[24]

Many farm organizations and farm land legislators feel the producer-referendum or *parity* approach to the problem is the only one that makes any sense. An analysis by Minnesota Impact says the *parity* or producer-referendum approach

> .....would totally eliminate all subsidy payments to farmers. Farm prices would be set to insure that farmers received a fair price for their products in the market place---not from the government. The federal marketing assistance agency, the Commodity Credit Corporation, would help farmers establish a "floor price" on crops at levels close to or slightly above the cost of production. Simultaneously, farmers would cut back production through an effective supply management program designed to insure that surplus stocks would not accumulate at taxpayers' expense.[25]

Parity is an old and tested approach and one that worked prior to free market tinkering in the late '40s and '50s. Senator Paul Harkin, Democrat, Iowa, is a proponent of such legislation, and introduced S.2869 on September 24, 1986. This bill, S.2869, entitled ***Save the Family Farm Act***, would provide price and income protection to family farmers through supply management. Moreover, policy resolutions passed by the United Farmer and Rancher Congress, meeting in St. Louis in September, 1986, seem to affirm the parity approach. These resolutions include the following:

1. Farm prices must be raised to cover cost of production and return to labor.
2. Farm income should come from the market and not the taxpayer, and should be protected by production quotas.
3. Farm and home foreclosures should be stopped until farm prices rise above costs of production.
4. International trade negotiations should aim at raising world commodity prices and seek fair trade rather than "free" trade.[26]

The future of agriculture in Kentucky Appalachia rests in important part with the national resolve, yet elements of its unique situation go beyond the national problem. Pete Daniel, in his insightful book ***Breaking The Land***, says, "The single-minded pursuit of higher production has warped agriculture and alienated it from tradition." It is difficult to talk against production without being labeled reactionary or romantic, but in today's economy, Appalachian agriculture must stay in touch with tradition if it is to survive. Ever larger farms, increasing mechanization, dependence on petro-chemicals and insecure government support is not inevitable. There is another way, and with the right combination of resources, attitude and determination, that way can be

followed. "The way" must include a return to diversified and balanced farming, the retention of self-sufficient "limited cash" farming as a desirable way of life, and some cash alternatives to tobacco. As Daniels graphically puts it,

> *With the premise that science, mechanization, and large-scale farming provide the only model for U.S. agriculture, the USDA will continually attempt to restructure rural life into its updated fantasy of giant machines, robots, experts, computers, and chemicals, that leaves no place for farmers who move in relation to natural cycles.*[27]

There are two possible futures for agriculture in Kentucky Appalachia: (1) a combination of corporate mega-farms worked by tenants and laborers, those who used to be family farm-owners, and further east, abandoned farm steads in a hungry land and empty boarded-up towns in a jobless "dependent" society; or (2) a renewed family farm system, a reawakening to the positive, sustaining nature of diversified, "self-sufficient" farming, a place for "farmers who move in relation to natural cycles." As President Lyndon Baines Johnson once put it, "The best fertilizer for the land is the footsteps of the owner." We need more, not less "owner fertilizer" in our region. The choice is up to us, all of us. "Ask not for whom the bell tolls, it tolls for thee and me."

Notes

[1] Introductory paragraphs from ***Rural Community In Crisis, A Report From Rural America***, 197th General Assembly (1985) Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), by Dave Ostendorf and Ben Poage, p. 3.

[2] From brochure: ***Food Prices Up - Farm Prices Down: Who's Making the Bread?*** League of Rural Voters, Minneapolis, MN

[3] *ibid.*

[4] ***Disappearance of Family Farm Agriculture in the U.S.:*** Implications for World Hunger, A presentation to the World Food Assembly, Rome, Italy, Nov. 12, 1984, by Mark Ritchie (Special Assistant to the Minnesota Commissioner of Agriculture), p. 3.

[5] Summary Report: ***Economy-wide Impacts of the Farm Crisis***, FAPRI Staff Report #9-85 (Revised); Contributors: ***Farm Journal Magazine***, FAPRI at Iowa State University, FAPRI at University of Missouri-Columbia, Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates; July 1985.

[6] From ***North American Farmer***, April 25, 1984.

[7] ***The Effects of the Agriculture Crisis on the Health and Lives of Farm Families***, William and Judith Heffernan, Department of Rural Sociology, University of Missouri, Columbia, May 1985.

[8] "Is The Church Open To Victims Of The Rural Crisis?" William and Judith Heffernan, ***Catholic Rural Life***, July, 1986.

[9] From testimony by Howard Knotts, Public Relations Director for the West Virginia State Department of Agriculture, speaking at a United Methodist Church Regional Hearing on Rural Life Issues, in Jackson's Mill, West Virginia, September 29, 1986.

[10] "Falling Crop Prices, Soaring Debt May Drive Farmers Back to Tenancy," ***The Washington Post***, Jan. 12, 1986.

[11] From ***Roll Of Thunder; Hear My Cry***, By Mildred Taylor, 1976.

[12] From unpublished paper on the Burley Belt Transitional Project by Hal Hamilton, Coordinator of Community Farm Alliance, Pleasureville, KY, January 1986.

[13] *ibid.*

[14] Chart compiled and map produced by Ben Poage, Associate Minister, Kentucky Appalachian Ministry, Richmond, KY from statistics obtained from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

[15] Farm Financial Situation, Perspective, And Recent Development In Farm Credit, by W. Donald Shurley, Department of Agriculture Economics, University of Kentucky, Table 2.

[16] "State Farmers Making Ends Meet With Off-The-Farm Employment," Business Monday Section, ***Lexington Herald-Leader***, July 28, 1986.

[17] Kentucky Cash Receipts From Farm Marketings, Kentucky Crop and Livestock Reporting Service.

[18] Paraphrased from ***Uncertain Harvest: A Report on North Carolina Agriculture***, by The Rural Advancement Fund, January 1985, pg. 11.

[19] "U.K. Fine-tunes Two Machines For Harvesting Burley Crop," ***Lexington Herald-Leader***, July 20, 1986.

[20] ***Rural Community In Crisis***, a report from Rural America, 197th General Assembly (1985) Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) by Dave Ostendorf and Ben Poage, pg. 17.

[21] ibid, pg. 19.

[22] ***An Analysis of the Food Security Act of 1985.*** FAPRI Staff Report #1-86, February, 1986.

[23] "Across The Editor's Desk," ***Successful Farming***, April, 1986.

[24] "Outraged Lawmakers Want Farm Policy Reforms," ***Express-News***, San Antonio, Texas, September 8, 1986.

[25] "The Farm Bill Debate: A Study Paper," ***PREPARE***, Minnesota Impact, October 1985.

[26] United Farmer and Rancher Congress Press Release, September 17, 1986.

[27] ***Breaking The Land: The Transformation Of Cotton, Tobacco and Rice Cultures Since 1880***, Pete Daniel, University of Illinois Press, 1985, p. 298.


APPALACHIAN REGION OF KENTUCKY (49 COUNTIES
I-64
I-75
KEY
NET INCOME INDICATORS
KENTUCKY
REALIZED NET INCOME FROM FARMING
$ DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 1980 & 1984
KENTUCKY TOTAL ---------- -(47)%
FARM SECTOR APPALACHIAN COUNTIES (20) ---------- -(57)%
OTHER APPALACHIAN COUNTIES (29) ---------- -(9)%
APPALACHIAN COUNTIES TOTAL (49) ---------- -(47)%

KENTUCKY COUNTIES		REALIZED NET INCOME* (Thousands of Dollars)		(1980 & 1984 : % DIFFERENCE)
COUNTY		(Net) 1980 INCOME	(Net) 1984 INCOME	% DIFFERENCE
Adair	(FSA)	9,881	6,687	-(32)
Allen		8,647	886	-(90)
Anderson		4,530	3,061	-(32)
Ballard		8,272	-3,323	-(140)
Barren		7,743	-2,400	-(131)
Bath	(FSA)	9,586	5,391	-(43)
Bell	(OA)	336	81	-(76)
Boone		2,362	-493	-(121)
Bourbon		74,676	90,056	+21
Boyd	(OA)	111	(L)	-(56)**
Boyle		4,106	-4,485	-(209)
Bracken		5,168	3,362	-(65)
Breathitt	(OA)	2,246	2,397	+7
Breckinridge		9,516	-7,816	-(18)
Bullitt		3,878	-166	-(104)
Butler		5,432	-2,761	-(151)
Caldwell		6,319	-5,516	-(187)
Calloway		9,243	-8,953	-(197)
Campbell		699	-776	-(211)
Carlisle		3,855	-2,619	-(168)
Carroll		3,894	2,176	-(44)
Carter	(FSA)	3,249	1,863	-(42)
Casey	(FSA)	11,329	5,569	-(51)
Christian		15,321	-15,249	-(199)
Clark	(FSA)	7,131	8,006	+9
Clay	(OA)	2,078	2,209	+6
Clinton	(FSA)	2,911	1,044	-(64)
Crittenden		4,983	-2,536	-(151)
Cumberland	(FSA)	5,016	4,111	-(18)
Daviess		10,486	-9,889	-(194)
Edmonson		4,274	(L)	-(99)**
Elliott	(OA)	1,918	1,452	-(24)
Estill	(OA)	1,867	1,296	-(31)
Fayette		205,987	369,491	+44
Fleming	(FSA)	6,330	-124	-(102)
Floyd	(OA)	553	334	-(39)
Franklin		8,151	2,256	-(72)
Fulton		4,233	-5,179	-(222)
Gallatin		1,074	227	-(79)
Garrard	(FSA)	5,438	1,523	-(72)
Grant		3,741	2,472	-(34)
Graves		6,317	-10,782	-(271)
Grayson		5,468	-4,102	-(175)
Green	(FSA)	8,637	2,314	-(73)
Greenup	(OA)	2,388	2,151	-(10)
Hancock		2,543	-2,148	-(185)
Hardin		9,199	-7,274	-(179)
Harlan	(OA)	68	(L)	-(28)**
Harrison		5,245	1,472	-(72)
Hart		11,934	6,097	-(49)
Henderson		18,691	-16,680	-(189)
Henry		9,837	603	-(94)
Hickman		6,586	-3,900	-(159)
Hopkins		7,831	-6,720	-(186)
Jackson	(OA)	1,988	2,161	+8
Jefferson		1,405	-301	-(121)
Jessamine		16,527	11,505	-(31)
Johnson	(OA)	758	524	-(31)
Kenton		1,475	-204	-(114)
Knott	(OA)	61	89	+32
Knox	(OA)	1,578	1,203	-(24)
Larue		6,661	-3,338	-(150)
Laurel	(FSA)	92	-1,111	-(1,208)
Lawrence	(OA)	667	1,198	+44
Lee	(OA)	599	287	-(52)
Leslie	(OA)	92	67	-(27)
Letcher	(OA)	121	(L)	-(60)**
Lewis	(FSA)	7,174	2,915	-(59)
Lincoln	(FSA)	6,904	-89	-(101)
Livingston		5,210	-2,088	-(140)
Logan		24,207	1,861	-(92)

L = Less than $50,000

Lyon		1,094	-1,127	-(203)
McCracken		2,970	-4,696	-(258)
McCreary	(OA)	290	274	-(6)
McLean		3,656	-2,496	-(168)
Madison	(FSA)	12,288	5,511	-(55)
Magoffin	(OA)	2,096	3,107	+33
Marion		5,485	-2,201	-(140)
Marshall		2,530	-3,376	-(233)
Martin	(OA)	75	137	+45
Mason		9,716	6,549	-(33)
Meade		2,607	-4,731	-(281)
Menifee	(OA)	1,453	1,019	-(30)
Mercer		9,021	1,027	-(89)
Metcalfe		3,942	1,143	-(71)
Monroe	(FSA)	5,453	683	-(87)
Montgomery	(FSA)	7,908	3,448	-(56)
Morgan	(OA)	4,164	3,357	-(19)
Muhlenberg		5,776	-3,525	-(161)
Nelson		8,829	-1,418	-(116)
Nicholas		3,554	722	-(80)
Ohio		7,069	-5,251	-(174)
Oldham		13,410	22,173	+40
Owen		6,463	2,886	-(55)
Owsley	(OA)	1,277	1,663	+23
Pendleton		2,770	866	-(69)
Perry	(OA)	234	224	-(4)
Pike	(OA)	183	(L)	-(73)**
Powell	(OA)	1,551	979	-(37)
Pulaski	(FSA)	10,617	4,425	-(58)
Robertson		5,267	6,320	+17
Rockcastle	(FSA)	2,519	491	-(80)
Rowan	(OA)	3,205	2,584	-(19)
Russell	(FSA)	7,485	4,767	-(36)
Scott		19,379	22,614	+14
Shelby		18,133	1,212	-(93)
Simpson		8,230	-7,882	-(196)
Spencer		2,472	-1,562	-(163)
Taylor		5,302	-5,505	-(204)
Todd		7,059	-8,697	-(223)
Trigg		7,398	-2,136	-(129)
Trimble		4,185	1,357	-(68)
Union		11,734	-5,830	-(150)
Warren		13,543	-8,011	-(159)
Washington		10,065	3,378	-(66)
Wayne	(FSA)	3,917	647	-(82)
Webster		8,266	-7,610	-(192)
Whitley	(OA)	1,329	751	-(43)
Wolfe	(OA)	2,731	2,991	+9
Woodford		37,720	68,439	+45
KENTUCKY	(Total)	969,372	$13,839	-(47)

L = Less than $50,000

		% KENTUCKY TOTAL		% KENTUCKY TOTAL	
Farm Sector***					
Appalachia (FSA = 20 counties)	133,865	14	58,071	11	-(57)
Other Appalachia (OA = 29counties)	36,017	4	32,731	6	-(9)
Appalachia (Total)	169,882	18	90,802	17	-(47)

* Cash receipts from all marketings, plus government payments, rent and other income, but not including income from farm wages or other labor income.

Realized Net Income reflects *the cash position realized from the farm business* and *does not* include the value of inventory changes. Realized Net Income figures *do* include corporate farms.

** % Difference, when Net Income is less than $50,000, is computed on $49,000.

*** Appalachian counties with a history of annual cash receipts from all marketings exceeding $9 million prior to 1980.

SOURCE: U.S. Department Of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

THE FUTURE OF COAL AND COAL-FIELD DEVELOPMENT: OBSERVATIONS AND PRESCRIPTIONS

Curtis Seltzer
Consultant and Principal, Blue Grass Enterprises
Bluegrass, Virginia

I came to West Virginia more than 15 years ago because I was hopeful. Lots of things seemed to be coming together---things that promised to make fundamental changes in how West Virginia's economy operated and how people would live and work in a state that had become synonymous with poverty.

West Virginia was the place for a strategic optimist 15 years ago. It seemed possible that a small amount of money, a lot of patience and energetic people could leverage big change. This was investment banking of a different sort, and I wanted to be in on the deal.

What was the situation in West Virginia and the Appalachian coal fields in the early 1970s?

The Appalachian coal industry was beginning to emerge from two decades of stagnant recession. Utilities were expanding their coal-fired capacity, and this was driving demand for Appalachian steam coal. Coal prices---which had hovered around $5 per ton (in current dollars) since 1950---began a slow and steady rise. Those coal operators who had survived the contractions of the 1950s and 1960s were now reasonably efficient and poised to take advantage of stronger markets. The coal industry shaped up as a growth sector in a region whose economy had been idling since the late 1940s.

At the same time, politically creative forces were loose in West Virginia and throughout the Appalachian coal fields. These forces were rooted in the desperate economic conditions that were laid in place during the preceding decades, and matured in the fertile protest politics of the late 1960s. Advocacy groups were their expression, and they made their mark in new legislation and attitudes.

Social forces created by underground mining conditions prompted Congress to pass a radical coal mine health and safety act in December, 1969. This Act promised to make substantial reductions in the human costs of producing coal. To the extent that the Executive branch and the private sector implemented this legislation in good faith, mine disasters would be eliminated and black lung disease might eventually follow. The Act authorized the payment of monetary compensation to miners suffering from black lung disease. This "benefits" program dispensed about $17 billion dollars to American coal miners since 1970, and now constitutes an important economic prop for many coal towns where long-term joblessness has become commonplace.

In 1970, the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) was a union in the midst of profound change. Its leadership was aged, isolated and corrupt. The successors to John L. Lewis had defined the UMWA as an institution in which the rank and file served the leadership. A rank-and-file reform movement---the Miners for Democracy (MFD)---was challenging the incumbents for control. It was the first serious insurgency for democratic governance in a major American labor union since the early years of this century.

The MFD, together with grass-roots activists in the Black Lung Association, represented new pistons of power in an engine that had seemed nothing but scrap metal only a few years before. The creative potential of a populist democratic mineworkers' union seemed almost limitless then. If the insurgents could win, their example might cascade through the American labor movement and lead to reconstructive changes in Appalachia's politics and economics.

Other advocacy groups were forcing specific issues onto the State's political agenda. The abuses of unregulated surface mining fathered oppositional forces whose goal was abolition or, failing that, strict regulation. Other environmental issues, involving pollution of air and water and the management of land and natural resources, had developed highly motivated constituencies.

Veterans of Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty were salted throughout Appalachia. Young professionals---lawyers, teachers, writers, community organizers and fund raisers---were tucked in with issue-oriented groups and public-interest law firms. From these organizational bases, they mounted their demands for change across

issues that broadly revolved around the redistribution of economic costs and benefits in both public- and private-sector activity. Their issues were welfare rights, tax justice, land and resource ownership, housing, education and political participation among others, but their underlying and unifying logic had to do with the redistribution of political and economic power.

West Virginia politics seemed as yeasty as any in the country. Populist ideas about the rights of citizens and the responsibilities of corporations took root in this already the most heavily unionized state in the Nation. Democrats like Rep. Ken Hechler represented a populist model that inspired maverick liberals in the State's three other districts. Jay Rockefeller---a liberal Democrat who had been elected Secretary of State in 1968 despite a Republican gubernatorial victory---was thought to have promise and potential by many average West Virginians, although left-wing community organizers believed that his commitment to personal political advancement would shape his commitment to any particular issue. State legislators like Si Galperin, Robert Nelson and Warren McGraw suggested that populists could survive and succeed in the State's cities and coal counties. A handful of like-minded politicians had seeded themselves in other parts of Appalachia as well.

Three ideas stand out in my memories of those days. These ideas formed a framework for thinking about political and economic change in West Virginia and Appalachia, and provided a casual theoretical underpinning for many of the oppositional groups working on particular issues at the time.

First, the idea that was most often used to explain the "paradox of a rich land and poor people" was that America's smokestack corporations exploited Appalachia as a resource colony. Coal companies, railroads and land-holding corporations, this argument went, had "ripped off" Appalachia's resources in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries, paying pennies an acre for land that would eventually yield millions of coal and timber dollars. "Outsiders" benefited from having Appalachia export its resource wealth and import its necessities, and they cared little about the social costs of the underdevelopment that resulted from this depleting arrangement. As long as the mass of people in Appalachia remained severed from their resources, they would be denied the wherewithal to control their economic fortunes, and their politics would continue to resemble that of a dependent Third World neo-colony.

Second, there was much talk of "regional solutions to regional problems." The coal business was seen as something of an evil empire whose business practices created the same set of economic costs and dislocations wherever it operated. Insofar as "the problem" was regional in nature, the argument was made that the only sensible long-term strategic solution had to be regional and industry-wide. Underlying this analysis was the assumption that Appalachia was a region whose people, politics and economics were functionally and structurally linked. Appalachian regionalism was touted as a kind of progressive nationalist ideology, mainly by left-of-center academics. Federal policy makers bought into the "regionalists'" framework---if not their analysis---through the Appalachian Regional Commission, the "Establishment's" programmatic expression of this perspective.

Third, most of the change advocates had a vision of a better tomorrow based on local people "taking control" of their lives and resources. These, they argued, should be managed for the benefit of those who "created the wealth" and their communities. No one in my recollection actually spelled out the details of what the Appalachian colony would look like following "independence" or how Appalachia's resources would actually be restructured and managed, and by whom. I don't remember that any single strategy for getting from the status quo to the "better tomorrow" ever prevailed. Rather, there was the assumption that each increment of change wrought by protest would lead to the next set of demands and the next, not unlike falling dominoes. Opposition groups mainly called for fairness and justice within the existing framework---particular remedies to specific wrongs---but a vague democratic socialist, anti-capitalist framework motivated many individual activists, particularly the young non-native organizers.

These ideas and the groups that promoted them have had an enormous impact on public policy and political attitudes over the last 15 years. This can be seen in the federal legislation---mine safety and health, surface mining, air and water pollution, wildlife protection and so forth---that now makes coal mining among America's most strictly regulated industries. The UMWA is certainly a more democratic union than it was in 1970. Mine workers are now capable of earning more than $25,000 a year if they are employed full time, compared with only about one-third of that in 1970. Black lung compensation payments and vested union pensions now provide an income floor for ill and retired miners. Over two decades, ARC invested more than $5 billion in highways, water and sewage facilities, education, health care and other programs for its 13 member states.

The marginal reforms effected since 1970 have protected the system of private enterprise by forcing it to adapt and, second, they have enervated the change-forcing critics and their ideas. The operational brilliance of

the American political system is that it defuses conflict by accommodating at least some of the demands from those insisting on change. But each incremental reform tends to further erode the change-forcing constituency until the agents of change find themselves out of work. The political history of West Virginia and Appalachia over the last 15 years makes this point as do the civil rights experience in the Deep South and the anti-Vietnam war movement. I think this is the likely political fate of all well-organized single-issue pressure groups.

Some, and perhaps a lot, of the credit for these improvements must be assigned to the groups who stirred the political pot over the last two decades. They were the squeaky wheels, and change occurred because our political system greases loud squeaks. It is also true that the private sector, particularly the coal industry, adapted to new norms of more responsible corporate behavior or, to use the vernacular, "they cleaned up their act."

The coal industry's critics also helped to reshape how coal managers see their responsibilities and roles. The interviews I've done over the last three years for MACED and Virginia Tech suggest that many of those who manage America's largest coal companies---the very absentee owners who once were accused of running "the colony"---have internalized a set of business ethics that places high value on worker safety, cooperative labor relations, environmental protection and civic responsibility. That value is expressed in higher production costs and smaller returns. Federal regulation was necessary to force mine operators to adopt new mining practices and behavior, which are now a more or less accepted business framework. (While the coal industry welcomed the regulatory slack provided by the Reagan Administration, mine operators did not press the Administration for a wholesale scuttling of cost-internalizing laws and regulations.) These are broad reportorial observations rather than a defense of the behavior of any individual company; some managers and some companies would undoubtedly prefer to return to the laissez-faire environment of the late 19th century. Judged by their words and deeds, many American coal operators are far more constructive and much wiser in their relations with their workers, communities and the public at large than they were 15 years ago. It is intellectually dishonest and incredibly dumb not to acknowledge this. If we persist in the attitude that coal operators are Appalachia's evil emperors, we will be guilty of both ignoring the truth and missing the boat.

For those who are employed, particularly coal miners, Appalachia can be an easier place today than it was in 1970. Working miners now constitute observable ghettos of comparative affluence and stability in counties that are otherwise desperate, poor and disintegrating. Appalachia is also an easier place to be for many retired and disabled. Much of the region is now underpinned by the "mailbox economy," from which comes modest pensions, black lung benefits and other transfer payments.

Appalachia is no easier a place for the underemployed, the unemployed and those who have---or have been---dropped from the work economy. This falls most heavily, it seems, on head-of-household women and the remaining blacks, but the majority are a large and growing number of white males. These groups may now constitute as much as 50% to 60% of the available workforce in some Appalachian coal counties. These people are Appalachia's "disappeared." Our data bases don't capture many of them, and we, as a society, have almost stopped thinking about them.

Appalachia's coal mines will provide jobs for a diminishing number of miners in the future as productivity rates rise faster than production rates. Coal mine employment cannot be seen as a cycle, alternating between periods of expansion and contraction. Despite production growth, the future job trend is steady decline---on the order of at least 10 to 20 percent by 1995. This will take place in Appalachian coal counties that typically have few, if any, other sources of primary wage income. Aside from coal mining, a non-coal private sector hardly exists in many coal counties. Without deliberate intervention, one cannot be expected to emerge. In the absence of a Marshall Plan-type reconstruction effort, these counties will become increasingly isolated from the constructive economic forces at work in America's economy. As this occurs, these areas will come to resemble reservations for the unemployed and impoverished, maintained in permanent dependency.

While the groups I've mentioned succeeded in having public policy and private-sector behavior incorporate many of their programmatic demands over the last 15 years, they and their ideas registered almost no impact at all on the pattern of resource ownership and management these critics once believed had to be restructured for genuine improvement to occur. Today, West Virginia and most of the Appalachian coal fields are as much owned by non-resident corporations as they were 15 years ago. Three questions follow from this observation. First, is it likely that future economic distress will produce redistribution of land and resources among "Appalachian people?" I think not. Second, would redistribution necessarily reverse the economic decline that I foresee? Perhaps, but I doubt it. These opinions lead me to think that possible reforms are going to be

conceived and implemented within the existing framework of resource ownership, private property and a mixed economy. The third question, then, is, have Appalachia's major resource owners reached the limits of their ability to incorporate social responsibility in their business behavior? Can we expect them to do more than they have for local economic development? I think so.

What of regionalism? Today, I hear little talk about regional solutions to regional problems. Appalachia, we must admit, has some regional characteristics, but it doesn't function as one. There is still no Appalachian consciousness among the vast majority of the people who live here. And despite all of ARC's investment in dollars and consciousness, I have seen precious little state-initiated regional action over the years. Shared problems do not a region make. As for public-sector regional organizations, the ARC is being phased out, and many region-wide advocacy groups that formed in the 1960s and 1970s have disbanded or are reduced in scale. If Appalachian regionalism were operational, I doubt that this have happened. The "regional" organizations that continue to shape Appalachia are those that predated our experiments with "cerebral regionalism"; they are a handful of coal companies, utilities, railroads and the UMWA.

Finally, although some talk is still heard about local people taking control of local resources, my sense is that there is far more interest in steady employment and basic survival, regardless of who owns what. Redistribution of ownership and resources are not the issues I hear being talked about; jobs are. It can be argued that monopoly ownership of Appalachia's resources "inevitably" produced the job crisis that now exists, but I think that lays far too much blame on one factor and not nearly enough on macro-economic forces that would operate no matter how democratically Appalachia's resources might be distributed.

The lack of fit between the ideological analysis of the late 1960s and where things are today suggest that these concepts have limited value in fashioning a framework for planning change or a vision around which to mobilize constituents. These observations lead me to offer two others about Appalachia's future, and particularly the future of economic development in our coal fields.

The first is that left-of-center groups did not spend much time figuring out how to make the Appalachian economic pie bigger for everyone, and it is obvious that the hungry mouths of fairness and justice can be more easily fed bigger slices from bigger pies. That, I think, is the task for such groups today.

Issues like job security and community economic development are embedded in the questions of the management of capital, the process of production and market demand for the product. Those are questions that are central to economic development strategies in the coal fields. "Community" and worker-owned enterprise provide alternative ways of approaching these questions, but I believe that in most places they will continue to be addressed within the current framework of private property and market economics. Alternatives should be encouraged and are capable of coexisting with for-profit business, but it is unrealistic to assume that such approaches will supplant those that dominate today's economy. While building alternatives is a useful activity, the more relevant issue is finding ways to wring more community economic development from the business that currently exists in the coal fields and linking future business activity to higher expectations of community development than in the past. Economic development---or lack thereof---in West Virginia and the rest of coal-field Appalachia has been mainly the unintended consequence of business decisions made almost exclusively within the market-driven private sector. This system has demonstrated limited success in building vibrant community economies in the coal fields. Insightful coal managers have come to realize that economic diversification and community development can benefit them even though it involves costs. They obviously don't want to pay all the freight for developing economies that have accumulated a "developmental deficit" over the years, nor can they. They are, however, capable and, in some cases willing, to do their share. While productivity growth has the effect of increasing joblessness, it should lead to better returns. A portion of that expected surplus can be devoted to economic development, either though new businesses initiated by coal companies or through other intervening agencies.

In the near future, Appalachian coal managers can expect to face three questions:

1. How much can the coal industry afford to spend on new business activity and economic development in coal counties?
2. How will the money be aggregated and managed?
3. How will the money be invested?

The format for asking and answering these questions is a function of leadership and pressure in both the public and private sector. Without pressure and leadership, little will change.

The second concluding observation I have is that

the American coal industry may be a ship destined to sink within the next 30 or 40 years, and possibly sooner. I don't like saying that; I don't want that to happen. But I think it may come to pass.

Most of the coal we use today is burned to make steam in electric power plants. Who among us will argue that we will not develop a cheaper and cleaner way to boil water within a generation? I cannot predict whether the new technology will be a form of nuclear energy, a renewable or something unknown at this moment. But I am confident that steam coal will eventually be replaced as the way we make electricity.

At that moment, Appalachian steam coal will lose its economic value. No purpose will be served in mining it. And every coal-dependent county will be decoupled from the train that has pulled it for so long, for better or worse.

Among the biggest losers will be those companies who now own billions of tons of unmined coal. They will find themselves paying taxes on near worthless assets. It is these companies who have the greatest organized stake in developing alternative economic uses for their resources---their coal, timber, land and capital. It is these companies, I think, who should be encouraged to begin diversifying coal-field economies. These self-interested companies will be the cutting edge of any diversification of Appalachia's coal-field economy over the next several decades. That won't change the distribution of resources, but it may lead to a more stable and viable economy.

Advocates for community economic development must join them in that process. The relationship must be frank, cooperative and creative. Quarrels can be expected from time to time, but they must not be allowed to lead to divorce. Far-sighted coal people, I think, will be willing to work with advocates because many objectives will be shared, and there is a lot of common ground.

If coal-owning companies do not begin planning for a non-coal future, they will find themselves with a great deal of equity accumulated in the Titanic. And many of us will be its passengers.

A coal industry initiative will not suffice, however. The need is far greater that what can properly be expected of coal operators in terms of capital, technical assistance, business development and vision.

Nothing less than the comprehensiveness and integration of an Appalachian Marshall Plan will make a difference. If the private sector begs off or its resources are inadequate, public investment and sponsored enterprise should be used.

The economy of the Appalachian coal fields can be strengthened and made sustainable, even though it is unlikely that it will ever be a leading edge of the American economy. It can, however, be recast to support the people who choose to live here if enough of them insist on it.

AN ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY FOR APPALACHIA'S FUTURE: APPLICATIONS OF "ANOTHER DEVELOPMENT" AND "SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY" THEMES TO A REGION IN CRISIS

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Appalachia is clearly a region in crisis. The land and its people continue to experience the traditional problems of poverty, unemployment, resource depletion, inadequate educational, health, and welfare programs, inequality, and environmental decay. In addition, the region has new difficulties that arise out of its interaction with the world economy and national government. These include capital flight, deregulation of environmental standards, and cuts in Federal programs, as well as a host of related problems (Couto, 1984).

The crisis of Appalachia is also a crisis of development theories. Development policies are a means of dealing with the problems that a society encounters. A crisis occurs when these theories are no longer adequate to deal with the problems. At the same time, many of the problems we face are the consequences of earlier development programs. It seems evident that many contemporary theories lack viability in the present situation.

This essay takes the position that a new set of development theories and policies is needed to respond to the region's problems. I will offer an alternative based on the themes of a "sustainable society" and "another development." Before delineating a different approach, however, it is useful to examine the existing theory base.

The Present State of Appalachian Development Theories

There is certainly no shortage of theories about Appalachian development, and space does not permit a full accounting here. For the sake of convenience, let us divide the theories into those that follow the Regional Planning and Modernization Schools and those that utilize the Dependency School and Marxist/Neo-Marxist analysis. We will refer to the first group as the Official Development Position and the second group as the Radical Alternative Position.

The official analysis sees the target region as the source of the problems and relies heavily on Modernization Theory. Approaches such as the Culture of Poverty (Weller, 1965; Lewis, 1967) and Regional Planning Model (Walls and Billings, 1977) seem to have their roots in this theory. Let us examine the major assumptions of this approach. Problems are seen as internal to the area in need of development (Lenski and Lenski, 1982). All societies go through a series of stages to reach industrialization, from a traditional state to a highly developed state (Rostow, 1960).

Economic growth is seen as central to the modernization process (Todero, 1985). While much of modernization thinking is economic, there is an important socio-political component. Some institutions are seen as promoting modernization, while others are seen as retarding this process. The former are promoted and the latter are replaced in the process of development (Galbraith, 1964). Even attitudes that do not support the modernization process are slated for change (Hagan, 1967; McClelland, 1962) as a "growth psychology" is promoted. The push for industrialization assured an almost inherently anti-rural bias. In fact, the early work of Arthur Lewis (1954) describes in detail how people are induced to move from the traditional agricultural sector to the modern industrial sector.

Modernization theory treats development as a technical process without a value base. Myrdal (1968) provides a stinging critique of this assumption.

Modernization theory was once the principal guiding force in development (Higgins and Higgins, 1979). In recent years, it has fallen into disrepute in the international development community, but appears to be a strong influence in Appalachian Development Theory. I have argued in an earlier paper (McNutt, 1986) that Appalachian Development continues to employ strategies that are rarely used in our Overseas Assistance Policies. It is fairly obvious that the programs of the Appalachian Regional Commission strongly reflect the ideals of the Official Position. The Growth Center

model has a strong urban, industrial, economic growth promotion-oriented bias. The emphasis on infrastructure development is also in keeping with the official approach.

Many states and communities also employ the Official Approach. The strategy of outside industrial recruitment seems to assume internal problem causation. Other aspects of local community economic development also reflect such a bias.

The Official Position provides us with a coherent view of the development process (if we accept the assumptions) and a set of policy prescriptions. What are the consequences of the policies that it encourages?

We cannot expect that the official approach would be able to respond very effectively to external economic threat. If one assumes internal causation of underdevelopment and bases one's policy prescriptions on that assumption, it is clear that the policy framework would be inappropriate. In conditions of external problem causation, (clearly the problem of capital flight is an external problem) the present strategy of industrial recruitment only puts communities in competition with each other (Shannon, 1983; Bluestone and Harrison, 1982).

The emphasis on economic growth as development, so aptly critiqued by Seers (1972), leads to additional problems. One would hardly call the wholesale destruction of the ecological system of the coalfields "Development," except in an economic sense. Yet this assumption is in keeping with the official approach.

Whisnant (1980) finds many Appalachian Development Programs "culturally destructive." The preservation of traditional culture is not a priority of the official approach. In fact, many earlier modernization theorists would argue that such cultural destructiveness was inevitable, even desirable. So it would hardly be surprising that policies from the official position would be culturally destructive.

Resource depletion is another problem that the official position aggravates. The assumption that economic growth is development provides an incentive to promote exploitation of non-renewable resources (Schumacher, 1973). This is apparently the case in Appalachia, especially with regard to coal.

The official approach also assumes that consumption must be limited to provide funds for investment which will contribute to economic growth. Expenditures on health, welfare and educational services are consumption and, unless they can be defended as "Human Capital Investment" are proscribed by the theory. This can be seen graphically in areas where such services are cut back in an attempt to attract industry by reducing taxes and the social wage (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982).

We see that cultural destructiveness, reduced social educational and health services, resource depletion, environmental decay, and a host of other problems are made more serious by the official theories. The policy prescriptions of this school thus seem less and less viable. The Radical Alternative, however, provides a different analysis of the region's problems. The radical alternative includes Marxist, Neo-Marxist and Dependency Analysis of the Appalachian situation. These theories include the internal colonialism model (Lewis, et al., 1978), the Internal Periphery Model (Walls and Billings, 1977) and a variety of related models.

The principle strand that ties these theories together is the assumption of external exploitation of the region. This analysis places the cause of many of the region's problems outside Appalachia.

The dependency-related theories, which make up much of the theoretical base for the radical alternative, focus on the unequal terms of trade between less developed and more developed areas. The periphery, or underdeveloped region, must remain poor for the core or developed area to remain rich. The analysis is still largely economic. This line of argument was pioneered by South American economists such as Raul Prebisch and Andre Gunter Frank who were looking for an alternative to western explanations of their region's poverty. Helen Lewis' (Lewis, Kobak, and Johnson, 1978; Lewis, 1970) application of internal colonialism to Appalachia is, perhaps, the best known representative of this model.

The Radical Alternative Position has provided us with a great deal of scholarly inquiry into the processes of dependency. Recent work on land ownership (Appalachian Land Ownership Task Force, 1983) has documented outside ownership of the land. Gaventa's (1980) careful work on the faces of power provides us with insight into the way Appalachians lost control of their communities. A small but dedicated group of critical scholars continue to explore the methods of external control.

While we can use the analysis of the radical alternative position, there are a limited number of practical policy prescriptions that can be culled from the radical alternative position.

Obviously, if we speak of terms of trade, one option would be to sever those relationships. The People's Republic of China was successful at doing this for many years. This option is not open to Appalachia. The nationalization of industries is another dependency-inspired intervention that is clearly impossible.

Appalachia as the third world is largely a metaphor and a metaphor that, as John Friedman (1966) reminds us, has definite limits of usefulness.

There have been a number of proposals for small-scale community initiatives (Shannon, 1984; Fisher and Foster, 1979). These do not, however, create a coherent regional policy. A number of alternatives are described by Whisnant (1980), but these generally fall short of effective public regional-level policy.

There are some additional limits to the radical alternative position. The analysis provided by the radical alternative continues to be largely economic and technical as opposed to global and normative. It provides a limited number of theory-based ideas about ecological destruction. While it does offer some ideas about resource depletion, the ideas are less global and more regional.

Clearly, we must offer another alternative to regional policy making from the official position. I feel that two emergent approaches from the international development literature have the promise of meeting, at least in part, the need for a new Appalachian Development Policy.

A New Development Theory Base For Appalachia

Appalachia finds itself in a position where it must plan development for the future while dealing with the problems created by earlier development efforts. At the same time, it must deal with a world economy that promises to have adverse effects on the region's future.

It seems unlikely that the region will be able to deal with the world economy in any absolute sense. The region's economy is too enmeshed with the world system to hope for more than a partial solution. It is, however, still possible to have the type of development that the region deserves.

In the late sixties and early seventies there was dissatisfaction with the present nature of development (largely Modernization Theory) and a search for alternatives began (Todero, 1985). Dependency theory became popular, but even with sovereign states it was difficult to formulate and apply solutions from the theory (See Hettne, 1983, for additional problems). Some less-developed countries nationalized industry, others united in regional cooperatives, and some attempted to close off trade. Perhaps the most significant expression of dependency inspired policy was the New International Economic Order (NIEO) proposal (Todero, 1985). This proposal called for a radical restructuring of the world's economy, generally in favor of the third world (Todero, 1985). The results have been less than impressive.

There was additional dissatisfaction with dependency theory. Like modernization theory, the analysis was still largely economic. It continued to preserve the myth that development was a technical process rather than a normative process (Myrdal, 1968; see also Whisnant, 1980, on this point). It also fails, as does modernization theory, to deal with the problems of ecological destruction and resource depletion. In many ways the dependency alternative failed to offer anything new.

A number of alternative approaches began to emerge. Two complementary development theories, Another Development and the idea of Building Sustainable Societies, were among these new approaches.

These two theories differ from earlier approaches in the role given to economic growth. While the Modernization and Dependency theories give economic issues a primary role, these new approaches tend to regard economic growth as a secondary issue.

The overall approach of these two theories is more "normative and value based" (Hettne, 1983:261). They call for a reorientation of the economic system toward human needs and values, much in the spirit of Lux and Lutz's "Humanistic Economics" (1979).

Sustainable society thinking is highly concerned with the resource and biological base of society (Brown, 1981; Praiges, 1977). The sustainable society theorists question not only if growth is desirable, but also if it is possible, given the resource constraints. Among the strategies advocated are renewable energy sources, local self-reliance, moving away from automobiles toward more sustainable transportation, changes in agriculture, restructuring the economy, movement away from urbanization, reduced consumption, and recycling. (Brown, 1981:247-284). Workplace democracy and local solutions to global problems are also advocated (Stokes, 1981). To use Brown's (1981:280) phrase, a movement "from growth to sustainability" becomes the goal.

"Another Development" accepts a decidedly normative framework for development as well. Hettne (1983:261) notes that previous approaches were based on the assumption that development was an inherent quality in all societies and that development was a good thing which should be promoted by removing obstacles to it, whether constituted by obsolete social structures or external dependence. In contrast, Another Development would be a process in accordance with contextually defined human needs and values.

Another Development, then, changes development from a technical/economic process to one with a strong value component, much in the tradition of Goulet (1971) and Myrdal's (1968) explorations into the normative bases of development.

Hettne (1983) notes that Another Development prescribes strategies of self-reliance, basic needs fulfillment, participation, and eco-development. Self-reliance refers to the idea of developing self-sufficient units for development. Fulfillment of basic needs means meeting the survival needs of all members of the population in as brief a period as possible. This strategy was adopted by the International Labor Office (1976) and U.S. Foreign Aid Programs during the 1970s. Basic needs have been defined to include not only food, clothing and shelter, but even things like education, social justice, participation, and health care (Baster, 1985).

While participation has a long tradition in community development, participatory development provides an alternative to the top-down strategies of the official strategies (Gran, 1980). Workplace democracy could be considered an aspect of participation. Eco-development has a very strong similarity to sustainable society orientations. It concentrates on resource conservation and ecological concerns (Hettne, 1983).

The strategies suggested in Sustainable Society and Another Development approaches are complementary. The common points of agreement include:

1. a normative, value-centered approach to development;
2. concentration resource conservation and ecological concerns as well as quality of life concerns;
3. small-scale development based on relatively self-reliant local communities;
4. rejection of economic growth as the sole criterion of development;
5. participation in development and production.

Other points suggested by one approach or another include commitment to basic needs fulfillment, overall self-reliance, etc. It is upon these building blocks that we can begin to build a better development strategy for Appalachia.

A New Strategy For Appalachian Development

We can now begin to speculate about the shape of an Appalachian Development strategy based on this conception of development. The proposed strategy has six elements:

1. a reorientation of goals away from economic growth toward an emphasis on human growth, quality of life, and societal growth;
2. a change in measurement to reflect the above-noted changes in goals;
3. a policy framework to encourage societal development within a sustainable context and to encourage community-level planning (Stokes, 1981);
4. a participatory "bottom-up" planning model, connected to policy framework and working at the community level;
5. a structure for providing technical assistance;
6. a structure for ensuring fulfillment of basic needs.

The relationship between these elements is depicted in Figure 1 (on the next page). Let us consider the elements in turn.

Changing the goals of Appalachian Development will require a major rethinking of what the future of the region will look like. Progress in the American mindset is equated with creating clones of the industrial northeast. This model may not be appropriate to the people of Appalachia (or, for that matter, to the people of the northeast), and if it is not, it should be discarded in favor of something more comfortable.

At the very least, a change in orientation should reflect concerns for the quality of life, social development, and the realization of human potential. Ideally, a fair amount of opportunity for participation in goal setting should be accorded to people of Appalachia. This would be a difficult and time-consuming process that may take many years to reach an acceptable level. We can, however, begin to move in this direction.

If there is a change in the way that development is conceived, there must also be a change in the way it is measured. The present economic output indicators fit well with the outcomes prescribed by the official theory. They presume to measure economic growth. While there are a number of criticisms of output measures, such as GNP, they remain appropriate to the task of showing progress in economic growth (Hicks and Streeten, 1979; Nordhaus and Tobin, 1972).

These output measures are not appropriate for the broader definitions of development that are proposed here (Seers, 1972; Morris, 1979; Schumacher, 1973; Brown, 1981). There has been a great deal of work in developing measures of socio-economic development,

Figure 1: Relationship Between Major Strategic Elements



much of which is relevant to our effort here (Baster, 1972; 1985; Rao, et al. 1978; Hicks and Streeten, 1979). These measures use either pure social indicators or a combination of social and economic indicators.

Galtung (1976) makes an important point when he suggests that the people be involved in the selection and development of indicators. It seems to make little sense to have a development based on participation measured by an elitist set of indicators.

While the region is very well supplied with economic indicators through the system of national accounts, other development indicators are not as widely available. It seems appropriate for an organization to be set up to gather information about the development of the region as reflected by the new orientation.

Another critical component of this approach is the creation of a policy framework to support and structure the development process. There will be four principal parts of this policy framework:

1. a set of policies dealing with regional level issues such as resource conservation and environmental protection;
2. a set of policies to support the efforts of local communities;
3. a set of policies to insure basic needs fulfillment;
4. a policy to provide technical assistance to community-level groups.

An overall set of policies for regional issues is vital because many problems cannot be dealt with on a local basis. The present policy framework of the official school supports (and even encourages) resource exploitation. Environmental regulation laws have been historically lax in Appalachia, so an overall policy might compensate for the lack of resolve on the part of the states. Those things that need to be done on a regional basis would fall into this category.

One part of the overall policy framework that could have a distinct impact on capital flight and related issues would be policies that would require notice before plants move out of an area or even co-determination (a worker voice on the Board of Directors) as is done in Germany and Sweden (Lux and Lutz, 1979; Bluestone and Harrison, 1982). Shearer (1983-1984) goes so far as to advocate a "Bill of Economic Rights." (See Gil, 1986, for a report of such an effort in Massachusetts). Along the same line, the overall policy framework should press for workplace democracy and employee ownership (Shearer, 1983-84; Stokes, 1981).

A second set of policies supports local efforts. Stokes (1981) notes that, while local efforts are the essence of a sustainable development strategy,

> *Public policies in support of self-help efforts are often necessary to overcome some of the human and institutional obstacles that stand in the path of people helping themselves.*
>
> (Stokes, 1981:123)

This set of policies will attempt to provide the means to obtain technical assistance and resources (such as loans), linkage between local and large-scale projects,

and linkages between local projects (Stokes, 1981:123-137).

In terms of technical assistance, it may be useful to set up a sub-regional system to link governmental and academic expertise with local communities through a system of sub-regional centers. These centers will have direct contact with the communities. One possible model, but not the only one, is the use of voluntary associations to provide technical assistance. Franda (1979) discusses one scheme where voluntary associations link village-level workers with young professionals who work and live in a voluntary association setting, much as the Settlement House workers did in the 1880s. This strategy has the potential advantage of putting professional expertise in a more personal package.

The provision of basic needs is another important part of the strategy. Perhaps what is needed is an enhanced community-oriented social welfare system with more emphasis on empowerment and a more secure system of income support. This would also argue for Full Employment Assurance (Gil, 1986) in the overall policy framework.

The final component of the model is the development of participatory bottom-up planning and problem-solving for Appalachian communities. This planning should give the people of the community the opportunity to define their own problems and develop local solutions that are consistent with local cultural and social patterns and local

Stokes (1981) provides an extensive discussion of local efforts. These efforts include energy conservation, healthcare, etc. Gran (1980) provides an extensive rationale for these types of efforts. The key is not only local efforts, but local efforts connected with regional efforts.

The obvious pitfall here is the power of local elites (Caudill, 1963; 1976; Gaventa, 1980). There is no ready solution to this problem. One might expect that through the involvement and empowerment of local people, some power redistribution might occur.

This completes the model in its entirety. The question is, will it work?

Viability of the Approach

The ultimate question that can be asked of any development program is, "Can it be successful in the real world?" The answer, while not completely clear, is not unhopeful.

It would be very difficult for this strategy to work in the present socioeconomic climate. There are a number of reasons to expect that this situation will change.

People are afraid of the future of the region. They fear for their families, their jobs, their communities, and their personal future. The present development strategies do little to allay that fear. People are also less trusting of business and government alike. This creates a situation where we will begin to look for new strategies.

Social movements, like the Greens, continue to grow in power. Hettne (1983) notes the consistency between these social movements and the growing popularity of another development in industrialized nations. The most important reason to suggest that this strategy is possible is the likelihood that the present crisis of Appalachia will get worse. There is little chance that Appalachia can deal successfully with the world system. The effects of capital flight will continue to warp local economies and communities. The policy instruments we have for dealing with the world system have an exceedingly slim chance of success. The present system continues to expend non-renewable resources at phenomenal rates---a trend that cannot continue forever (Brown, 1981; Schumacher, 1973). To put it simply, official development cannot continue to function in the present environment.

There is, then, some cause for optimism. Present approaches seem to have reached the end of their utility and the evolving national ideology may provide for a new development in Appalachia.

Conclusion

Appalachian Development Theory has experienced a number of problems in dealing with the crisis of Appalachia. The official position provides a set of undesirable policy prescriptions. While the radical alternative provides a somewhat different analysis, it provides only a few usable policies. An alternative development strategy, based on Another Development and sustainable society concepts has been offered here. This model combines local development with a regional policy framework to provide a model of development that is both workable and viable for Appalachia. We can have the kind of future we want for the mountains. It is vital that we move toward that future with every step taken in the cause of regional development.

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APPALACHIAN TRENDS AND THE LIBERAL ARTS COLLEGE: A PERSPECTIVE AND CASE STUDY BASED ON POWER THEORY

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The purpose of this paper is to use power theory as developed by John Gaventa (1980) in his historical study of Appalachia to examine selected current and projected trends in the region, to evaluate some of the proposed solutions to the region's persistent problems, and to focus on the role of the local liberal arts college as a resource for progress through rural adult education. The liberal arts college is one of the "mediating structures" (Couto, 1986) that may serve as change agent in the search for new solutions. It is of special significance to us because we work there and believe that we and our fellow academicians have a unique opportunity to impact the region for good. To illustrate the promise and difficulties of this approach, we will conclude by presenting a case study of the newly established, joint extension program between Carson-Newman College and the Rural Counties Educational Cooperative in Jellico, Tennessee.

Power Theory and the Economic Picture

It is consistent with power theory to say that economic trends in Appalachia often reflect unilateral moves by powerful interests to accumulate and protect capital, with little consideration paid to the local human costs resulting from those moves. Such moves are cloaked in the language of economic imperatives, which gives them an urgency and logic that serves as justification and prevents the effective emergence of local opposition. Without local opposition, alternatives are not explored and issues are not clarified, so that the powerful corporate interests are left to define the situation, even in the minds of the local populace (Gaventa, 1980).

In rural Appalachia today, trends include the loss of some manufacturing firms to foreign locations, an increase in automation that further reduces the number of manufacturing jobs, and missing out almost entirely on acquiring new industries in the growth areas of military spending and high technology (Couto, 1984, 1986; Winter, 1986; Rosenfeld, 1983). Since corporate decision-makers tend to reside outside the region and are accountable to stock-holders and interests other than the local community (Gaventa, 1980), such moves can be made independently of local actions. A historical trend that compounds the powerlessness of local interests is that industries that do come and stay often contribute little to community development in terms of a solid, diversified economic base (Cobb, 1986). While the pay-roll is of course much appreciated while it lasts, the taxes and wages paid out are typically low. This hinders the building of local wealth and a strong system of education and other community services. Thus, not only can decisions that hurt the local community be made and justified unilaterally on the basis of powerful corporate interests, but after the industry is gone, circumstances may be worse than ever, especially in those cases in which the departing industry retains absentee ownership of land or leaves a significant portion of it polluted or otherwise unusable. Put another way, power of outside corporate interests too often adds little to the power of the local community and may in fact reduce it.

Two other significant trends include the feminization of the workforce and the reduction of many federal aid programs (e.g., Couto, 1986). In the short term, loss of the federal aid programs may be catastrophic to the local community's ability to respond to its economic problems. While the addition of income earned by women can be a positive trend for the local economy, it is unfortunately often offset by the decline in employment for men and may represent growth restricted to the low-paying service sector. On the other hand, women new to the workforce may be gaining valuable experience that serves to empower these individuals (Gibbs and Fowler, 1985; Wolfe and Olah, 1985). This trend may well turn out to be the critical step in the formation of local community interest groups that are able to establish joint programs in rural adult education with area colleges (Hyland, 1984) and thereby respond to problems from more of a position of power.

The social costs of the region's economic problems are well-known and tragic. Rates of infant mortality, hunger, unemployment, and educational failure are

alarmingly high and in many locales getting worse (Carter and Osborne, 1987). The irony of this bleak assessment is that, in terms of mineral wealth and industrial potential, Appalachia consistently has been shown to be among the richest regions in the entire nation (Gaventa, 1980; Couto, 1984).

Appalachia in the Information Age

Interwoven with all the economic trends in Appalachia is the fact that the U.S. and other developed countries are in the midst of an information revolution (Dillman, 1985, 1986; Goe, 1986). As Dillman writes, "Increasingly, information substitutes.....for energy and labor in the production of goods and services" (1985:3). The information age by definition emphasizes the national and international context of Appalachia's economic picture since geographic distance becomes irrelevant in the conduct of commerce.

The impact of the information age on Appalachia is unclear at this point. Conceivably, both "good" and "bad" developments could occur. Of particular relevance to the region, however, is Dillman's (1985) projections about possible role and status changes of local white-collar individuals such as bankers and managers. The information age literally could put these people out of business. Hawken (1983) has called this process "disintermediation," and Cleveland (1983) has referred to it as the "twilight of hierarchy."

As we argue elsewhere (Carter and Osborne, 1987), this potential development is highly relevant to Appalachia because of the key function that local white-collar elite traditionally have served in the region's economic system. Gaventa's (1980) historical analysis of the region based on power theory convincingly argues that the widespread system of absentee ownership, poverty among the region's inhabitants and institutions, and quiescence to this arrangement on the part of its victims is highly dependent on the actions of the local elite. Examples of such actions include the manipulation of information to define political agendas, control of economic rewards and punishments, and power to invoke values and symbols to legitimize the status quo.

What will happen to the local elite if they become dispensable in Appalachia's economic system? Power theory would predict a shift towards disenfranchisement as their usefulness to absentee corporations diminishes. Already, evidence is accumulating that shows an "erosion of the middle income sector" (Couto, 1984:67, 1986) in rural Appalachia. In our home county in east Tennessee, we personally know of a half dozen cases in which engineers at local plants and mines have been fired or demoted as part of their company's retrenchment move to eliminate middle management positions. Of the five liberal arts colleges in Appalachian Tennessee, three nearly closed for financial reasons (within the past 10 years) before being re-organized, and the other two are experiencing moderate to severe enrollment declines of their own. Obviously, these trends if continued will have dire consequences for the personal lives and social institutions of the local elite. Their standard of living, range of professional opportunities, and viability of such institutions as the private college and mainline denomination church all will be threatened. Ironically, then, the local elite will face the same hard choices confronted by the Appalachian farm worker and coal miner of one or two generations ago. Displaced by technological innovation or economic recession they can stay and eke out a living under increasingly unfriendly economic circumstances, or migrate out of the region to seek a better life elsewhere.

On the other hand, power theory also allows that the changing dynamics of Appalachia under the information age could stimulate a historic shift that will raise the prospects for a better future for all the region's inhabitants. If the absentee corporations no longer need them, the local elite are freed to re-align themselves with the interests of their fellow Appalachians. Instead of having a vested interest in the status quo, the local elite may come to see their fate as dependent upon helping to recapture local control of resources and decisions that impact on the personal destinies of all the region's inhabitants. According to power theory, such local control is precisely the change needed to counter the structural and psychological obstacles that lie in the path of a more self- determined prosperity for the region.

This possibility may not be as far-fetched as it perhaps first seems to those familiar with the persistent problems found within the region. For example, if there are fewer middle income people to apply for loans at the local bank or for admission to the local college, and if the absentee owners of the local plant are contributing less and less to the economic stability of the community, and if professional people with declining incomes find themselves facing some of the same problems encountered by working class and poor people, perhaps conditions will become favorable for new coalitions to emerge among the local inhabitants who remain in the region.

Such local people presumably would be those committed to place and hence to each other. According to power theory, they would need a new language and set of symbols to talk about their circumstances and goals, to replace the language and symbols of powerlessness

that emphasize dependence and economic impossibilities (Gaventa, 1980). Happily, new language and symbols are already evolving in the region. Community organizations such as the Kentucky Fair Tax Coalition, Yellow Creek Concerned Citizens, Save Our Cumberland Mountains, and Mountain Women's Exchange illustrate this fact with their poetic names eliciting images of hope, cooperation, and empowerment (Horton and Ernstein, 1982).

While such community groups operating in isolation may have limited impact (Couto, 1986), those which come to have cross-sectional ties within the community may be more effective over the long term (MDC, 1986). For example, consider CORA (the Commission on Religion in Appalachia). This is a well-known ecumenical organization of mostly main-line and middle-class religious denominations. For quite some time, it has been involved as a partner in the successful work and funding of many grass-roots community groups. Thus, re-alignments of the sort described under the effects of the information age may not be just a future possibility but a present reality, small and growing.

The Search for Solutions

The shifting allegiances of the middle class and the appearance of adequately funded and organized community groups may be two prerequisites for finding solutions to Appalachia's problems. According to power theory, unless an effective opposition is able to form that calls into question the decisions and practices of the dominant interests in the region, then no solutions dealing with the need for systemic change will even be sought (Gaventa, 1980). At most, band-aid and charity-type solutions will be proposed that give the appearance of proper concern but leave the underlying causes untouched.

In addition to needing a new language and set of symbols to emphasize empowerment and hopefulness, a cooperative search for solutions also needs to come to terms with the ambiguous and negative images and meanings attached to Appalachia's history, customs, and people. Power theory recognizes that stereotypes and negative attitudes toward the common culture serve to maintain inequities and oppose change (Gaventa, 1980). This is an area in which local colleges can have a major positive impact by promoting research on such social psychological issues as attitude change in Appalachia, and by establishing programs to promote a serious appreciation of Appalachian history and culture.

Moving from these general concerns, we look now at a number of specific proposals that have been made to address the long-standing economic problems of Appalachia. Apparently, the prospects of recruiting major new manufacturing firms, or high technology and research and development industries, are not bright, since these tend to go to foreign locations or metropolitan areas (Winter, 1986). Also, government cut-backs are making federal aid programs a declining resource (Couto, 1986). Instead of relying exclusively on industrial recruitment and federal aid, therefore, current proposals are emphasizing local development and utilization of existing resources within the region.

Winter (1986:107), for example, recommends that "new business development," "new agricultural products," and "tourism and retirement areas" be created through entrepreneurship and funded by "modest amounts of venture capital" from local financial institutions. The recent report from the MDC group in North Carolina (MDC, 1986:12) is optimistic in its assessment of the adequacy of existing human resources and enterprises in rural areas to come up with innovative and successful ventures ranging from "worker-owned businesses, cottage industries, and cooperatives, as well as traditional small businesses" that are "tailored to local needs, goals, and opportunities."

In evaluating these proposals, we would call attention to the fact that they presume, first, a commitment on the part of local leadership to the community itself rather than to stockholders or other interests residing outside the region. This fact alone short-circuits many of the processes identified by power theory that limit the development of local control and justify inequities and unilateral moves from the outside which are in opposition to community interests. Caring about community is perhaps an ethic whose time has again come in Appalachia (Eller, 1986) as part of the wider search in contemporary American culture to recover a sense of place and belonging (Bellah *et al.*, 1985). Secondly, the proposals presume that a cooperative quest for answers (Carter and Osborne, 1987) utilizing a cross section of the community and resources available locally is better than an arrangement which depends upon and benefits only select individuals with ties to outside interests. Thus, from the perspective of power theory, we find that the new proposals represent a positive step in regional development for Appalachia.

Throughout the literature on proposed solutions for Appalachia, references to the need for better education are frequent. While traditional thinking calls for better education to enhance worker training and productivity (Martorana and Garland, 1984; Gilmer and Pulsipher, 1986), more innovative approaches call for education in entrepreneurship and small business skills beginning at

the high school level (Rosenfeld, 1983; Winter, 1986; MDC, 1986). From the perspective of power theory, however, we see the need to go even further, beyond the narrowly defined topics of applied education, to the liberal arts. The main contribution of a liberal arts education is in empowering people to be active change agents in their own lives. If a truly cooperative and cross-sectional effort is to be made within Appalachian communities, then power must be shared, and this requires that working class and poor people participate. This need for empowerment through education is widely recognized (Rosenfeld, 1983; Hyland, 1984; Barker, 1985), but is difficult to achieve in practice. The barriers and structures identified by power theory which divide the community and support social inequities leave a legacy of suspicion, misunderstanding, cross purposes, and difficult communication that works against shared ventures between different interest groups such as the local college and the citizens' cooperative. In order to explore the promise and difficulties of such shared ventures, we turn now to a case study of the joint extension program between Carson-Newman College and the Rural Counties Educational Cooperative (RCEC) in Jellico, Tennessee.

The Case Study

Methods: In order to gather information for the study, we read RCEC's promotional literature; interviewed the present and interim coordinators of the group; talked informally on several occasions with students enrolled in a social psychology class that one of us (G.L.O.) is teaching for RCEC; interviewed the president and academic dean of Carson-Newman College; read the college's statement of purpose and history; talked informally with several Carson-Newman faculty who have been involved in the RCEC program; and read in the literature on rural adult and community education. Also, we administered a brief survey to students enrolled in a RCEC-sponsored class in Jellico and to students enrolled in the same course on the main campus. The purpose was to compare the two groups with regard to demographic and life history data, as well as attitudes about work, community, and education.

Program Descriptions: RCEC describes itself as a "cooperative endeavor of mountain women" that "provides college classes in the supportive atmosphere of the local community." It "keeps rates affordable for poor and working class people" and actively participates in "designing a curriculum that relates to the lifestyle and needs of rural women and men" (brochure, "Rural Communities Educational Cooperative").

RCEC began as a project of Mountain Women's Exchange in 1982. The first courses in Jellico were offered in 1983 through Roane State Community College. A FIPSE grant (U.S. Department of Education Fund for the Improvement of Postsecondary Education) was awarded in 1984. Since 1985, RCEC has worked with Carson-Newman College, which is located 80 miles away in Jefferson City, Tennessee (brochure, "Rural Communities Educational Cooperative"). Enrollment through RCEC has grown from 25 students in 1983 to 71 in the fall of 1986.

Current recruitment material states that RCEC is "a way to improve yourself.....to advance your career goals." Students may work toward a bachelor's degree in general studies or general business. Costs are considerably less than the tuition paid by regular students at the main campus, and various financial aid and scholarship funds are available to cover most or all of the expense for students unable to pay on their own (brochure, "RCEC").

Established in 1851, Carson-Newman College is a private, primarily undergraduate, liberal arts institution affiliated with the Tennessee Baptist Convention. In its statement of purpose, Carson-Newman is described as following "a tradition that involves an awareness of those foundational areas through which the values and experience of mankind are understood." At Carson-Newman, the feeling is that "vocational questions can best be answered in a liberal arts setting. There is also an emphasis on the "community---of learners, teachers, thinkers, all committed to the understanding of Christianity---working together in a spirit of mutual respect. The statement concludes with these words: "A famous American writer has said, 'When I read, I am always listening for the sound of the human voice.' At CN, we try to help you find yours" (Carson-Newman College Catalogue, 1986-87).

Currently, Carson-Newman has around 1600 students, which represents a slight decline in enrollment in comparison to 1984 figures. However, of the six or eight small colleges in the area, Carson-Newman is considered to be one of the most stable in enrollment, secure in financial terms, and respected as an institution of high academic standards.

Carson-Newman had a major extension program in Oak Ridge, Tennessee until the mid-1970s, when it folded because of opposition by faculty to what they perceived to be a problem with academic quality, and because the two key liaison people in Oak Ridge died or moved away. Currently, Carson-Newman is offering four or five courses per semester through RCEC. A joint curriculum committee, consisting of the academic

dean, head of career planning, and two faculty, along with the coordinators and the sever-member board of RCEC, decides what courses are needed and which faculty will be asked to teach. Generally, faculty are regulars from Carson-Newman who drive the 160-mile round trip once or even twice a week to hold their classes in Jellico High School. Occasionally, a qualified professional from the immediate area is hired, if approved by both RCEC and the college.

Student Characteristics and Attitudes: By reputation, RCEC would be seen primarily as a working class group, largely female, composed of non-traditional learners, whereas Carson-Newman would be seen as more of a middle class institution, coeducational, attended by traditional college-age learners. Conceivably, if the groups are this dichotomous, attitudes with respect to work, community, and education would be different. Knowing about such differences would be important to faculty as they prepare to teach according to the particular learning environment and student characteristics to be encountered.

The results of the survey of students in the Jellico course versus those in the same course at the main campus are summarized in the following tables. Table 1 (on the next page) lists demographic characteristics. As expected, RCEC students were mostly female, older, and more likely to have children (items 1, 2, 4, 5). As a group they also were poorer, both presently and while growing up, and were more likely to have worked to support a family (items 6, 7, 8).

Attitudinal differences between RCEC and Carson-Newman students were present but not large, as shown in Table 2 (see page 65). RCEC students were more likely to believe that unions are a good thing (item 2). There was also some tendency for them to express less religiosity, less condemnation of welfare, and more expectation of getting a job as a result of enrollment in the course (items 1, 4, & 7). Otherwise, the two groups were quite similar. Note also that considerable variability occurred within both groups for most measures, which should be taken as a warning not to stereotype members of RCEC who showed as much individuality in their responses as did Carson-Newman students.

Benefits of the Joint Program: We turn now to some important questions on the value, problems, and future needs of the joint program between RCEC and Carson-Newman. First, what does each party hope to gain from this shared venture?

At a basic level, RCEC is about jobs. While a number of students say they only want a "good, general education," there are strong expectations on the part of others that their studies will pay off vocationally. Unfortunately, as our review indicated earlier, the economic trends are rather pessimistic. It would be a mistake, therefore, to adopt a narrowly specialized job training program as has been the tradition in rural adult education (e.g., Martorana and Garland, 1984) for the simple reason that too few jobs exist in the area to warrant this approach. RCEC has in fact avoided this pitfall by going with a liberal arts college. The key benefit of the liberal arts approach is that students gain knowledge and skills relevant to their own emergence in the community as leaders and informed change agents (Barker, 1985; Rosenfeld, 1983). As noted earlier, Appalachia needs local leadership committed to local interests, community development, and entrepreneurship (MDC, 1986; Winter, 1986). A practical program of studies within the tradition of the liberal arts would seem most able to meet these needs.

Since the program is indeed a shared venture, empowerment is also enhanced as RCEC administers itself, negotiates with the college, and confronts the inevitable conflicts that arise. As stated by Gibbs and Fowler (1985:338-339) in their article on rural women and economic development, "The journey rural women have taken in helping their sisters is no less than an heroic journey which has, as outcome, transformed some of the oppressive forces in society, making a new place for women rather than trying to keep women in their place." The empowerment of women and the resulting positive consequences for community development may be the single most encouraging trend to be found in Appalachia today.

Finally, many RCEC students report having a lot of fun going to college. They find some of the courses interesting, but the real enjoyment seems to be in the social experience. They meet new people, share common concerns, and do things that are out of the ordinary.

From the college's standpoint, the joint venture provides a unique opportunity to be of service and to respond as partner to individual and community needs. This is consistent with the mandate as heard in the institution's statement of purpose, and was the most frequent response by college administrators to the question, "Why is Carson-Newman involved?" The fact is that, because of tuition breaks and added travel expense, the program with RCEC does not generate much profit for the college, but rather just manages to pay for itself.

On the other hand, increased revenues to institutions was one of the positive effects of adult education noted by Fleer (1986) in her recent study of the response of independent higher education in the South to the adult learner. At Carson-Newman, the hope is that through its

Table 1. Survey Results Showing Demographic Comparisons of CNC and RCEC Students

Measure		CNC[a]	RCEC[b]	Chi-Square
1. Sex:	male	6	1	6.24
	female	11	21	p<.02
2. Age:	17 or under	0	0	19.1
	18-22	12	2	p<.001
	23-29	4	5	
	30-39	1	11	
	40-49	0	4	
	50 or older	0	0	
3. Race:	White	16	21	1.5
	Black	1	0	p<.50
	Other	0	0	
4. Marital Status:				
	single never married	14	4	18.68
	single divorce/separated	0	7	p<.001
	single widowed	1	1	
	married, first	1	9	
	married, remarried	1	1	
5. Do you have children?	yes	1	17	19.41
	no	16	5	p<.001
6. Present family income:				
	10,000 or less	3	10	11.54
	11-20,000	3	9	p<.05
	21-30,000	4	1	
	31-40,000	2	1	
	41-50,000	3	1	
	51,000 or more	2	0	
7. Have you ever worked to support your family?	yes	2	21	26.8
	no	14	1	p<.001
8. Childhood family description:				
	poor	0	7	10.29
	working class	5	9	p<.02
	middle class	13	6	
	upper class	0	0	
9. Have you ever been unintentionally unemployed?	yes	4	8	0.86
	no	12	12	p<.5

a) n =17. Actual number of responses may vary due to omissions or multiple answers.

b) n =21. Actual number of responses may vary as noted above.

Table 2. Survey Results Showing Attitudinal Comparisons of CNC and RCEC Students

Attitude		CNC	RCEC	Chi-Square
1. I am a religious person.	A[a]	17	15	5.75
	N	0	6	p<.10
	D	0	0	
2. I believe unions are a good thing.	A	4	14	7.482
	N	11	5	p<.025
	D	2	2	
3. I believe the purpose of education is to let the best students get the best jobs.	A	4	5	2.54
	N	0	3	p<.50
	D	13	14	
4. Welfare is a bad thing.	A	2	5	5.66
	N	7	2	p<.10
	D	8	15	
5. I believe the purpose of education is to let everyone live a happy life and help other people.	A	12	13	1.43
	N	1	4	p<.50
	D	4	4	
6. Our economic system is fair in terms of who gets the jobs and who has the money.	A	2	3	0.18
	N	1	2	p<.95
	D	14	17	
7. The main thing I want from this course is to help me get a better job.	A	4	12	5.76
	N	1	3	p<.10
	D	12	7	
8. The main thing I want from this course is to help others in the community.	A	16	15	3.80
	N	0	4	p<.25
	D	1	1	
9. The main thing I want from this course is to help me get a good general education.	A	15	17	0.83
	N	1	3	p<.75
	D	1	2	
10. I feel confident I will do well in college.	A	15	15	1.96
	N	2	3	p<.50
	D	0	2	

a) A = Agree or agree strongly,
N = neutral or no opinion,
D = disagree or disagree strongly.

presence in Jellico and the RCEC program, more students from the area will become interested in enrolling at the college on a full-time basis, so that eventually some financial gain can be realized. Carson-Newman, like many other private undergraduate institutions its size, is highly tuition-dependent. To a certain degree, then, groups like RCEC are in a strong bargaining position when it comes to negotiating with such institutions of higher education. In these days of declining enrollment figures, colleges can benefit through the increased numbers of students and tuition income that come from joint programs with community groups like RCEC.

While the college itself may not be making an immediate profit, individual faculty are being paid on an overload basis for teaching in Jellico. Given the decline in the middle-income sector noted earlier, this is not an insignificant factor in the faculty member's willingness to drive the 160 miles per week to teach in the RCEC program.

A final benefit for the college noted by Fleer (1986) was her finding that the presence of adult learners enriched the teaching and learning environment. While this may be less true for Carson-Newman since RCEC classes are held off campus, faculty do report that they enjoy the experience of teaching more mature, motivated, and lively students. Also, at least two faculty have developed scholarly interests in Appalachia since becoming involved in the program. Thus, the joint venture with RCEC offers the added benefit of providing a rich opportunity for research by scholars interested in the region. By coincidence, this may prove to be a critically important feature of such programs. Federal support for research on Appalachia such as monitoring economic problems and human needs is being cut back severely (Couto, 1986). Perhaps faculty who teach in RCEC and similar programs can pick up some of the slack.

If we were to ask our original question a little differently, as *who* benefits from the joint program between RCEC and Carson-Newman College, the answer is that everybody does: the women of RCEC, the community of Jellico, the college as an institution, the faculty, and ultimately the region itself. Thus, from a perspective of power theory, the mutuality of the joint program is to be commended. But what about the potential and inevitable problems and concerns associated with such a venture? This is the subject to which we now turn.

Problems and Concerns: The literature on adult and community-based education identifies a number of typical problems encountered as a traditional institution of higher education like Carson-Newman attempts to work with a nontraditional group such as RCEC. Adult learners are recognized as having special needs and characteristics that can impair performance in the classroom, such as being highly anxious under time pressures, having a strong need for the material to be personally relevant, being rusty in basic academic skills, and a general unfamiliarity with institutional procedures. For the interested reader, a number of fine resources exist that offer helpful suggestions for curriculum design, support programs, and teaching methods that increase academic success rates for the adult learner (e.g., Barker, 1985; Backus, 1984; Lunch, Doyle, and Chickering, 1985). Also, it is noteworthy that RCEC helps its students with such programs as literacy training.

More difficult to resolve are problems concerning faculty attitudes that equate adjusting teaching methods with compromising academic standards (Hyland, 1984; Fleer, 1986). Carson-Newman apparently had this problem with the previous extension program at Oak Ridge that failed. It seems likely that the present circumstances with RCEC, in which faculty members play an equal role in curriculum planning, combined with the particular personalities involved and the economic pressures on the college to maintain enrollment, serve as a deterrent to hold this problem in check. However, the potential difficulty of oppositional faculty underscores the importance of strategic planning in the selection of people to teach and to serve on the curriculum committee, and the need for open and frequent dialogue.

Communication is also important, given the cross purposes that are likely to exist. Hyland. (1984:35) states that "Recognition of the possibility of conflicting agendas and interests" should lead to "establishing early precise assumptions, expectations, and limitations." From his experience with adult education in New York, Hyland observed the problems that can arise as an activist community group works with a traditional academic institution. One is seeking social change from a perspective critical of establishment norms and values, while the other is a part of the establishment. Hyland also notes that factions within the groups can form as individuals deal with the cross pressures they are under. One Carson-Newman faculty member reported, for example, that some of the students in his class formed two opposing cliques after the first exam, based on how well they had done. Those who had gotten A's were supportive of the existing grading system, whereas those who had gotten C's and D's were critical of it. The faculty responded by holding an open discussion to air various points of view and to solicit suggestions, and the issue was resolved to everybody's satisfaction. Thus, in this case, awareness of conflicting interests and the need for communication helped to remediate a potentially bad situation.

Carson-Newman administrators acknowledge that the tension between maintaining high academic standards and tailoring the course to fit the needs of RCEC students will be a continuing issue. They endorse the idea of faculty training in non-traditional teaching methods. The problems of commuting distance, added expense, and expanded work load to conduct the program with RCEC are accepted as part of the inevitable realities of doing rural adult education. Both the President and the Academic Dean enthusiastically support further joint ventures between Carson-Newman and community groups like RCEC and believe such ventures are entirely consistent with the mission and philosophy of the college.

One of the major obstacles that faces Carson-Newman in its effort to develop additional extension programs in rural Appalachia is the absence of highly supportive liaison people in the community. This factor apparently contributed to the demise of the Oak Ridge program. Thus, the fact that RCEC plays the instrumental role that it does in coordinating the arrangements in Jellico is much appreciated within the college. It is known that educators can facilitate the emergence of community groups like RCEC (Hyland, 1984), and this strategy may be the best way Carson-Newman can pursue its interests in rural adult education in the future.

From the perspective of RCEC, the main problem in the past has been a lack of flexibility on the part of certain institutions and individual faculty. RCEC needs institutions to be flexible in terms of tuition payment schedule, negotiated group tuition rates, and when and what courses are taught, and for faculty to be sensitive to the student's needs and the purposes of the program. RCEC has found working with state schools to be particularly frustrating because of the myriad of bureaucratic regulations involved. Happily, both the institution and faculty of Carson-Newman have proved to be sufficiently flexible most of the time. The private college may well enjoy a decided advantage over state schools in the flexibility needed to work with groups like RCEC.

A second problem concerns the actual level of teaching and the faculty's professional credentials. RCEC members recall an earlier extension program in Jellico from another private college that failed because high school teachers were assigned who treated the students in a highly patronizing manner. Since RCEC now collaborates with Carson-Newman in the selection of faculty, this problem is no longer a major concern. Although RCEC expects faculty and the college to be flexible as previously mentioned, it is also in complete agreement with Carson-Newman that appropriate academic standards be maintained to protect the students' best interests.

A final problem is that students in the RCEC program have different social needs than the prototypical student in a large urban university. On the personal level, they compliment Carson-Newman on its small-town, friendly atmosphere. Faculty and administrators who are eager to help, to be supportive, and to relate democratically are very much appreciated. One dimension to this issue is the need to take things gradually. RCEC members are aware that other community education groups in nearby towns have failed. The interpretation is that they tried to accomplish too much too quickly. A gradual progression is also needed given the newness of the higher educational experience to most students and the many constraints on member's time from family and work. Another interesting dimension is the fact that RCEC is composed almost entirely of women, whereas Carson-Newman has more of a male persona. Thus, interactions may be complicated by different perceptual and nonverbal communication styles, particularly concerning the theme of power. Besides being sensitive to this point, one simple preventive measure is to alternate administrative meeting locales between the college and RCEC so that habitual patterns of dominance by one side or the other do not develop.

Summary and Conclusion

This paper has reviewed some current trends that portray a bleak economic picture for rural Appalachia. Although dire assessments of the region's circumstances are not new, the emerging troubles of the middle class and other local elite may signal a qualitative change for the worse. If this trend continues, institutions such as the mainline church, locally owned bank, and denominational college can be expected to suffer. On a more hopeful note, positive trends can be found in the empowerment of rural women, as increasing numbers enter the workforce, and in the rise of numerous community interest groups such as RCEC.

In the past, industrial recruitment and federal welfare programs have served as the economic lifeline for the region's rural areas. Indications are that these resources can no longer be counted on at least for the foreseeable future. Instead, cooperative efforts that utilize local resources and that reflect community strengths and needs are being proposed. In order for such efforts to be effective, however, local leadership must be drawn from a cross section of the community, including middle class and local elite, and working class and poor people. A cross-sectional effort is needed because no single sector appears capable of solving the community's

problems by itself.

Under ordinary circumstances, inclusion of working class and poor people as leaders in community economic development is made difficult by the myriad of social forces described by power theory. These are not ordinary times, however. New alliances are beginning to emerge as the various interest groups within rural Appalachian communities recognize that they need each other. Cooperative educational programs such as that between Carson-Newman College and RCEC may be the essential link that permits such cross-sectional alliances to work.

The liberal arts college can help empower rural mountain people to become active change agents in their personal lives and in the life of their community. Rural mountain people in turn can help the liberal arts college to fulfill its mission and to remain financially stable. The tentative success enjoyed by Carson-Newman College and RCEC can encourage others to pursue a joint extension program of this type. With the future of rural Appalachia presently in doubt, the need for more cooperative ventures between local colleges and community interest groups is an urgent one.

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ECONOMICS, EXPERTS, AND RISK: LESSONS FROM ABERFAN

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Children evoke powerful responses. They incarnate the hope for continuity of individuals, families, communities and the human species. Their activity and training in school expresses a community's effort to impart its values and to improve its condition. When we find school children in surroundings so grim that they tarnish the hope the children embody and compromise the effort of the community that discovery shocks us.

Harry Caudill attributes his inspiration to write, ***Night Comes to the Cumberlands*** to such a shock. Caudill served as a commencement speaker for an eight-grade graduation in a coal camp school in 1960. In the beginning of his book, he recounts the dilapidated two-room building, its leaky roof and rattling windows and other details of the ceremony. Of the seven graduating students, one was fatherless due to a mining accident, the father of a second graduate was wheezing and gasping with silicosis, and the fathers of three of the other graduates were jobless. The nearby immense slate dump and the grassless school playground added yet more contrast to the lyrics of "America the Beautiful" which the assembled people sang to begin the ceremonies. Caudill recalls, "The irony of the words, sung so lustily in such a setting, inspired the writing of this book" (Caudill, 1962: xiii).

Six and one-half years after Caudill's commencement experience, Aberfan, a coalmining community in South Wales, experienced the greatest, tragic shock imaginable related to its children. A portion of a huge pile of coal waste on the hill above the school, within easy view like the slate dump Caudill could see from the school he visited, collapsed. It tumbled down the mountain, buried a portion of the school and killed 52 boys and 52 girls in those classrooms; most of the community's children between the ages of 8 and 10. This tide of death claimed forty other lives on that morning of October 21, 1966.

Kai Erikson characterizes events like Aberfan as an acute disaster and events like Caudill's experience as part of a chronic disaster (Erikson, 132). He makes that distinction in a discussion of a different set of events; those which occurred on Buffalo Creek, West Virginia and resulted in a catastrophe on February 26, 1972. Acute catastrophes like Aberfan and Buffalo Creek fit in a context of the chronic catastrophe of economic vulnerability and political powerlessness.

The acute disasters at Aberfan and Buffalo Creek are a catastrophe in a precise sense of that term as Charles Perrow has developed it. That is, they are a rare combination of events which contribute to a group of people losing their lives or to have them threatened without warning, through no responsibility of their own and at an unexpected time and place (Perrow, 1986:356). In addition, characteristics of Aberfan distinguish it from other catastrophes. It is human in origin as well as consequence. A significant portion of the survivors had close ties to the victims. It happened in a community with stable, on-going ties. It is a specific, sudden tragedy but only one among many tragic events in the community's relation with the coal industry. Gwyn Thomas, the Welsh writer, called Aberfan, "the latest and, spiritually, the most destructive of our social obscenities, the last word in our long litany of lethal misfortunes" (Thomas, 21). These characteristics distinguish Aberfan from other catastrophes such as natural disasters and accidents.

Aberfan is also different from other forms of human tragedies with which we are familiar. Residents of coalmining communities know death and injury but Aberfan was not miners in the bowels of the earth running risks of roof falls and explosive gases; its victims were children in school. Children who never had the opportunity to calculate and accept or reject the odds of injury and death as miners do every day. Nazi Germany made us all aware of the deaths of innocent victims at the hands of others but Aberfan was not the extraordinary murder by ideology of the Holocaust; Aberfan was the consequence of the ordinary conduct of business. The elements of the disaster were the by-products of the industry that sustained the village.

It is important to distinguish from Aberfan other accidents, disasters and other forms of catastrophes to appreciate better its precise relation with a limited number of catastrophes. Such catastrophes, unfortunately, are increasingly recognizable and occur disproportionately often in regions with chronically depressed economies, such as Appalachia and especially in the coal fields. Buffalo Creek is an example already cited. But there are other similar instances as well. Bhopal and Institute, West Virginia suggest a recent parallel to Aberfan and Buffalo Creek. Browns Ferry and Chernobyl offer another parallel.

There are connections and not merely parallels between and among these catastrophes. For example, after Aberfan the U.S. Geological Survey and the Bureau of Mines studied mine-waste dumps in the United States. The Buffalo Creek waste pile was among the thirty-eight singled out as hazardous in West Virginia. The report stated explicitly that the waste dam could not hold excess rain, it would likely collapse and a "large wash would fill valley" (Caudill, 1972:16). Likewise, the cloud of death at Bhopal increased concern with the operations of Union Carbide in this country. Company assurances that America's better equipment, personnel and technology made a Bhopal-type accident here unlikely, preceded the accident at Institute. Finally, the Chernobyl catastrophe brought forward other, "it-can't-happen- here" assurances. These assurances sounded hollow after we discovered that American plants are inferior to Chernobyl in some aspects of design and that the Tennessee Valley Authority had intimidated employees who had spoken of their concerns about safety with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the press (Perrow, 1986). At present not one of the TVA's nuclear plants is operating because of concern with design and construction faults.

The relation of these catastrophes is remarkable because catastrophes are rare events made possible by an unlikely and infrequent set of conditions and by recurring risk (Perrow, 329). Their incidence in Appalachia suggests a higher than ordinary risk within the economy of the region. Rather than dwell on the infrequently occurring conditions, this paper deals with the recurring risks. Likewise, rather than draw parallels of destruction, this paper develops parallels of peril. It deals with two underlying causes of the catastrophe at Aberfan. Those lessons are the economic vulnerability of the community and the events of the political power of community residents to acquire or apply knowledge of their risk and to assure the action of experts with important knowledge on behalf of the community. These factors are related to each other and to the high risk technologies and the low opportunity performance of the economies of regions like South Wales and Appalachia.

To draw these lessons from Aberfan we will recount events there; relate the interpretation of those events; and finally, discuss the efforts of local leaders to express community values in the aftermath of the catastrophe and based on the lessons that they had acquired from the catastrophe.

The Catastrophe at Aberfan

At 9:15 on the morning of Friday, October 21, 1966, the 247 students and 9 teachers at Pant Glas Junior School in Aberfan began the school day with special enthusiasm. It was the last day before the start of their week-long, mid-term holiday. They had just left the school assembly in the center of the building and were settling down in their classrooms to begin their day's work.

On the fog-shrouded mountain behind the school - a steep slope where coal mine waste had been dumped for years - a portion of a tip, a mound of coalwaste, split away from the rest and rolled like a thundering wave toward the valley below. The shiny, black tide, a 140-cubic-yard mass with twice the density of water, crushed everything in its path as it gathered speed racing down the mountain. When it reached the rear of Pant Glas School, it packed enough force to crush and engulf the four classrooms in the rear. One hundred and four children in those classrooms - 52 boys and 52 girls between the ages of 8 and 10 - were killed instantly, along with five teachers and one other staff member. Outside, six other children died as they waited for the nearby senior school to open. The wave also hit a row of 16 houses across from the school, killing 22 adults and six more children there.

Within two or three minutes, the grotesque tidal wave of horror was still and a terrible silence enveloped the tragic scene of the devastated school and the nearby houses. One person who arrived on the scene early described the silence most memorably: "You couldn't hear a bird or a child" (Report, 27).

The first people to have early signs and warnings that something was wrong that morning were the workmen who went to the top of the mountain to begin the day's tipping operations. Two hundred and fifty tons of coal waste material was hauled to the top of the mountain every day in trams. Once there, men, called "slingers," attached chains to the tram and a crane lifted and tipped the trams sending its contents down the long face of the tip. By October 21, 1966, this particular tip had

been used for eight and one-half years. It was 111 feet high and it contained 297,000 cubic yards of waste or enough to cover 22 football fields 10 feet high.

The workmen arrived at their station at the top of the mountain about 7 a.m. and noticed a hole in the middle of the tip about nine feet deep. The tip was falling into itself and the rails on which the crane moved back and forth were hanging over the pit's depression. One of the workmen went back to the mine to inform the manager of what they had seen. He had to walk because the telephone at their work station did not work. The wires connecting the station to the plant had been robbed so many times that eventually they were not replaced. The manager advised the workman and his foreman to return to the worksite, sever the rails overhanging the depression with an oxy-acetylene burner and to move the crane back as far as possible. Tipping would be suspended for the day and on Monday they would select a site, the eighth, for a new tip.

When the workman and a foreman arrived back at the top of the mountain with their instructions it was 9 o'clock. The depression had grown to 20 feet. They discussed their task and decided to take a tea break before getting underway. The crane operator stayed behind momentarily, looking into the tip and recalled:

> *What I saw I couldn't believe my eyes. It was starting to come back up. It started to rise slowly at first. I still did not believe it, I thought I was seeing things. Then it rose up pretty fast, at a tremendous speed. Then it sort of came up out of the depression and turned itself into a wave - that is the only way I can describe it - down towards the mountain.....towards Aberfan village.....into the mist (Report, 30).*

There is one eyewitness account from the village below the wave. Howard Rees, a senior school student, was walking along Moy Road to school. He saw a big wave of muck higher than a house coming over the old railway embankment and heading for him. In the muck were boulders, trees, trams, bricks, slurry and water. It was moving as fast as a car travels through town, he recounted, and rumbled like the sound of an old train. Three of his friends were sitting on a wall outside one of the houses which the wave hit. Howard saw them buried, crushed and killed by the wave of muck (Report, 27).

When the workmen from the top of the mountain arrived in the valley, their path to the school was blocked by the water flowing from burst pipes which carry water from the mountains to the city of Cardiff. They took another route that brought them to the school at the time others were arriving to begin rescue operations and to take the roll of survivors and victims. When the realization sunk in that the results of this event were final, no matter how brief the event itself, thoughts turned to how it happened.

The government tribunal conducted in the end of 1966 attributed the accident to liquification of the coal tip. A spring under Tip 7, swollen by heavier than normal rain, fed excess water into the tip. The water filled the spaces in the material of the tip reducing the stress of friction, that is, it turned the center to liquid. Some previous flows occurred at the toe of the tip, that is the section furthest down the mountain, as water reached there seeking an escape. With each slight advancing adjustment of the toe, the crown of the tip also settled. Thus the depression the workmen found at 7:00 a.m. in the crown of the tip was actually a measure of slipping at the toe.

The toe of the tip was adjacent to ground with a boulder and clay substrata which was also filled with water and, like wet wood, provided little frictional stress. The toe kept advancing, hence the 20 foot depression the workmen found at 9:00 a.m., until the central, most saturated section of the tip reached the saturated substrata and the tip slipped, flowed and rolled down the mountain until it reached the embankment and then the school and houses. The release of the tip permitted the spring to begin to flow more freely at a rate of 20 cubic feet per second. This water washed tip material and soil down the mountain in a secondary flow of mud that pushed the tip waste further into the village and eventually wore a channel through the tip waste after its flow had stopped. Finally, clean water from the burst pipes emerged and flowed over the surface of the mud and tip waste (Report, 116-7).

It took a few expert hydrologists and civil engineers to explain why the flow occurred but it took many and diverse people to answer if the flow could have been prevented. The tribunal found that the tragedy was foreseeable and preventable, that the NCB was legally liable and blameworthy and went as far as naming six individuals, all in the management of the Merthyr Vale Colliery or the NCB, as blameworthy also; not wicked but blameworthy (Report, 92). Aberfan was not a tale of wickedness, the tribunal explained, "but of ignorance, ineptitude and a failure in communication." One man found blameworthy had thought of buying one of the houses destroyed by the slide so unaware was he of the danger of his actions for which he was later blamed. Indeed, the tribunal found "many witnesses.....had been oblivious of what lay before their eyes. It did not enter their consciousness. They were like moles being asked about

the habits of birds." People could have acted to prevent the accident. All that was necessary was "a sober and intelligent consideration of the established facts" (Report, 25).

We Don't Trust the Experts

Interviews with Aberfan's residents and the tribunal's record indicate that more than "a sober and intelligent consideration of the established facts" is needed to prevent events like Aberfan. Four residents of Aberfan in interviews in 1983 reflected on matters which impeded such consideration and action in Aberfan. Rev. Kenneth J. Hayes was chairman/secretary of the Parents and Residents Association in Aberfan when we spoke in 1983. He lost his son in the catastrophe. He sat in on every session of the tribunal and has a well-worn copy of its transcripts and conclusions. Erastus Jones directed Ty Toronto which began with a gift of the Welsh community of Toronto to the Merthyr Tydfil Council of Churches. Jones coordinated several community organizations around Aberfan and Merthyr Vale and initiated broad efforts of coordination and study of community development in South Wales. Will John O'Brien is representative of the knowledgeable local residents who abound in South Wales and whose reading, extensive experience and native intelligence make them scholars and experts on local matters. Mr. O'Brien lost his granddaughter, Karen, in the catastrophe. He is a retired coal miner who began work in the mines at 14 years of age and worked in the mines, underground, for fifty-one years. Cyril Vaughn teaches at Afan Taf Senior School in Aberfan and has served as the vice chairman of both the Management Committee of the Aberfan Disaster Relief Fund and the Aberfan and Merthyr Vale Community Association.

A deeply felt lesson from Aberfan is distrust of experts. O'Brien asserts, "The local expertise is worth a lot more than book knowledge." Rev. Hayes is more emphatic.

> *We don't trust the experts! Oh no! We discovered what an expert means. An expert sits around the table and takes out a packet of matches and does a sum then quotes a figure then everybody else is quoting the figure including the BBC news and all that.*

Part of this distrust is rooted in the lessons the survivors at Aberfan acquired about the knowledge and conduct of the officials of the South Wales Area of the National Coal Board, the "experts." First, there is their conduct regarding the spring under Tip 7. There was clear and general knowledge derived from previous accidents, that tipping should not be done over a spring. In 1963, a tip slide was attributed to ground failure due to a spring and as a NCB South Wales Area officials prepared a memo warning of the dangers of tipping over a spring, he came across a memo written in 1939 on precautions to prevent tip sliding. The memo stated as its fifth precaution: "Tipping should never be done over springs of water, whether continuous or intermittent, or over bogged or water-logged ground" (Report, 74- 5). The tribunal posed a crucial question: could anyone have known the spring was there?

The answer to that question had two distinct and opposite answers almost immediately. Will Paynter, the president of the South Wales Area National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) in 1966, reported that on the day of the slide local residents told him of the existence of the spring. In fact, in another of the cruel ironies of the catastrophe, he learned that the spring and stream had been dammed up during the mineowner's lockout of miners in 1928 so that the children of miners could bathe (Paynter, 130). Lord Robens, on the other hand, chairman of the NCB, arrived at Aberfan the next day and after discussion with colliery officials told an television interviewer: "It was impossible to know that there was a spring in the heart of this tip which was turning the center of the mountain into sludge" (Robens, 250). The NCB's position during the tribunal was "that the disaster was due to a coincidence of a set of geological factors, each of which is in itself not exceptional but which collectively created a particularly critical geological environment." The tribunal rejected the NCB position completely. "Nothing that the Tribunal heard or read throughout its 76 days of sitting tended even remotely to support such a conclusion" (Robens, 257).

The existence of the spring under Tip 7 was well-known to some. The farmer whose land adjoined the tips knew of the spring; the tip workgang drank from the spring at the foot of Tip 7; and local children testified that they built pools there. The Ordinance Survey maps of 1874, 1898 and 1919 of Merthyr Mountain, the inhospitable host of tips, showed the same streams in the area where tipping took place. Moreover, the map indicated springs under Tips 4 and 5, both of which had slipped, as well as under 7, which slid to disaster (Report, 19).

The point is that the existence and danger of the spring were equally well-known but by different sets of people. As the knowledge of the spring became clearer, the NCB reflected a confusion about knowledge of a general threat which was not applied to a specific threat that was well known to some. In the closing sessions of the tribunal, Lord Robens was given the opportunity to

testify and reported, to almost everyone's disbelief, that the NCB had knowledge that might have prevented the accident but did not use it because no one could conceive the consequence of an accident such as Aberfan. This was a pathetic *non sequitur* which contradicted the entire position of the NCB that a set of unexceptional factors combined to create a critical and unforeseeable tragedy. The counsel of the NCB distanced his case from the chairman and invited the tribunal, "To say that nothing in his (Robens') evidence assisted the Tribunal at all, and that the position (of the NCB) is exactly the same as if he had given no evidence at all....." (Report, 89-91). The chief executive officer of the agency directly involved in the catastrophe at Aberfan had nothing relevant to say about the event especially about the responsibility of the agency for knowing about a specific threat.

The NCB dealt with another danger related to Tip 7 which they could see, unlike the spring which they could not, but evidenced little willingness to take action to correct an apparent threat despite the expressed concern and complaints of local authorities. New processes of mining and processing coal created a new waste products, tailings, which combined fine coal particles and water to form a substance like quicksand. Tailings presented new problems in tipping. First of all, NCB South Wales Area's officials knew of problems of excessive spreading, seepage and water pollution from tailings. A directive requiring the separate tipping of mine waste and tailings never reached the Merthyr Vale colliery where tailings were dumped onto the tip at Aberfan right up to the time of the collapse. This directive came after tips with tailings slipped in other Welsh communities in February 1962 and in 1965. While some South Wales NCB officials were aware of the danger of the tailings based on their experience, they did not communicate that well to others in the area, to officials in London and never became aware of reports of tip instability related to tailings in four other NCB areas outside of Wales.

In addition, to the general problem related to tailings in the tips there had been specific concern about dumping tailings in Tip 7 at Aberfan. Residents complained of increased flooding shortly after Tip 7 was begun about Easter time 1958 and suspected water from the new tip as contributing to their problem. There followed a series of public assurances from the management of the mine but little change in practice. The public works superintendent of the borough visited the colliery manager and received an assurance that the material was 40% dewatered when in fact the practice of the men at the top of the tip was to add water to the trams to wash out the thick and slimy tailings. The mine official in charge of tipping suggested in September of 1963 that tailings would at some future point be disposed of separately. They were not.

On November 26, 1963, Tip 7 had a big slide and Mr. Wynne the colliery manager decided that the tipping of tailings must stop as soon as possible. But this was not carried out. Mr. Roberts, the colliery official in charge of tipping, wrote to local officials on January 28, 1964 that, "A satisfactory and suitable place other than the tip to dispose of the tailings eludes me at the moment and causes me great concern." Two and one-half months later, Mr. Roberts responded to local officials' criticisms of the NCB and its handling of the tailings by pointing out dangers beyond the flooding. "We would not like to continue beyond the next six to eight weeks in tipping (tailings) on the mountainside where it is likely to be a source of danger to Pantglas School" (Report, 57). These warnings and expressions of concern were not followed by action and tipping of tailings continued for one and one-half years, up to October 21, 1966. The colliery managers expressed their concern by pointing out their awareness of dangers that extended beyond those which local residents and officials spoke of but they took no action about the problem they could see while the real problem worked unnoticed towards disaster.

Knowledge of the actions of responsible officials regarding the problems of tipping and Aberfan Tip 7 eroded their status in the estimation of local residents but not as much as their actions subsequent to the catastrophe. Lord Robens' denial about this spring and lack of relevant knowledge are particularly significant. Residents came into their most serious conflict with Robens and the NCB after the tribunal over the question of the tips and they were far less willing to acquiesce to NCB officials at that time. O'Brien recalls:

> *A continual monument to the disaster in Aberfan were those tips that remained. As you approach from the direction of Cardiff, you would see those tips and it was a continual memory for the people in Aberfan. And we wanted those tips completely removed. Lord Robens, I can remember in that meeting in Aberfan said, "You cannot remove the tip, it is on fire." The people of Aberfan said, "Well, you are going to move it." It was moved. That is what we say, no longer do we in Aberfan put our fullest trust in experts.*

Rev. Hayes added:

> *Lord Robens said he didn't see the point in removing them all. He saw the point of making them smaller and landscaping them. He said, "Not that we can't do it. With modern earth-moving*

machinery, we can do anything." Yes, he truly said that. We built on that, didn't we?

Build on it they did. The tips in Aberfan are gone and others in much of South Wales are also gone or landscaped and stabilized.

But it was not a victory for the residents entirely. O'Brien complains that the NCB insisted on having some sort of payment for taking those tips away and the only group with money in sufficient amounts to pay for the work was the Aberfan Disaster Fund. "That money in our opinion should never have been taken from the Disaster Fund. I always say it's like the rope that made the nooses. We were paying for our own rope." That incident portrays the many and unexpected ways in which victims pay for disasters not of their own making. Rev. Hayes also has a sense of injustice about the payment for the tip removal but the community was weary. "The question was, do we suffer this new injustice or do we fight this new injustice? I think we thought, 'Let's get the fighting out of the way so we can get into the real job of living!' "

But the job of living also entails fighting. Several years after the disaster, plans for a new road, A470, between Cardiff and Merthyr Tydfil included a route right through Aberfan. The residents protested that they had been through enough, countered with their own experts about alternative routes and won. The road passes on the hill over the village, through the area that had been used for tipping and about one hundred yards above the cemetery where the victims of the disaster are buried. Rev. Hayes underscores the important lesson the community derived from the catastrophe and applied in these later instances. "The Parents and Residents Committee is kept on by memory of the disaster to remind a new generation to question the experts, to look out for the community."

Economics--The Shadow Behind Every Sign of Hope

The aftermath of Aberfan also details the limits of the power of the residents to construct alternatives to the economies that provide little opportunity and require the acquiescence to risk to maintain them. Jones led a major effort to articulate a vision of alternative economic development. Beginning in Aberfan and Merthyr Vale, the adjoining community, Jones eventually engaged several communities in discussions about a different economic future. These efforts culminated in the Year of the Valleys in 1974 and a series of meetings, studies and discussions which resulted in the publication of ***A Socio-Economic Strategy for the Valleys of South Wales.*** Follow-up to this document has disappointed those involved in it especially because the process of preparing the document demonstrated the vitality of human resources in the Valleys. Very little has changed.

In fact, almost a decade after the publication of the book, many of the Valleys' residents engaged in the longest labor strike in Britain's history to maintain the economic base they had, despite its risks, and lost. The British coalminers' strike specifically incorporated concerns about the vitality of coalmining communities if the closure of their pits occurred as planned. The strike exemplifies the plight of communities with economies in decline. On the one hand they work and sacrifice to defend what they have despite its limits, on the other they calculate anew the risks associated with other economic options especially in the wake of unsuccessful efforts to sustain an alternative. Jones points out one such new calculation of risk about nuclear power required of the people of Wales with a declining economy and a disproportionate number of power plants. Britain's first generation of nuclear power plants are aging and without an alternative, there is likely to be local support for the construction of a new set of plants. Such local support for a system of risk occurred in Institute shortly after the accident on August 10, 1985. One week after the accident, 400 people rallied in support of the plant and its continued operation.

Jones draws a lesson about the effort of experts to deal with the obvious and known threats of tipping and the less obvious but knowable threats.

The locals know but don't have the power to act. People who had the power to act in the hierarchy whether in the NCB or in politics or anywhere, either didn't know or didn't want to know. How can you link up the knowledge that is left by experience with the power to do something about it to prevent disasters? You don't count. You have the power of knowledge but not the power of action, you see.

While linking power to knowledge is a serious matter, it is not all together clear that there was sufficient knowledge among the local people. In fact, part of the tragedy for some survivors is the awareness now of a threat which they saw then but did not recognize. The catastrophe prompted local residents to reflect on the human ability to live side by side with the factors which threaten our existence when they represent the only economic option available. Vaughn shared his reflections with a sense of resignation to his uncomfortable conclusion.

I remember talking to Bill Evans, he lost his wife and his two children and his home. He said, "I could see the thing growing every day as I looked out my bedroom window." You know this is the biggest problem, that people were living in danger. They could see it growing around them and they didn't do much about it. They didn't believe it.

People live with danger. They can see it growing around them but they don't do much about it. They don't believe it. This is the biggest danger of nuclear warfare, we are going to leave it until it's too late.

It is not just a matter of ignoring a danger that people could see but the growth of tolerance of the threat. Each slide prepared the community for the next. Rev. Kenneth J. Hayes makes the point that this is physically as well as psychologically true.

Now an old tip (#4) slid in 1944, as #7 slid in 1966. It slid the same distance. Only, because it was that much higher up the mountain, it stopped short of the village. Now in 1966, this material from the 1944 slide extended down the hill and actually caused the flowing liquid material from #7 to split and some of it was diverted right to the school.

The lessons of 1944 were not learned. That slide was not cleaned up after 1944 and it was one of the factors which led to the disaster because if the 1966 slide had not been diverted in that way then it would have floated into an area with an embankment. Some of it may have come over but by and large I think it would have been held.

Hayes suggests that the residents of Aberfan were both aware and unaware of the danger and in this they resembled the experts. There had been slips but no major tragedy and the century old practice of waste disposal inured people to the dangers that they could see. Hayes, like the other three, feels it was a mistake for the tribunal to name six men as responsible for the slide. There is enough responsibility to pass around to their superiors as well as residents in Aberfan he feels. The verdict of the tribunal stigmatized the "dirty six" and undermined their place in the community. This concern for these men is a different but related form of the understanding that people with knowledge of importance for the community and responsibility for that knowledge need to be integrated with the community. The preference to unite knowledge and the power to act does not represent a guaranteed reduced risk for a community as much as it represents increased and shared responsibility for its well-being and its risks.

This separation of knowledge from power and power from action is rooted in the economic vulnerability of the community. Jones maintains that "underlying the *crisis* in every sphere of the Valleys' life and a shadow behind every sign of hope is the economic (crisis)" (Jones, 40). O'Brien points out that the very first response to the earliest indication of danger was economic.

When the tip began to slide, one man ran all the way down and reported it. The answer he had was, "Get the machinery back." Nothing more. And that's when it started sliding. The machinery had slid. "Get it back, get it back." That was the response.

The tribunal also concluded that the economic decline of the coal industry in South Wales influenced events at Aberfan. Pits were closing at a rapid rate and men were going without work. Between 1955 and 1965, the number of pits in South Wales was halved from 163 to 81 and the number of miners dropped from 103,700 to 64,600. Consequently, the tribunal wrote, while some "may have entertained doubts about it, ... the reflection that to stop tipping could bring about the closure of the Merthyr Vale Colliery may well have led to the quick suppression of those doubts, so vividly remain in the South Wales valleys the grim memories of long years of widespread unemployment" (Report, 31). These considerations muted the potential criticisms of members of organizations such as the National Union of Mineworkers which so militantly defended the rights and safety of its members. But they were rights and safety factors related to work and only indirectly to the village.

Given their relation to the economy, people living near the tips transformed them and established non-threatening relations to them. Children made them play areas and adults wrote poetry about them (Aberfan and the Teachers, 4). But despite these transformations, after Aberfan studies concluded the tips were threats because of "poor design, construction, operation and maintenance" (McKechnie and Rodin, 677). Two factors contributed to these characteristics of tip management, according to civil engineers working on the tip stabilization program which followed Aberfan. First, there was a great increase in the amount of waste and a change in its nature but no new technology to deal with it. Second, tipping was part of the production process and its rapid and inexpensive disposal was vital to the running of a pit.

It was the responsibility of the mechanical engineer to dispose of waste material as all other parts of the

production process were his responsibility. But ordinarily mechanical engineers "had all their attention directed to the hazardous work below ground and the actual tipping had scant attention" (McKechnie and Rodin, 681). Once dangerous tip occurrences were required to be reported, the extent of the problem became more apparent. Twelve tip slides were reported in 1970 and fewer subsequently as the most dangerous tips were removed or stabilized (McKechnie and Rodin, 679).

Conclusion

Aberfan is, at root, an example of the catastrophic deaths of dependents of workers of a high risk economy and residents of a community with such an economy. Aberfan, like Caudill's school commencement, suggest that an improved future of the coalfields and probably many other parts of the world depend on people having employment, having choice in employment and having the opportunity to fashion and express their preference for lower risk economies with higher levels of opportunity. Without these changes, regions like Appalachia will continue to present higher than normal risk to its residents for an occasional catastrophe and an on-going, chronic disaster that robs peoples' lives without ending them. Aberfan was an assault on human life preceded by an assault on human dignity. That assault was indirect and included the environment as well as the people. It was an assault that withstood the complaints of some and continued with the acquiescence of others. It proceeded in the face of problematic facts also, like the spring.

One basic lesson from Aberfan is that we work to destroy life when we discount the earth which sustains it and when economic considerations are not only central but exclusive to how we live. The tribunal found that "Economic considerations have largely, if not solely, determined where they (the tips) were placed" (Report, 31). But preceding this determination the land itself had been reduced to an economic subsidy. Thus the colliery manager stated: "The type of land which is normally allocated at colleries for tipping sites is some of the lowest value that cannot possibly be used for any other purpose....." (Report, 31). This calculation and the resulting decision to use the land for some other and more dangerous purpose is done by people who run little risk from their decision. These decision makers are, in the words of Gwyn Thomas, " 'nimble-footed Pharaohs' who put up vast, indecent pyramids but take care that they themselves will not be buried beneath them."

Since Aberfan we have learned much about catastrophes (Ball, Everest, Lifton, The Observer, Stern). We know that they are preceded by warnings and knowledge that people with responsibility ignore. The record is clear on Aberfan. Inspections which Aberfan inspired of waste piles in the United States uncovered the threat of Buffalo Creek. Bhopal was not a reason for concern, in the estimate of company officials, although records later showed 61 leaks of methyl isocyanate at Institute in the five and one-half years before the leak that injured 135 people. We know that warnings of the threatening event are often delayed and the consequence of their occurrence minimized or denied by those responsible. Chernobyl is a clear example of this delay and denial but so is the reaction of British officials to the radioactive cloud that covered Wales. Rain from that cloud contaminated lambs pasturing in North Wales. The meat of these lambs exceeded Britain's safe level but was sold anyway. When the facts became known, public officials assured the public that the old levels were very conservative, the levels in the lamb's meat were very safe and that a person would have to eat vast amounts of lamb to equal a modest additional dose of radioactivity. One can almost hear Tip #4 .all in that statement which warns us and inures us at the same time. We also know that responsibility for catastrophes is most often attributed to some by others and is seldom assumed easily.

Erikson took from Buffalo Creek a lesson for us all on the importance of asserting community forms of living in the conduct of other activity (Erikson, 259) and the residents of Aberfan expressed that lesson in the aftermath of their loss. They demonstrated that the exhortation of experts to heed their concerns is insufficient and that new forms of community action, participation and expertise are required to gain even limited modifications of the conduct of industry and the plans for infrastructure. Major economic alternatives which end the chronic disasters in which the recurring risks for acute disaster reside have eluded the efforts of the residents of Aberfan despite a very serious and extended effort. The lack of power to form alternatives for collective improvement influences new calculations of individual risk and individual need and new forms of psychological blocks of the unhappy answers. This point is rooted in the history of the communities. Erikson refers back to the miners' armed struggle at Blair Mountain in 1921 as part of the legacy that led to the Buffalo Creek catastrophe (Erikson, 120). He is less clear that this battle represents an assertion of collective worth in face of an assault on their dignity, i.e. attempts to block their efforts to organize a labor union. The history of the struggle of the miners and their families for a union also preceded Aberfan (Francis and Smith) and continued in a different form after the catastrophe.

Charles Perrow examined several recent

catastrophes, but not Aberfan, and underscored the lack of power of people in danger of accidents from high risk technologies to overcome decisions made for and about them. He concluded that another set of Thomas' "nimble-footed Pharaohs" who construct risky systems do so because their interests override the interests of those who run the risk.

> *Catastrophes are possible where community and regional interests are not mobilized or where they are overridden by national policy; where the economic costs of the disaster can be displaced from the private or governmental organization in charge to the rest of the society; where the social costs are borne by relatively powerless sections of society; and where supraorganizational goals, such as the economic health of an industry deemed vital or the control of outer space, are served....As long as national goals are served by risky systems, we will continue to have them and their catastrophes (Perrow, 1986:356).*

There are memorials indicating that the people of Aberfan acquired that lesson and exercised limited moral and political power in its application to reduce risk and challenge supraorganizational goals. The tips are gone not only in Aberfan but in much of Wales. They are gone not only because they were an evil memorial but also because they posed a danger that was acceptable only to those unwilling to pay the price for their removal. In addition, the new highway A470, which runs from Merthyr Tydfil to Cardiff, comes over the mountain that looks down on Aberfan from the north, but, instead of continuing straight and encroaching on the town about a mile before Aberfan, it curves to the right or left, depending on where you stand, and up the mountain and loops around the cemetery and Aberfan in a respectful distance. The motorway is a humming, asphalt deviation from the linear thinking that all things must make way in the path of progress and that people must be made compatible with our economy, technology and risks. Perhaps this is the most important expression of the lesson those who live in Aberfan took from those who died twenty years ago. It may also be the most important lesson for us all as well as the difficulty of applying it.

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GENDER, FAMILY STRUCTURE, AND POVERTY IN CENTRAL APPALACHIA

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Introduction

More than two decades after Appalachia was identified as a primary battleground in the "war on poverty," the region remains the quintessential example of persistent poverty and underdevelopment in the United States. This is true despite decades of government interventions promoting growth as well as clear evidence of real growth in aggregate income, industrialization, and improved infrastructure. In this paper we look at how the economic structure of the region differentially influences poverty rates for different segments of the population. In particular, we combine the insights from theories of uneven development with those from the emerging feminist analysis of poverty to examine how region, gender, and family structure contribute to our understanding of poverty in the central Appalachian region.

Perspectives on Appalachian Poverty

The persistence of poverty in the United States has re-emerged in the 1980s as a social problem and a political issue after a decade of relative quiescence. In the 1960s poverty was conceptualized largely in terms of region, race, and age---as a problem of the urban ghettos, the elderly, native populations, the deep South, and Appalachia. In the 80s gender and family structure were added to the list of factors recognized as important sources of poverty. The "feminization of poverty" is a phrase that captures the growing recognition that women and children are disproportionately represented in poor populations. To date there is very little research which looks at how region, gender, and family structure interrelate and how the problems of poverty for women and their dependents is influenced by the local economy of particular places. Here we examine how gender and family structure are implicated in the region with some of the most persistent and intractable poverty levels in the U.S.---central Appalachia.

In 1979, when 9.6% of all American families had incomes below the poverty level, the poverty rate for families in the central subregion of Appalachia---the area most clearly identified with the region---was 19.2% (19.9% for nonmetropolitan counties only). This contrasts with a rate of 10.9% for the non-Appalachian counties of the five surrounding states (13.2% for nonmetro counties).

The reasons for this situation remain a matter of debate. Some Appalachian scholars say there is a unique subcultural identity for the region with its own patterns of economic activity, family life, language, and customs which run counter to modern economic values (Brown and Hillary, 1962; Campbell, 1969; Stephenson, 1968). An unsympathetic version of this argument defines this cultural complex as the "culture of poverty" and uses this to explain persistent poverty in the region.

More recently, however, many regional economists and development specialists have questioned the explanatory value of regional labels or subcultural explanations, suggesting that the problems associated with a region are the result of the particular configuration of its regional political economy (Markusen and Schoenberger, 1979). Appalachian poverty and underdevelopment are explained with such factors as class composition, land ownership, industrial base, and lack of urban development (Billings, 1974; Fisher, 1977; Philliber, 1981; Walls, 1978; Walls and Billings, 1977).

Uneven Development: The concept of uneven development entailed in this approach has become an important tool for understanding pockets of regional and subregional poverty which remain endemic to specific locations within advanced capitalist economies such as central Appalachia (Malizia, 1978; Hansen, 1979). Perhaps more to the point, it has also become clear that even in places of large scale economic growth, regional imbalances remain. Traditional socioeconomic theories of development assumed that expanded growth would result more or less automatically in increased benefits for the places and populations involved. Ultimately, even the poorest segments of the population would

benefit via a "trickle down" process (Friedman and Weaver, 1978; Hansen, 1974; Higgins, 1977). As the experiences of both third world and regional pockets of poverty in the U.S. and other industrialized nations demonstrate, even vastly expanded growth in income and productivity do not necessarily benefit large segments of society if the benefits of such growth do not get distributed to the population. In this (not uncommon) case, underdeveloped areas remain impoverished or even decline in the quality of life for many residents (Adelman and Morris, 1973; Cline, 1975). Studies of the impact of economic sector and economic growth in Kentucky demonstrate that measures of development and quality of life are influenced both by the nature of the local economy and by the distribution of income and jobs resulting from the type of economic activity found in each county (Tickamyer and Duncan, 1984; Duncan, 1985).

Policies designed to promote development via economic growth are likely to fail if the social relations of production promote maldistribution of income, jobs and resources (Holland, 1976; Markusen, 1979; Bluestone and Harrison, 1982). To understand regional poverty it is not enough to examine the type of local economy and the degree of economic development, although these are very important. In addition, it is crucial to look at how key socio-economic factors affect different groups within a region and how these factors are translated into opportunities for individuals and groups.

Gender and Family Structure: The importance of examining the different impacts of economic structure on different groups and the importance of the distribution of opportunities both highlight one of the key insights of the new feminist scholarship. This is the new recognition of the importance of gender and family structure in the explanation of poverty. In other words, gender takes its place along with race and class and age as a major determinant of poverty status. The last few years have seen massive documentation of the increasing disadvantage of women and the vastly greater likelihood they have of entering poverty, remaining poor, slipping in and out of poverty, and transmitting it to their children (Pearce and McAdoo, 1981). At least three different reasons for this situation have been identified. These are women's disadvantage in the waged labor force, women's predominance in unpaid labor, and government policies towards women's work both paid and unpaid.

Women's poor position in the waged labor force has been documented at length. A summary of factors which contribute to the impoverishment of women include occupational sex segregation with women's jobs concentrated in low wage secondary occupations and peripheral industries; technological obsolescence and deskilling of many traditional women's jobs such as clerical work; and contraction of high wage industries, preventing expansion of women into better paying sectors (Scott, 1984). Many of these trends are particularly appropriate for understanding women's labor market status in central Appalachia, where much of the industrial employment is either in low wage peripheral industries or in the better paid but rapidly declining mining sector.

In addition to their waged labor, women's unpaid labor plays a major role in increasing their vulnerability to poverty. Women shoulder the greatest amount of home work, including major if not sole responsibility for child rearing and household chores (Hartmann, 1981; Berk and Berk, 1979). This "unjust dual role" places major burdens on women as well as limiting opportunities for generating income (Sarvasy and Van Allen, 1984). The disadvantage may extend beyond underpaid waged labor and unpaid domestic duties. The large amount of volunteer work done by women provides important community goods and services but rarely can be translated into income generating activities. Finally, Scott (1984) points out that in the third world, unpaid labor includes out of the house work in the informal sector, i.e. the supply of goods and services to both formal and other informal sector members. Studies of poor people in poor places in the U.S. find the same thing (cf. Stack, 1975; Stack and Semmel, 1975).

Many idealized accounts of Appalachian community life depict the non-market economic activities of women which are crucial for family survival but do little to assist women out of poverty when there are few other sources of income. Considering the strength of traditional family forms in the Appalachian region, the failure to participate in the waged labor force can extract a heavy price in terms of women and their dependents' economic well-being.

Finally, government policies towards women, families and work play a major role in the impoverishment of women. Public family and welfare policies devalue both women's domestic labor and their labor force activity (Folbre, 1984). Comparative studies of how women's labor and family roles are treated show that the U.S. is virtually the only industrialized nation which makes no provision for women's dual role, nor provides any but punitive assistance to poor mothers and their children (Kamerman, 1984). A dual welfare system exists which parallels the segmented labor markets in which women work (Pearce and McAdoo, 1981). In the secondary welfare system which primarily applies to women and children, programs such as Aid to Families

with Dependent Children (AFDC) are seen as a privilege rather than a right, coverage is uncertain, stigmatized, and varies from place to place. This is in sharp contrast to entitlement programs such as unemployment compensation and social security for which men are more often eligible. For example, in Appalachian mining communities, many men collect unemployment or disability benefits which are generally defined as earned benefits rather than the "handouts" which are available to impoverished women, such as AFDC. Finally, the experience with the welfare bureaucracy disempowers poor people, increasing their disadvantage and making effective opposition unlikely. This too is more likely with transfers defined as charity compared to entitlements viewed as rights, and therefore more likely to be experienced by women.

These contributions from feminist scholarship make it clear that in order to disentangle the factors contributing to poverty, it is necessary to consider the role of gender and family structure. When we look at information on individuals, the factors creating poverty for women are not always the same for men. At the aggregate level, however, it is not clear how women and men compare. There is no question that women have higher rates of poverty, but it is not known whether local and regional economic factors will influence female poverty rates in the same ways as for males. In fact, there is some reason to think they won't, since women's position in the labor force and local economy is not the same as it is for men. Therefore, our goal is to determine whether and how regional economic structure affects gender-based county poverty levels in central Appalachia.

Source of Data on Appalachian Poverty

To address these issues we examine 1980 county level census data for the Appalachian region. There are massive problems in trying to find information on socio-economic structure of subregional areas of the U.S. such as Appalachia. First, the only way of obtaining data for the Appalachian region which does not include large non-Appalachian areas is to use county level data. The major sources of data for individuals such as the public use samples of the census, current population surveys and a variety of large scale surveys geared to issues of income and poverty (e.g. PSID, SIPP, NLS) either do not permit this type of regional breakdown or omit this region entirely from their sampling frame.

Using county data, however, creates addition problems. The most reliable and complete source of data is the summary information tabulated for the 1980 U.S. census. For income and poverty levels, this means using 1979 data. During intercensal periods, especially as the next decennial census looms closer, questions arise about whether the figures are still valid. At this time the information is almost seven years old and during this period there has been a major recession, farm crisis, and decline in energy prices, to name a few of the events that can be presumed to have a major influence on Appalachian poverty. Attempting independent estimates for intercensal years is a risky business, however, and tend to be highly inaccurate. For example, poverty estimates published by the Kentucky Department of Commerce for 1978 are grossly different from the 1979 census figures, and efforts by state agencies in other parts of the country have found the problem equally intractable. Difficulties in projecting total poverty rates make clear the difficulty of obtaining rates for specific population segments.

Given the events during this decade, it seems reasonable to assume that the poverty situation for Appalachian counties is no better than it was in 1979, and it quite likely is worse. However, this is not the end of the problem. There are relatively few tabulations provided by the census of population values for different groups' socio-economic characteristics. For example, it is possible to obtain poverty rates for female-headed households with and without children, but it is not possible to directly obtain poverty rates for women by labor force status. Furthermore, in many cases even where the census does provide information, privacy guidelines mandate suppression of data for any situation where resulting small numbers might violate these rules. Especially in the many small population counties of rural Appalachia, this results in suppression of important information. It would be impossible, for example, to obtain poverty rates for blacks in many Appalachian counties.

The problems do not end with the source of data. There are also difficulties in defining poverty and defining Appalachia. There has long been a debate on the most appropriate way to measure poverty levels. In the two census periods in which this has been attempted, the procedure entails determining the cost of food (the "market basket") for families of various sizes and types and then multiplying this by three on the assumption that in a minimal survival budget, food costs will be a third of total consumption needs. The resulting figure is the poverty level specific for family household size and age in 1980 and also farm status in 1970. In 1979 for a family of four including two related children under the age of eighteen, this was defined as an income of $7356. The specific criteria vary for individuals and families of different sizes and types. It was calculated differently in the 1970 census than in 1980. This means that it is not possible to compare poverty rates directly across the census years. It is also not clear how location influences the actual experience of poverty since prices of basic

commodities can vary dramatically from region to region. Similarly, it is not clear that the price of food relative to other commodities has been stable over time and place, raising questions about the multiplier used (3). Finally, there is no way to account for noncash benefits such as food stamps which may influence the meaning of particular income levels and the ensuing quality of life.

An alternative approach to calculating poverty levels is to measure *relative poverty* using the bottom income quintile as the definition of poverty. Using this approach, the rate of poverty in this country jumps dramatically in many areas since by definition it is 20% in the U.S. as a whole. For Appalachia this means a 28.4% rate for the ARC counties of the five state central region (including metro)---more than double the usual and official poverty rate. It should be noted that even though the proportion of families in poverty increases dramatically, the income level is not that much higher. It is $9844, underscoring how close to the margin even officially nonpoor populations live. Critics of this approach say that an arbitrary cutoff point such as the bottom quintile has no intrinsic meaning. It does not incorporate a sense of the submarginal standard of living which poverty is supposed to convey. However, the low income figure represented by the bottom quintile suggests that large numbers of persons who are not officially classified as poor have an impoverished standard of living. Most important, using this approach allows comparisons across time.

A final problem area is the definition of Appalachia. In the mid-sixties with the formation of the Appalachian Regional Commission, counties in thirteen states ranging from New York to Mississippi were designated "Appalachian." However, it is generally, recognized that there were major political considerations employed in the designation of Appalachian status, and that many areas not traditionally defined as Appalachia or not needing the interventions for which the ARC was defined were included. To deal with the problems this creates, the larger Appalachian region is often divided into subregions, including central, southern and northern. Additional definitions of Appalachia have been suggested (cf. Ford, 1967). In this study we have used a number of different definitions of Appalachia to check the validity of our findings and to define the limits of the regional effect. For clarity the emphasis in this study is on the portion of the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC) defined Appalachian region within the five central states of Kentucky, North Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia. The non-Appalachian comparisons generally are the non-ARC counties within these states.

Appalachian Poverty: Data and Findings

The data for this study are all from the 1980 U.S. Census and represent the years 1979 and 1980 (U.S. Census, 1982). Counties are the unit of analysis and, include the five states of Central Appalachia described above.

Poverty Measures include a number of different group specific poverty rates. Major emphasis is placed on comparing the percent of female headed families with children to nonfemale-headed (families with a male head or married couple) with children. However, for descriptive and comparison purposes, we also look at the percent of all female and nonfemale-headed families in poverty, as well as various breakdowns by age and family status.

Table 1 shows the distribution of persons and families in poverty for various definitions of poverty and family situations (see page 84). A number of alternative formulations of poverty rates are included. From Table 1, it is clear that Appalachia is substantially worse off than the rest of the United States. By far the most impoverished region is central Appalachia, using the central ARC counties of Kentucky, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia. Both the counties which define central Appalachia and the total state figures in which these counties are located present a fairly dismal picture. The Northern and Southern subregions tend to be better off than central Appalachia, with poverty rates similar to non-ARC counties, but still worse than the total nation.

This pattern holds when examining poverty status of different family types. It is clear that gender is the major variable affecting poverty status. Female-headed families are by far the worst off; those which include children present a devastating picture.

Measures of Socio-Economic Structure compare ARC and non-ARC nonmetropolitan counties on a variety of social and economic characteristics as shown in Table 2 (see page 85). Unemployment is the proportion of persons with any episode of unemployment during the course of the year. Nonparticipation rate shows the proportion of persons sixteen and over who are not in the labor force. The percent of residents living in rural areas is defined by the Census as persons living in places under 2500 population. Economic base is represented by proportion of workers employed in agriculture, mining, and manufacturing. Finally, characteristics of family structure are shown with proportion of persons in families, proportion of female-headed families, proportion of families with no workers and one worker and proportion of persons in families in poverty.

Table 1. Proportion of Nonmetro Persons and Families in Poverty by Region, Family Type, and Definition of Poverty.

	Extreme Poverty and Near Poverty: Proportions of Persons Below Specified Percentages Of Poverty Level				Proportion of Families in Poverty By Type of Family				
	75%	100%	125%	150%	Total Families	Total Female Headed Families	Female Headed Families With Children	Total Nonfemale Headed Families	Nonfemale Headed Families With Children
U.S. Total (including metro)	.083	.124	.170	.217	.096	.303	.403	.062	.075
Appalachian Subregions In Five State Region:									
Non-ARC	.109	.168	.233	.297	.132	.339	.437	.100	.109
Central Appalachian	.162	.238	.308	.378	.199	.396	.527	.174	.194
Northern Appalachian	.107	.164	.227	.290	.127	.307	.438	.104	.121
Southern Appalachian	.094	.154	.206	.269	.124	.284	.368	.104	.111
State Totals:									
Kentucky	.150	.218	.288	.356	.183	.388	.507	.158	.175
North Carolina	.108	.169	.237	.305	.135	.345	.436	.100	.109
Tennessee	.117	.185	.254	.323	.150	.333	.435	.126	.134
Virginia	.095	.147	.207	.270	.111	.289	.382	.086	.096
West Virginia	.113	.169	.232	.294	.134	.321	.459	.109	.128

Table 2. Economic Characteristics of Nonmetro Counties in Five State Region, By ARC Appalachian Subregion

	ARC Appalachian Subregion Within Central Five State Region			
	Non-ARC	Central	North	South
Unemployment Rate:				
Female	.192	.214	.195	.197
Male	.162	.252	.228	.177
Labor Force Nonparticipation Rate:				
Female	.432	.594	.567	.446
Male	.207	.299	.266	.219
Proportion Rural	.668	.817	.761	.736
Agriculture Employment (Proportion of Workers)	.057	.045	.029	.036
Mining Employment (Proportion of Workers)	.009	.152	.104	.006
Manufacturing Employment (Proportion of Workers)	.318	.179	.181	.393
Proportion of Persons In Families	.879	.915	.878	.897
Proportion of Families Female Head No Husband	.134	.114	.112	.110
Proportion of Families With No Workers	.120	.202	.174	.130
Proportion of Families With One Worker	.317	.405	.403	.318
Persons in Families In Poverty (Proportion)	.147	.221	.139	.132

Table 3. Proportion of Nonmetro Families with Children in Poverty by Family Type and ARC Appalachian Subregion, for Three Levels of Selected County Economic Characteristics.

Proportion of Families with Children in Poverty, By Family Type and Region
By Nonmetropolitan County Economic Characteristics
For Five State Region

	Female head, no husband present				Non-female headed			
	Non-ARC	Central	North	South	Non-ARC	Central	North	South
Unemployment Rate:								
Less than 20%	.430	.433	.443	.334	.103	.140	.109	.094
20% - 25%	.460	.526	.409	.422	.125	.179	.113	.135
More than 25%	.486	.578	.529	.497	.143	.244	.178	.209
Labor Force Nonparticipation Rate:								
Less than 35%	.416	.441	.370	.347	.097	.139	.088	.096
35% - 45%	.489	.506	.428	.400	.136	.198	.114	.132
More than 45%	.455	.558	.497	---	.109	.203	.153	---
Proportion Rural:								
Less than 70%	.426	.501	.373	.366	.097	.157	.101	.100
70% - 90%	.438	.524	.462	.361	.113	.184	.117	.107
More than 90%	.484	.551	.494	.393	.143	.227	.153	.145
Agriculture Employment (Proportion of Workers):								
Less than 4%	.365	.530	.431	.361	.075	.181	.120	.102
4% - 8%	.461	.499	.455	.379	.114	.192	.116	.125
More than 8%	.491	.569	.467	.430	.146	.267	.143	.171
Mining Employment (Proportion of Workers):								
Less than 5%	.437	.505	.451	.365	.109	.203	.106	.110
5% - 15%	.432	.528	.402	.452	.111	.221	.117	.151
More than 15%	.398	.541	.472	---	.115	.177	.139	---
Manufacturing Employment (Proportion of Workers):								
Less than 15%	.400	.533	.442	.321	.090	.178	.127	.096
15% - 30%	.465	.535	.432	.364	.115	.216	.120	.114
More than 30%	.424	.491	.455	.369	.108	.208	.100	.111

Table 2 provides an interesting profile of Appalachian economy and society. The Central Appalachian subregion is much worse off than the portions of the five-state region which are in the northern or southern subregions. Unemployment rates are higher as are the nonparticipation rate and the proportion rural. The southern subregions look much more like the non-ARC counties than the central region, and the northern region falls in the middle. As to be expected, there is higher mining but lower manufacturing employment in Central Appalachia. Family structure is particularly interesting as there are more persons in families, fewer with female heads/no husband, and many more with no workers or only one worker. In other words, a more traditional family structure prevails in the central Appalachian subregion, alongside a more depressed economy.

Next we use the different economic characteristics to compare male and female-headed families with children for ARC and non-ARC counties in order to see how local and regional economic structure affects gender and family based poverty rates. Each of the economic factors is trichotomized into low, medium, and high levels to characterize counties with different economic profiles. Table 3 shows the results (see page 86).

As expected, ARC counties have higher poverty rates than non-ARC; central Appalachian counties are worse than other ARC counties; as the percent of rural population increases so does poverty, and at every level there are higher female-headed family poverty rates than non-female. Poverty rates increase with higher unemployment rates, with especially dramatic figures for women. The greater the nonparticipation in the labor force rate, the greater the levels of poverty, again especially for female-headed families.

What is very clear is that regardless of the basis of the local economy, women have higher poverty rates, and they are especially at risk in counties with high mining and agricultural employment. Mining is especially interesting, because at the highest levels of mining employment, men's poverty levels drop whereas women's increase. This undoubtedly results from the lack of other employment opportunities in the male dominated resource extraction industries, and the fact that although the mining industry tends to be highly volatile, when employment opportunities exist, the men working in this field make relatively high wages (Tickamyer and Duncan, 1984). Poverty rates are highest in high agriculture employment counties, although again, they are much higher for women. Both male and female rates fall slightly for high manufacturing employment, but the baseline rate remains much higher for women. It is ironic to note that while at the highest level of manufacturing employment, female poverty rates decline somewhat, it is precisely the jobs in low wage manufacturing, frequently held by women, which are declining in the region.

Discussion and Conclusions

It is clear that the situation of female-headed families is far more dire than others and female-headed families with children are especially at risk. The situation in Central Appalachia is far worse than in the rest of the country or other portions of Appalachia. However, compared to other areas, it seems safe to conclude that Appalachian poverty problems are not attributable to having large segments of the population at risk. Elsewhere, high poverty rates can at least in part be attributed to the disproportionate presence of groups at risk---the elderly, female-headed families, children, blacks, and other racial or ethnic minorities. In Appalachia, however, these groups are either at or below the expected population levels. Appalachian poverty is clearly identified with the structure of the local economy, the type of employment opportunities, and the degree of isolation which makes economic opportunity scarce. These hit women harder than men, but the same factors are implicated for both.

In an earlier study, we used multivariate statistical techniques to identify and control for factors which have been used to explain differential male and female aggregate poverty rates. We had similar results: the same types of influences were important for both male and female poverty rates, suggesting that there are similarities in the process of producing high poverty levels. However, we were better able to explain the amount of poverty for the nonfemale-headed families than for female-headed families These results reinforce the idea that there are additional factors which must be considered to explain women's poverty compared to men. It is not that the factors which create male poverty don't apply to women, but rather that women bear additional burdens which increase their risk. In the Appalachian region where there remains a larger proportion of women who are not in the labor force and where there is a strong tradition of husband-wife families with a traditional division of labor (including a higher proportion of single earner families than in the rest of the country), women will be especially vulnerable to spells of poverty when their usual sources of support break down.

We suggest that one reason for the high poverty levels for women and their dependents in Appalachia is that they represent a segment of the population which is most vulnerable to whatever negative economic trends

emerge. The more traditional the community and family life (and it is often argued with good evidence that this is a major characteristic of Appalachia), the more limited the opportunities for employment and income generating activities, the harder hit will be those groups in the population who are least economically independent. It would be easy to blame the breakdown of community for the "feminization of poverty," but it is more appropriate to view this trend as an outcome of the problems in the position of women in a society where non-market labor is marginalized and where market opportunities are not readily available. To deal with *all* Appalachian poverty, it is necessary to have more jobs. But it is particularly important to make sure that opportunities of whatever type and location are available to *all* members of the community.

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THEY'RE NOT ALL SITTING BACK AND TAKING IT: FIGHTING FOR CHANGE IN EASTERN KENTUCKY

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In 1974, Sidney Cornett retired after 20 years of military service. He planned to settle quietly with his wife and two children on his family's farm in Perry County. Sidney spent his first two years of retirement remodeling an old family house on Combs Branch, helping relatives and friends to fix their houses and becoming an active member of the Dwarf Baptist Church.

Then the peaceful existence that Sidney and his wife Brenda sought was shattered. A land agent for Falcon Coal Company presented them with an incredible "take it or leave it" offer: take a lump sum payment for an easement to get the coal underneath the Cornetts' farm or the company would strip-mine it without paying any royalties. The coal was going to be mined under the notorious broad form deed, a legal instrument which at the time gave the mineral owner complete access to the minerals underground even if the surface land was owned by someone else. The Cornetts realized they were caught in a bind and decided to grant the easement. The company agreed to reclaim the land properly after extracting the coal and promised to take only the top seam of coal.

Falcon Coal shut down its operation in 1981 and another company, Vegas Coals Inc., took over the lease. Unfortunately for the Cornetts, Vegas was not as cooperative. After being tipped off by a gas line inspector, Sidney walked up the mountain above his house one day and discovered that the company had gone out of the boundaries of its mining permit, cut down seven or eight acres of timber and was strip-mining the area. He called every government official he could think of, hoping to stop the devastation of his land. He quickly learned that the broad form deed gave the strip-mine operator a free ticket to mine his property, even against his wishes. He also learned that many other eastern Kentuckians faced similar situations.

While the Cornetts were struggling to protect their farm, in 1981, the Appalachian Alliance was releasing the results of a massive land and mineral ownership study of Central Appalachia, ***Land Ownership Patterns and Their Impacts on Appalachian Communities.***[1] The study showed that about 85% of the minerals and more than half of the surface land in eastern Kentucky were owned by absentee interests. Because of the control these mineral owners had with the broad form deed, most of the decisions about the houses, the roads, the creeks, the gardens, and the well-being of eastern Kentuckians were made in corporate boardrooms far, far away, with little regard for those who lived in the mountains.

Among the most dramatic findings of the Appalachian land ownership study was the gross underassessment and minimal taxation of minerals in Central Appalachia. Eastern Kentucky was particularly hard hit by the failure to tax valuable coal holdings adequately. One case in the study was Pocahontas-Kentucky Corporation (now Pocahontas Development Corporation), a subsidiary of Norfolk and Western (now Norfolk and Southern) Railroad, which owned 81,333 acres of coal in Martin County alone; the company's total property tax bill on these minerals was $76 per year---the same amount of property tax one would pay for a late model four-wheel drive pick-up truck. The wealth of eastern Kentucky---billions of tons of coal---was going virtually untaxed. To add insult to injury, Pocahontas's parent company was being extremely generous to philanthropic needs in the city where its headquarters was located---Roanoke, Virginia---but making few charitable contributions in Martin County.

The under-taxation of the region's wealth is evident in Kentucky schools, where lack of money contributes to many problems. Teachers often have to spend their own money for school supplies, and in many districts, students and parents sell candy bars and pop---often during school hours---to pay the school telephone bills and buy paper for the copying machine. Education in Kentucky ranks near the bottom in the nation. Kentucky has the lowest rate of adult literacy in the country, and the lowest percentage of high school graduates. One in every three adults cannot read or write. Almost half of the students starting the ninth grade in the Appalachian

counties will drop out of school before graduating.

Aggravated by high unemployment, an insufficient property tax base, and repeated cuts of federal funding to the area, the paucity of community services is felt by many who seek such everyday necessities as adequate health care, transportation, clean water and proper sewage treatment.

Besides controlling the land and minerals, outside interests control coal *production* as well. A research project by Tom Del Savio for the Kentucky Fair Tax Coalition showed that in 1983, the top 20 coal producers--- all but two were headquartered out of the state---mined nearly half the coal in Kentucky.[2]

A closer look at Kentucky's coal production provides a quick lesson in national and international linkages to the corporations controlling Appalachian residents. For example, Del Savio's study also revealed that Martin County Coal Company, one of the largest coal producers in Martin County, is in fact part of A.T. Massey, which is a subsidiary of St. Joe Minerals, which is owned by Holland-based Royal Dutch Shell and the Fluor Corporation, a California-based construction firm which also deals in nuclear power. Actions taken in corporate boardrooms thousands of miles away direct the operations of these mines and have a powerful influence on the lives of Appalachian people.

Many believe there is nothing that can be done about the stranglehold of absentee control. Some people sell out, move out, or simply give up on the region. One who has given up is Letcher County author/historian Harry Caudill. In his latest book, ***Theirs Be The Power*** (1983), Caudill ends with these fatalistic lines:

> *.....The region's doom is virtually sealed; the insatiable global demands for fuel and chemicals have already determined that.*
>
> *There is a major eastern Kentucky coal operator whose ancestors have lived in the hills for many generations. He is a thoughtful, articulate, and reflective man with an engineering degree from an Ivy League university. Like the men who work in his mines, like those who illuminate their homes with the power from the coal his miners dig, like the directors of Robeco and Chase Manhattan, like all mankind, he is locked into an industrial system he deems unstoppable. "I wish it could be avoided," he said wistfully, "but it cannot. Only God could stop it with a miracle, and I do not believe in miracles."*[3]

In the face of such corporate power, it is easy for people of the region to get discouraged. In fact, many writers have argued that discouragement is inevitable, and leads to a feeling of powerlessness in Appalachia which cannot be overcome. They argue that Appalachian people are too individualistic to work together and the powers against them are so strong that attempts to organize in the region are doomed to fail. Writers like Caudill, Jack Weller, and Richard Ball grossly neglect, and often completely ignore, individuals and community groups working for change in the mountains. Few accounts tell about such groups as the Appalachian Group to Save the Land and People, Save Our Kentucky, the Kentucky Black Lung Association or the Mud Creek Welfare Rights Organization, all active in the 1960s and 70s.

People in eastern Kentucky *are* fighting back. Community groups continue to spring up in counties throughout Kentucky, including the Kentucky Fair Tax Coalition (KFTC), a membership-based organization working on many issues. After only five years, KFTC has more than 1,350 members in 67 counties and is growing daily. The group has put an end to the broad form deed by pushing for legislation to guarantee surface owners' rights and then defending the new law in the courts, giving people like Sidney and Brenda Cornett more control over their land. KFTC has forced the state to require all coal operators to begin monitoring groundwater at all mining operations six months prior to any permit application, dropping the former practice of granting waivers to hundreds of coal operations each year.

Several communities have worked for---and gotten---reliable water supplies to replace their own wells damaged by mining and oil drilling, while a number of others made sure their water did not get contaminated in the first place. Another major organizational victory came when a state circuit court judge ruled that the present miniscule property tax rate on unmined minerals is unconstitutional. Through the work of KFTC members, several county school systems have also been forced to make major reforms.

The efforts of KFTC members and other citizens groups contradict the writings of those who argue that powerlessness prevails in eastern Kentucky. The theory of powerlessness was perhaps most clearly articulated in 1980 by John Gaventa of the Highlander Center in New Market, Tennessee, who argued in his book, ***Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence and Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley,*** that after people grow up in a controlled environment and suffer defeat so often when change efforts are tried, they give up and don't try to fight back any more. Writers and others in the academic community were quick to generalize the concept to describe Appalachian communities. They concluded that nobody

was fighting back and instead of analyzing the barriers to participation and looking at the circumstances of each barrier, most chose to blame the victims, saying their inaction was due to their own paralyzing feelings of powerlessness.

Today, however, Gaventa acknowledges that his theory of powerlessness was overstated. "Remember, it was a doctoral dissertation written 10 years ago," Gaventa said recently. "You can't use it (powerlessness) as a broad sweeping statement. You have to look at all the factors which influence participation."[4]

As Gaventa argues in his book, we should not confuse powerlessness---giving up and accepting inevitable defeat---with political and economic exclusion. There are hurdles which people must overcome if they are to participate in community change. Some of the barriers are economic dependency on coal in a single-industry economy; the influence of fundamentalist churches which often discourage participation in political, worldly matters; illiteracy and poor education; high unemployment; meager resources compared to those of corporations and governmental agencies; disorganization; an atmosphere of mistrust created by a long history of political corruption in the coalfields; lack of good roads and distances between counties which make it difficult to hold meetings; a lack of available facilities not controlled by local politicians; and, public officials who cry "Communist" whenever local people try to push for change.

But we must recognize that powerlessness is not within the Appalachian people themselves; many are struggling for a better future. Some of the factors that have opened up opportunities to participate in community affairs are increased mobility; the construction of more major access roads; better community services in some counties; cable TV which provides local programming; the presence of strong citizens groups and successes they have achieved; better open meetings and open records laws; and, increased newspaper coverage.

Members of KFTC and other community organizations are trying to wrest the control of land and minerals back from the corporate giants. They want to be part of a democratic process in the decisions that affect their lives. They want improved community services and better education. They want more jobs and better working conditions. They want to develop alternatives that will provide a brighter future for their children and their grandchildren.

It is obvious that politicians and bureaucrats have not done the job. KFTC members and others are building toward a new future by developing local community groups and enhancing the skill development of individual leaders. KFTC emphasizes long-term organizational development, while stressing the importance of channeling skills, energy, and knowledge into direct action on such issues as water protection, toxics, education, surface owners' rights, fair taxation, improved community services and legislative democracy. Community groups are confronting the companies, the politicians, the governmental agencies and other causes of the problems that have held Appalachian people down. With effective organizing methods, victories do happen, inspiring people to work even harder and encouraging others to participate as well.

There is a growing number of examples of how groups are persistently fighting for change. In Lawrence County, KFTC members have worked for four years to keep a proposed hazardous waste incineration plant from locating there. They have convinced the county government of the need for a comprehensive zoning plan to prevent such unwanted facilities and have won the endorsement of the Lawrence Fiscal Court, their state representative, state senator and congressman, and others. Equally important, they have realized the need to join with people in other parts of the state to push for legislation to provide local county governments with some say as to where such hazardous waste facilities are located. Through their contact with other KFTC members throughout the state, they have also begun to see the need to work cooperatively on other issues.

In the Pond Creek section of Pike County, residents fought Eastern Coal Company's practice of reinjecting coal slurry (coal processing waste water) into abandoned underground mines because they were afraid their groundwater would be contaminated. Today, 6,200 acres of groundwater are protected because the company was forced to install a surface impoundment to treat its waste water properly. After this victory, group members went on to tackle other issues in the community, getting the bridge to the elementary school raised to prevent flooding, and helping people on the Right Fork of Brushy Creek get their road paved.

People have publicly shown their opposition to bad water and bad schools. Grassy Creek (Pike County) residents presented Bureau of Surface Mining officials with gift-wrapped jars of contaminated water from their private wells at a surface mining permit conference; Grapevine Creek (Pike County) members took their jars of bad water to the state office of the natural resources agency where they set up an old-fashioned Kool-Aid stand to "sell" their water. Parents at McDowell High School (Floyd County) walked on a "protest line" with posters in front of the school to bring attention

to concerns with the safety of the school boiler, instructors teaching out of their fields and a shortage of textbooks. Martin Countians were tired of the county Board of Education meeting in a room which was too small to fit observers in, so they showed up early to a school board meeting and used all the available chairs, including those set aside for the Board of Education. The school board quickly changed its meeting place to the high school gymnasium where everyone could have a seat!

Individuals, too, are fighting for change in Appalachia. In Leslie County, deep miner Raleigh Adams and his family have blocked trucks crossing his land to do exploratory gas drilling, and have challenged a nearby coal company about its illegal mining operation. When he repeatedly confronted his employer with health and safety concerns in the mine, Raleigh was dismissed from his job. After an arbitrator heard all sides, Raleigh was reinstated.

Floyd County native Beverly May, who worked as a community organizer for KFTC for three years, puts it this way:

> *I've come to see that the broad form deed to my family's land, and the irresponsible mining it allowed, were not isolated exceptions, but the rule in eastern Kentucky. And I came to recognize the small trickle of funds flowing into the Floyd County schools as the result of a complex system of protections for the corporate coal and land owners.*
>
> *But I've also seen that the answer is in organizing. It's been the greatest joy to watch folks take those first courageous steps of chairing a meeting or standing up to a condescending official and watching communities stand together to protect themselves. My old crust of cynicism and hopelessness has dropped away as I've seen the power of people to take back control of their lives by supporting each other and organizing.*
>
> *The future for eastern Kentucky looks much different to me now, because of KFTC's victories and because I know how strong and determined the membership is.*
>
> *.....Because KFTC is growing, not just in numbers, but in the abilities and commitment of its members, I'm looking forward to seeing a few other dreams realized. Soon.....our absentee landlords will be paying their due in taxes to the communities which have made them wealthy. Economic development will mean more than a rollercoaster coal industry; it will mean fine schools, adequate water supplies and housing. I'm looking forward to the time when communities have the right to protect themselves from toxics and abusive oil drillers. And someday, elected officials will respond to the will and best interests of the people they serve, or know they won't last long.*
>
> *Most of all, I'm looking forward to the day when the kids from my hometown will find rows of new books in their library and will search the shelves for the ones with the brightest pictures and the funniest stories to take home. And when they find a book to cherish, they'll be finding their future as well. I hope they take home armloads.*[5]

Gladys Maynard, the first chairperson of the Kentucky Fair Tax Coalition, describes activities in her county that led to her involvement in community action:

Gladys Maynard describes her involvement in community action

Our first attempt to work with a group was in 1972 when a committee formed up Route 292 to improve the road. There was not much coal mining from the 1930s until the early 1960s. But after the coal trucks came back, the roads wouldn't hold up the weight. Route 292 was just one big pothole after another.

I guess I began talking with some customers who came into my beauty shop, and they informed me there had been a meeting called. I went because we had so much trouble with the dusty road from here to Warfield, which is two miles away.

As I rode to that first meeting, I was concentrating on the roads, and I probably had some hopes of getting to people a little higher on the state level. There was actually no plan on my mind. But letter-writing campaigns followed, letters to the governor and the state department of transportation and meetings in Frankfort, the state capital.

We had state officials here for a big dinner in an open field---we did that several times. We had signs posted along the road. This went on for several years, and we were known as the Citizens for Better Roads. The chairperson was Clyde Robinette, who had been involved in community organizing (across the Tug River) in West Virginia. He knew how to go about getting this done.

By the time we got the road finished---we finally got it hardtopped---there were a number of people beginning

to get interested. We began to realize that we just had to fight.

By this time, we had a new high school in the county, named Sheldon Clark High School, after the superintendent of schools. Along with the school came a new dress code that was so strict that it was a hardship on the local people.

A member of the group came up with the idea to pass a petition to change the name of the school and do away with the dress code. Several people from the Citizens for Better Roads group went to work on the petition. We gathered so many names that the board of education canceled their meeting. We continued to work on the petition until their next meeting, and again they called it off. But we did not hear about the meeting being canceled, and about 40 people went to the courthouse that afternoon. We were locked out of the courthouse, locked out in the rain, and a photographer for the local paper took some pictures of us standing there.

Later, somebody came with the key and let us in the building. We discussed what we could do and decided that we would keep up until we could go before the board with our petition. And the coverage in the paper helped quite a bit, because the next time we got into the meeting.

I had been chosen to do the talking. This is the first time that I was in a leadership position. Well, I wasn't thinking of myself as a leader. I had all the materials I had gathered, and I wanted to put it all together by that time. I wanted to talk about it. I wanted to tell them.

Because there were people in the room who the board did not know, they really got upset. They had not been used to dealing with that many people at one time. Apparently, they wanted no part of our ideas. But we did come out of that meeting with a promise to meet with the board and with a committee on the dress code.

The board brought the name of the school to a vote, and we lost. The rules of the dress code were not changed, but they sort of faded out.

I guess it was during the road project that we started to collect names, addresses, and phone numbers of people in other counties and other community groups. We got on every mailing list and attended as many workshops as possible. We had lots of fundraising projects going on and had some travel money of our own. We would usually send a couple of representatives to any kind of meeting that we thought would be of use to us.

The people of the road committee pretty well kept in touch. We had been meeting in a church, but they got new people in the church and didn't want to let us use the building. So we met in homes and kept the organization going. County residents were asking about a number of issues. They wanted to know how to file for black lung benefits, Social Security, and after the April 1977 flood, how to get governmental assistance. So we helped with the information we had been gathering and did what we could. For the flood work, we formed the Flood Preparation Group.

Then, in January of 1980, I learned that the county housing agency was going to move the entire town of Beauty, about 100 families, with federal funds. They said it was to prevent the town from being flooded, but there were rumors---rumors we never proved---that a coal company wanted to mine the land the town was on. I partly grew up in that community and knew every family that lived there. My husband's parents had been relocated by a coal company a couple of years before. We knew how upset they were: "We don't want to move again; we've already moved once." There was talk about moving them to a new housing project. "We don't want to move into a strange neighborhood," they said.

The people of Beauty began to form an organization to stop the relocation plan, the Concerned Citizens of Martin County. Then all the other community groups that had ever been in place, like the Flood Preparation Group and the Citizens for Better Roads, joined in. Several other individuals joined in, too. I knew there were enough people in Beauty---I knew their nature---that once someone tried to take something away from them or push them around, they would fight back. They got together two or three nights a week for meetings and went over the proposal. They learned what it said and learned about the regulations.

They understood from the beginning what had to be done in order to save their homes. They made trips to Louisville and Washington. There were letters, phone calls, newspaper articles, TV reports, and lots of officials coming to meetings. Finally, we got through to the head officials at the Department of Housing and Urban Development in Washington, and they didn't approve the project. They said it didn't have proper citizen participation. A whole town had been saved.

I really didn't have any idea that we could go that far and I could do part of it myself. I don't like to see someone in a political position taking advantage of people.

I think it's fun when people work together and understand together what the problems are and how to go about dealing with them. I can look back and see an awful lot of changes. I feel sure that if enough people become involved, things will get better and better. New ideas are sometimes hard to get across, but I'm still optimistic.[6]

There are very few places to read about the Beverly Mays and Gladys Maynards of Appalachia, especially when hard times fall on magazines like ***Southern Exposure*** and ***Mountain Life and Work.*** A few books have been written---like those by Frank Adams, Thomas J. Schoenbaum, and David Whisnant[7] ---about social change efforts in the Appalachian region. The challenge ahead is for writers and academicians to put pen to paper and let history reflect the actions of individuals and community groups pushing hard for a better tomorrow. Most people have dreams and visions; we have to continue to tap their ideas, their experiences. The key question is: will we continue to look at eastern Kentucky through Harry Caudill's pessimistic eyes, which have been perceptive to problems but blind to solutions, or through eyes of people like Beverly May and Gladys Maynard, who work to promote the rights, protect the property and prepare for the future of people living in Appalachian communities?

NOTES

[1] Appalachian Land Ownership Task Force, ***Land Ownership Patterns and Their Impacts on Appalachian Communities,*** February 1981.

[2] Tom Del Savio, ***Who's Mining Kentucky's Coal: The Second Annual Report on Corporate Ownership of Kentucky Coal Production,*** January 1985.

[3] Harry Caudill, ***Theirs Be The Power,*** University of Illinois Press, 1983.

[4] Interview with John Gaventa at the Highlander Center, New Market, Tennessee, September 21, 1986.

[5] Excerpts from an interview with Beverly May from "Organizing has brought hope for Bev May" in ***balancing the scales*** (Kentucky Fair Tax Coalition newsletter), May 22, 1986.

[6] Interviews with Gladys Maynard at her home in Lovely, Kentucky, April-May, 1982.

[7] Frank Adams, ***Unearthing the Seeds of Fire: The Idea of Highlander,*** John F. Blair, Publisher, 1975; Thomas J. Schoenbaum, ***The New River Controversy,*** John F. Blair, Publisher, 1979; and David Whisnant, ***Modernizing the Mountaineer,*** Appalachian Consortium Press, 1980.

DIRECT ACTION AND APPALACHIAN FORESTLANDS

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Appalachian and other forestlands are undergoing a major environmental assault due to modern clear-cutting practices, rapid encroachment by industrial, mining, agricultural and urban development interests, unscrupulous hunting and recreation practices, and lack of sufficient protection of natural and cultural resources. Access roads have been carved in otherwise pristine areas; dirt bikes trails and litter abound; stealing of black walnut and other valuable trees is not uncommon. The Appalachian region, which once contained some of the world's largest hardwoods, has no primitive areas remaining. The grand logs of the past remain only in faded nineteenth-century photographs.

Residents in forested areas often are frustrated in attempts to preserve their environment. Law enforcement seems so far away when needed; no comprehensive monitoring of resources occurs; the environmental movement is distant and concerned about other matters. Outsiders and some other residents regard the woods as a place to do as one likes. Forest-lovers react to these conditions in a number of ways: some retreat to what they perceive as a less touched section of wilderness; some install the satellite dish and close their eyes to what is occurring around them; others in a true mountain spirit decide to fight for what is rightfully theirs. The manner of this combat is the subject of this discussion.

The body of environmental activists is small in any community except perhaps when a major environmental assault threatens the entire community, e.g., an incinerator or a hazardous waste dump. A difficulty for forest dwellers is that few communities identify with the surrounding woods. A development project generally forces the woods to recede and sets up protective barriers from nature equal to that of larger metropolitan areas. The relatively isolated woodland dweller does not have community support for coping with the multitude of insults experienced throughout the year. Falling back on the resources of a small cadre of like-minded persons is essential---not organizing folks who may live near woods but do not know they are. The isolated environmental activist may be highly creative, prefers to avoid publicity, but is still willing to share experiences with others who are sensitive about preserving our forests.

For the forest activist, two sets of models emerge. One is the early anti-strip mine activists of the 1960s, many of whom are still around but desire to remain unnamed. The second is the direct activist of the western part of the nation especially the Rocky Mountain and Northwest and exemplified in the writings of the Earth First newsletter originating from Tucson, Arizona. However, like the coyote, "eco-defense" has crossed the Mississippi and is coming to Appalachia for its own unique adaptation.

What isolated environmentalists and preservationists find so inviting is that the methods of direct action bypass traditional legal approaches, which seem either too complex or too expensive. Furthermore, direct action does not leave to distant professionals the task of environmental protection, but accepts in true pioneer spirit that folks must carve out and sustain their homestead against all attackers. For these, direct action gets results, can be done alone, is fun, and enlivens the spirits in otherwise difficult times. Furthermore, the focus of attention is shifted from the newsworthiness of the event to telling a message directly to the culprit.

Another advantage of direct action is that it is inexpensive. Preserving forestlands is not a hot funding topic; besides, few woodland dwellers have access to the offices of the grantspeople. Furthermore, stopping polluters is far more radical than discussing philosophy. Direct action can be a free-time occupation; it does not need and cannot effectively work with excessive structure (offices, staff, overhead); and it requires simple devices readily found in most tool shops. What direct action thrives on is a homesteader's mentality, a sense of the earth's rhythms, of humor, and of knowledge of the lay of the land. It glories in being flexible and it is mindful of the fragility of the woodlands. Its patron saints are a combination of Simon Kenton, Francis Marion, St. Francis, and Rachel Carson.

The forest-loving environmentalist realizes that

direct action may have its drawbacks. Some techniques are not perfectly "legal" in contemporary society; in fact, the practice of eco-defense is quite threatening to certain vested interests. How else could one explain that a person in Wyoming this year had to stay in jail for his full six-month sentence for pulling up Exxon stakes on government land? Furthermore, an action might backfire and hurt someone, or the polluter might decide to counterattack in some fashion. Property damage can occur, depending on the methods used, and can mount to thousands of dollars.

Spiking threatened trees may be seen as a preserving action by inhabitants, or as costing enormous sums by the logging interests wanting to extract wood. One worldview sees trees as having aesthetic value, the other, economic value. Both agree that at least some trees could and should be cut at times; one wants the woods preserved, while the other is willing to sacrifice woods for efficient timber growth. The problem is that the so-called protector of Appalachian woods, the U.S. Forest Service, is part of the Department of Agriculture, and prefers to speak of timber-stand improvement rather than wilderness preservation. Too often such improvement is couched in terms of the logging interests.

The logging-versus-naturalist conflict is not resolved by some sort of compromise or fundable conference between opposing parties. Radicals of the woods do not want to be sipping coffee with clearcutters. They would rather spike, for that saves trees and speaks in loggers' language. What logger wants timber that has the potential of tearing up a chain saw or debarking machine? In the same manner, what radical would want to be sentenced by a judge to remove fifty pounds of spikes? It would take a month to undo one day of nailing. The direct activist and the logger both know what many other environmentalists do not fully realize--- namely, that methods exist to preserve the aesthetic value of trees while decreasing or eliminating the economic value of trees as timber.

Direct action appeals to forest dwellers. Time allows for the untimely action. For some activists it is lightheartedness; for others it shows in symbolic fashion just how grave the initial assault by the intruder has been. For still others there is a certain ethical or religious justification stemming from the Judeo-Christian prophetic stance of breaking idols, driving out money changers and halting damaging economic or political processes through individual symbolic action.

ASPI has undertaken an investigation of Appalachian ecoteur practices for the following reasons: ASPI is one of the very few environmental organizations located within a forested area (our property borders on Daniel Boone National Forest tracts); our contiguous public-private forest is threatened by a variety of outside interests; the ASPI goal is to make science and technology responsive to the needs of people in the region---and preserving forests is a quite neglected need; and finally ASPI champions methods that require a minimum investment of financial and physical resources.

ASPI has recently published ***The Treesaver's Manual*** describing the major environmental threats and direct actions which have been used to counter these threats. These together with possible harm that might arise through indiscriminate use of such methods are summarized in Table 1 on the next page. For a more technical discussion, see the full text of the ***Manual***; here the effectiveness of the current methods used in the ecoteur literature is discussed. Some methods are flawed or non-reproducible. For example, a common method of assembling road spikes to discourage intruding vehicles would make the spikes incapable of being driven into the road pavement. As described in some manuals, they are worthless for discouraging traffic. However, with modification by a technically astute person, the spikes could be rendered workable.

A second arena of discussion deals with the ethical consideration of a variety of means to reach the same end. For instance, what is the best action to dissuade dirt bikers who cause serious soil erosion and generate noise pollution in forestlands? One might fence across the trail or make a log barrier. Since both of these could be easily removed by bikers, other more drastic means have been devised. Some activists have placed wires across the trails, but these may cause serious injury or death to bike riders. Spiking trails has been used in Appalachia, but spikes can harm, and have harmed, bikers by tossing them when blowouts occur. Drastic, but far less humanly harmful, is to spike the unloading area, usually an elevated embankment, where four-wheelers enter to unload their dirt bikes. The same discouragement could result but with bodily harm much less likely.

What is the best technique to halt the environmental threat? Certainly the death of the biker would stop the threat, but one can hardly justify environmental protection through murder. The action is not proportionate to the original threat. The word "best" then is more than a technical term, a quest for effectiveness at lowest cost. Those involved are human beings, some willfully and some inadvertently doing environmental harm. Dissuasion needs to occur with the least harm to people---and minimal harm to property.

Should we attempt less drastic environmental methods first, and reserve direct action for times when the other methods fail? Forest dwellers know the woods

Table 1

Environmental Threats	Direct Actions	Possible Damage or Injury
Loggers & clearcutters	Spike trees, give notice to local sawmills	Tearing up chainsaw and possible bodily harm
Illegal strip mining operators	Spike roads, trash bulldozers, disturb drilling/mining equipment	Vehicle accidents, malfunctioning equipment
Trappers, poachers, careless hunters	Flatten tires, apply noise-makers to frighten off game, remove traps	Moving in the vicinity of careless hunters may lead to gunshot wounds or death
Off-road recreational vehicles (dirt bikes, etc.)	Put barriers, wires, or spikes on trails or unloading areas	Nasty accidents may occur to the fast-moving biker
Developers, oil prospectors, road builders	Pull up or transfer stakes to other areas for confusion	little
Litterers, quarry & mine waste depositors	Spy on perpetrators and notify authorities, barricade dump sites, return waste to dumper	little
Billboard displayers	Saw off partly and allow the wind to do the rest, deface and paint with counterads	Danger of blowing debris; possible harm to ecoteur
Air & water polluters	Return sludge to office carpets, seal air or water outlets	little
Scavengers, amateur archeologists, joy riders, etc.	Put rice in radiator, crazy glue in key locks, smoke grenades/cheese in exhaust	hernias
Paper wasters (e.g., junk mail senders)	Affix return mailer to heavy package of junk iron	little
Right-of-way chemical users	Put nails in roads, decommission equipment on sprayer breaks, erect barriers, threaten to sue	little
Illegal fires	Take water and put it out, make a citizen's arrest	Possible fight

will be exhausted long before these other legal environmental methods are proven successful. This sequential approach is what I advocated in ***The Contrasumers: A Citizen's Guide to Resource Conservation*** (Praeger, 1974). However, the difficulty is more than time; many environmentally conscious persons are simply more suited to performing certain types of action. Rather more effective means involve a multiplicity of approaches (education, expose, legal advocacy, etc.) used simultaneously in hopes that the combination may cut the implementation time. This reasoning permits and even encourages direct action as one approach in the arsenal of general methods that the environmental community needs to consider. This is especially true since no method or approach has been completely successful to date in saving the earth and Appalachia.

In any ethical discussion of direct actions, one must ask whether the action leads to preserving the environment, enhances the beauty of the damaged earth, and persuades and requires the impacting party to abandon faulty practices. Effectiveness must always be considered along with the basic ecological and ethical principle of non-violence to people even those who harm the environment. The risk of doing some bodily harm must always be minimized by the direct activist. Is it necessary to eliminate all possibility of human harm, or just the most probable occasion of harm? Much depends on the degree of the environmental damage done by the culprit.

In our society non-violence is intertwined with damage or destruction to physical property. Most ecoteurs and ethicists see clear distinctions between property and people, although the general population may not. In fact, some regard violence as primarily involving property; for them, trashing a bulldozer is a very violent act, in fact far more violent than sending a football opponent

to the hospital for life. Because perceptions of violence are so different, the ecoteur has a long uphill battle.

The environmentally sensitive person must preserve the environment, and still weigh the hostility of both the general populace and many within the environmental movement who want to separate themselves from the radical fringe. The threat to this environmental community may rest in forcing them to purify their motives. Is association with other parts of the movement conditioned on public attitudes, job security, and funding group acceptability? Isn't the movement large enough to contain the direct activists? Isn't the proven method of direct action a legitimate form of preserving Appalachian forests? Is violence to property permitted in order to check and eliminate threats and actual violence to the fragile forests of our earth?

The saving of our Appalachian tree cover is still in question, so it is truly fitting to end this particular discussion with these unanswered questions.

PLUS ÇA CHANGE, PLUS C'EST LA MEME CHOSE: BREAKING GEOGRAPHIC DETERMINISM IN EAST TENNESSEE

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The rediscovery of the Southern Highlands in the 1960s and early 1970s reconvinced many Americans that change and progress had bypassed Appalachia. This erroneous view was reinforced by the production of aggregate regional statistics. Using the Tennessee Valley as a case study, it is clear that change has taken place. But it is also clear that change has taken place unevenly. The Tennessee River itself, the parallel roads and turnpikes, the parallel railroads, the TVA projects and the interstate revolution have carved a channel of modernization along which flow socio-economic and cultural change. A study of the economic development of East Tennessee reveals a disturbing sort of socio-economic and cultural determinism whereby the changes on the valley floor have not been enjoyed by those in the valley uplands. East Tennessee remains a land of progress and poverty. (See Figure 1 on page 106.)

The valley floor, roughly 200 miles long and 55 miles wide, tapering towards the southwest and to about 35 miles, was spacious enough to accommodate the earliest settlers. The best land on the floor was rapidly taken by the first influx of settlers in the 1770s and 1780s, and increasing waves of settlement pushed population east and west into the poorer areas of the Cumberlands and the Blue Ridge. Even on the valley floor, river and road transportation was slow and uneven, limiting what urban growth there was by inaccessibility to markets. But such urban growth as there was had already created a chasm between floor and upland peoples well before the railroad came. The floor, with better farmland, higher yields, and accessibility to markets, also evolved nodules of town elites which were growing richer as secession approached. Counties on the valley floor had lower crude birth rates, smaller families, lower illiteracy and a lower dependence ratio than those of the uplands. When the railroads came to the valley floor, they found a culturally prepared and innovative population already in place.

The first regional railroad establishment was Chattanooga in 1850. In a decade it had become a major rail junction and spurred the valley floor development of rails up and down the old stagecoach routes. By 1860, passengers and freight could move on the East Tennessee and Georgia and the East Tennessee and Virginia railroads from Chattanooga and Knoxville to Washington and New York or to Atlanta and Charleston. Despite the setbacks of the Civil War, the opening of the twentieth century saw three parallel rail lines on the valley floor. Few linkages were supplied into the mountainous hinterland.

The rail connections turned Knoxville and Chattanooga into burgeoning manufacturing and wholesale centers. The coal and iron deposits near both cities plus their railroads and outside capital transformed them into New South manufacturing centers. In Knoxville alone, between 1870 and 1890, capital investment increased sixfold and 97 new factories were built between 1880 and 1887 alone. The populations of both cities boomed, swelled not only by in-migrating blacks, leaving farms and plantations, but by rural whites from the uplands. Although such expansion concentrated in Chattanooga and Knoxville and was uneven along the rest of the valley floor, Sullivan and Bradley counties showed signs of economic robustness. But with two-thirds of the manufacturing goods of the valley coming from the two cities, they were dominant. By 1900, fully one-third of the valley population lived in cities of 10,000 or more.

The gulf between floor and upland widened to a chasm. Knoxville, for example, got streetlights in 1885, and interior electric lighting in 1886. Nearby, rural Sevierville did not even have paved streets until 1924. The pull of urban places took in the region's professional men, in the process denuding the uplands. In 1900, Sevier County had 25 doctors. In 1928, it had 12, 6 of whom were over fifty years old. Detailed medical data from Sevier County indicates that general health and medical care were inferior to that which was available on the valley floor. The floor cities and adjoining towns acted as a magnet for manufacturing labor. In 1900, Hamilton (Chattanooga) and Knox (Knoxville) counties had 6,228 and 5,479 manufacturing wage earners respectively. Only 6 of East Tennessee's 36 other

counties had 500 or more manufacturing wage-earners, all of them on the valley floor or adjacent to railroad lines. The grooves of modernization had worn deeply into the valley floor, and between 1900 and 1930 would become deeper.

The first three decades of the twentieth century saw continued growth in the manufacturing sector, especially in textiles and apparel. The world of the valley was transformed by paved roads and automobility, residential and commercial/industrial electrification, introduction of the radio and telephone and significant advances in public education. These changes, like industrialism, were felt unevenly, making their most profound impact on the valley floor. By 1930 large portions of the Cumberland and Blue Ridge uplands had reached a demographic and economic crisis point, with strong out-migration already well underway. These areas, already in a state of depression by 1930, were, as we shall see, further impacted during the Great Depression, as previous out-migrants to manufacturing centers traced their way back homeward to weather out the economic storm on the worn-out lands they had so recently left. But until 1930, the valley floor counties were booming. The number of manufacturing wage-earners increased dramatically in the 1900-1930 period. In two decades, they increased 147% in Hamilton County and 114% in Knox County. Starting from a smaller base, the other valley floor counties showed considerable growth, in our sample growing 212%, from 3,109 workers to 9,709. Of the top 12 manufacturing counties in the state, 8 were on the floor of East Tennessee's Great Valley. Comparable value added by manufacturing and population data show that between 1910 and 1920, floor growth was high in both categories, while the uplands showed little or no growth in value added and all upland counties suffered population declines. Lured by dreams of jobs, prosperity, and future opportunities, men and women were leaving the Cumberland and Blue Ridge for counties along the valley floor. These dreams were often shattered amid the slums of shotgun houses in the industrial cities of the valley floor, where racial violence, homicide and suicide were more prevalent than in the uplands. Fisk University sociologist Charles S. Johnson urged blacks to stay on the land rather than endure the hardships of life in the urban concentrations of the Tennessee Valley, and he might have issued the same advice to the upland white migrants who flocked to the cities as well. But if life was hazardous for some, there was for many the enhanced life-style of the urban environment---automobility, telephones, electricity, radio and opportunity.

In later decades, automobility would mean the opportunity to stay in the uplands and commute to a job. But in the uplands during this period, roads were poor and autos scarce. The floor counties averaged one auto for every 7 persons. In the uplands it was one for every 26. The same disparities existed in terms of electric hookups, telephones, paved roads, and radios and, more seriously, in educational opportunities.

Whatever the merits of the country school, the public school systems of cities had the advantage of educational flexibility: more and better-educated teachers, better public support, bigger libraries and more varied curricula. In 1928, on the valley floor there was zero percent of elementary school teachers with only elementary school educations. Some of the upland counties had from 25% to 35%. Correspondingly, more tax monies (in many instances double) were used for education in the floor counties than in the upland counties. Higher upland fertility rates, larger families, higher dependency ratios and abnormally low standards of living indicate that by the time of the depression, the upland counties were in the grip of a negative determinism. This in turn led to an increasing abandonment of the less prosperous areas for the urban clusters on the valley floor. In 1900, 33.5% of the valley's residents lived in towns of 10,000 or more persons. By 1930, that figure had risen to 48.3%. But more exited the rural counties than could even be absorbed by the valley floor's modernization. In 1930, the ratio of people born in the TVA states but living elsewhere to those born elsewhere but living in TVA's seven states was a disturbing 4.4 to 1.0. The crisis so long in coming had arrived even before the national depression.

The depression caught both the floor and upland counties at a particularly vulnerable time. The rural counties, still predominantly agricultural, had reached the limits of arable land and through inheritance patterns had subdivided land to the point where out-migration to floor cities had become imperative. The uplands, with few exceptions, had been farmed to the point of near-exhaustion, so that even the leached-out remnants of the farming populations were on the brink of economic disaster. The floor cities whose density had increased with industrialization had absorbed people beyond their capacity to provide jobs, and many of the jobs they did have were labor intensive, low-wage ones. Crowded with blacks and Appalachian whites, who engaged in a savage competition for jobs in neighborhoods already obsolescent, the cities were chaotic. And the struggles between older business elites and progressives over issues like taxation and government reform meant that they were badly prepared to deal with the fury of the depression. In Knoxville, for example, by 1932 all six of its national banks had collapsed. Wages were low (35 cents an hour for textile workers) unemployment high (from 2,284 in 1930 to 7,534 in 1937), tax

collections dried up, and the city had to issue scrip to keep going. In the uplands, the situation was worse, as previous migrants to the cities of the valley floor and the nation's industrial centers returned to press hard on already-strained resources. In Grundy County on the Cumberland Plateau, for example, 60% of the total population was on relief in 1935. The depression afflicted upland and lowland alike. By 1932, income from industrial production in the Tennessee Valley states was 55.8% of its 1929 figure. Agriculture was 41.4% and construction 25.9% City and county alike fought to survive the crisis, some towns forfeiting the equivalent of 30% of tax receipts in exemptions to lure industries. Between 1934 and 1937, 63 firms did locate in the valley. But half were textile and apparel industries, comprising 64% of the new jobs, and they paid desperately low wages.

The Tennessee Valley Authority was born in the midst of this crisis. The agency was riven by internal power struggles whose net result was the triumph of the power, navigation, and test demonstration farm programs, at the expense of idealistic planning programs designed only to improve the rural uplands. But the successful programs deepened the channel of modernization along the valley floor and, in some cases, barely touched the upland. Electrification came late and in small amounts to the rural cooperatives, early and abundantly to the municipal distributors on the valley floor. Improved navigation, it is now abundantly clear, did not affect East Tennessee and, as Wilmon Droze has shown, the bulk of the increased river traffic using the nine foot channel was used by TVA to supply its own building programs and later coal for its steam plants.

Test demonstration data and materials from TVA's files indicate that, though successful on the valley floor, the program was designed to help the larger commercial farm units, and was of little real help to the upland farmer practicing subsistence farming. Indeed, many of the latter were forced to relocate by TVA dams and most, reinforced by a culture that was avowedly premodernist, chose to remain on the poorer soils of the uplands instead of migrating to better farmlands on the valley floor. By 1946, TVA had acquired 1.1 million acres of land---1/23rd of the entire valley---and had removed 13,449 families (roughly 72,000 persons) from 16 reservoir areas. It had inundated 298,000 acres, much of it the region's best crop and pasture land. The removed rural upland families paid a heavy social cost for benefits ostensibly derived downstream at Chattanooga.

Yet the TVA-claimed benefits of flood control at Chattanooga were somewhat dubious. For example, if the "500 year flood" of 1867 were to reoccur with all the TVA dams in place, the flood crest at Chattanooga would be 47.8 feet, which would almost devastate the city. It is demonstrable that the industrial growth along the Tennessee River owed more to railroads than to the river, and that cheap electrical power, save for the giant Atomic Energy Commission complex at Oak Ridge, was not really a spur to industrialization. The greatest growth item was in textile and apparel industries, which do not consider power rates a large cost item, relying more on low taxes, low-wage nonunion workers, and cheaper construction costs. Moreover, the region's central urban areas, which accounted for 56.1% of the increase in manufacturing workers between 1929 and 1950, had been electrified long before the advent of TVA. Finally, there was no surge in industrialization after TVA took over power production: from 1929 to 1950, manufacturing income rose only from 15 to 20% of the area's total income.

Assessing TVA's impact is made extremely difficult because it is so inseparable from the impact of World War II. What benefits it did bring were essentially confined to the valley floor. A study done in 1940 to assess the impact of TVA on the Norris Basin, an upland area of 5 counties, noted *approvingly* that TVA had got people "on the move" and, indeed, it had; outmigration from TVA areas was powerful throughout the 1950s and 1960s, in itself a sign that TVA had not produced enough impact to provide in-place socio-economic relief. As the war neared an end, there was a revival in TVA of a movement to have the agency address regional problems, a testament of the authority's limited successes in uplifting the Tennessee valley. Yet where there were successes, again they had been along the valley floor and, like the railroad earlier, had widened the gap between the uplands and the floor of the valley. The postwar years would see this long-term trend continue.

Nationally the period from World War II to 1960 was one of economic growth fueled by suburbanization, low interest rates, high industrial production, consumer purchasing and installment buying. East Tennesseans did not, to a large extent, share in this. The region, even with government assistance, was unable to reverse trends which had locked it into a sort of stasis with persistent rural poverty and continued out-migration.

The experience of Claiborne County, by no means the poorest in the region, is a case in point. By 1960, the county had but two small industries, was heavily agricultural and losing young people in enormous numbers. By 1966, 79% of the county's families had annual incomes of under $3,000 and the county was heavily dependent upon federal programs. Adult illiteracy was

estimated to be over 50%. Nor could the metro areas on the valley floor staunch the flow of young people outwards from the region. In Knoxville between 1948 and 1960, durable goods manufacturing declined by 4,200 jobs, and total personal income (in 1958 dollars) was 13.6% below southeastern averages. By 1957 unemployment had risen to 9.7%. As people left the uplands for the floor cities to seek work, they were often disappointed. During the war years (1940-1950), 44,500 persons migrated into Knoxville. In the following decade 30,000 left, most of them between the ages of 18 and 64. In 1959, when 33% of U.S. families earned incomes of under $5,000, 51% of Knoxville's families fell into that category. In Chattanooga and Tri-Cities, the same patterns were discernible. Unable to build on wartime gains, the cities were beginning to look like the regions which demographically fed them.

The inability of floor cities to play their absorptive role to the hinterlands meant that those areas would be plagued by steady out-migration from the region and rising dependency ratios. The Tennessee Valley's per capita income was, in 1929, only 45% of the nation's. By 1966, the valley's percentage had risen to 70% of the national average. But only 34 of TVA's 201 counties could match or exceed that figure and many upland counties still had incomes which were 45% of the national average. In aggregate terms, the TVA region still lagged about 25% behind the nation in personal income. In attempting to account for that gap and the inability of East Tennessee to recover from modern recessionary trends, the authors sampled nine upland and six floor counties in East Tennessee. This disaggregated data, unlike the aggregate figures TVA uses for the Tennessee Valley, reveal that the gap discussed earlier has not only not disappeared in the most recent decades, but in some respects it has widened further, leading the authors to posit an argument that regionally the economy operates at highly variable speeds and in variant directions in East Tennessee. The cutting edge of this variance appears to lie in physiographic determinants. Nor does this separation by upland and lowland counties reveal all the differences, since some counties are internally divided between "upland" and "lowland" zones. If the data were taken apart by CCD's, which we have done for one county, and all the uplands matched against all the lowland data by county census districts, the results would reveal a greater determinism than is reflected here. Isolation, inaccessibility, lagged industrial growth and in general a slower response to modernization have continued to exact a high social price from the people of the rural uplands. (See map in Figure 1 on page 106.)

It is hardly news that, for the most part, these historical trends have not been altered in contemporary times, in spite of a good deal of attention and money being paid to the rural uplands. Demographically, average family size in the uplands has declined, but is still well above that for the valley floor. Also, while heavy outmigration appears to have ceased, in fact it has not, but is only being masked by retired people (many of them original outmigrants from the region) moving into the uplands, thus skewing the dependency ratio even more out of balance.

In educational facilities, the valley floor counties continue to outperform the uplands, where illiteracy remains high, tax support for education low, and hostility to institutionalized education never far from the surface. (See Tables 1 and 2 on page 107.) Indeed, this animosity has surfaced in places like Claiborne County, where an elementary school intensive reading program is in danger of being sacked by irate parents. And, as with educational facilities, upland counties tend to be deficient in health care facilities as well. These areas remain significantly below average in the mean numbers of physicians, dentists, nurses and professional health care facilities, in spite of the fact that the uplands contain a rapidly aging population. (See Tables 3, 4, and 5 on pages 108, 109, and 110.)

Economic indicators still show the deep chasm between valley and upland counties. Personal income data continue to show strong variances. The service sector, a large proportion of the jobs in a modern urban society, is generally anemic in the uplands. In the uplands, a significant amount of total income is derived from government transfer payments (federal assistance), in many cases exceeding the dependency levels of the Great Depression of the 1930s. (See Tables 6 and 7 on page 111, as well as Figure 2 on page 112.) Indeed, in the Cumberland Plateau counties of Bledsoe and Grundy, transfer payments are the largest single source of income. In short, poverty has ridden the contour marks across East Tennessee. To be sure, some industry has come to the uplands. Yet, for the most part, they are low-wage, labor-intensive establishments like textiles and apparel, neither of which offer the region sufficient economic diversification or consumer buying power so desperately needed. At the same time, part-time farming, widely practiced in the uplands, is less an economic equalizer as it is a life-style which many upland citizens preserve by working off the farm, in the mills, in construction, in tourism. All are economically vulnerable, as noted in the State of Tennessee's 1977 Tennessee Appalachian Development Plan, which called for a greater "mix" of employment opportunities. (See Figures 3, 4, and 5 on page 113.)

The dominance of low-technology, low-wage industries has made it extremely difficult for the uplands to move ahead to close the gap between it and the valley floor or the nation. The Eastern District continued to hold roughly 71% of all textiles and apparel jobs in the TVA 201-county area. While some "new line" industries did come to East Tennessee, they tended to concentrate along the deep grooves of the valley floor, which possessed better transportation facilities, a skilled labor pool, and aggressive industrial recruiters. Most upland counties were left virtually untouched by the "new line" industrialization. Hence, in terms of types of industry, educational facilities, incomes, dependency ratios, dispersal of construction and health care facilities, the upland counties continue to be the most vulnerable section of a highly vulnerable region. (See Figures 6, 7, and 8 on page 114.)

What is to be done? National policy assumes increasingly that the "market" should be the sole arbiter of economic development, as in the maxim that if jobs are not made available in a region then people should be encouraged to leave the region for jobs elsewhere. The authors disagree with this (or these) assumptions and feel that, where possible, deliberate developmental efforts should be made for and within the region or subregion, and that such efforts should deliberately seek to bend or reshape economic development to suit the needs of the region's people. The "market" must not be allowed to shape the regional destiny through outmigration.

Today the region finds itself in a state of economic imbalance and vulnerability. It is an assumption of the authors that TVA's goal of economic development should be the achievement of an "adequate" quality of life of the region's inhabitants, and that "adequate" may be taken to mean "must meet national standards of employment, income, education, health, and safety." Ideologically and statutorily, TVA's mission, seen historically, was in the regional planning function with the aim of socio-economic improvement of the valley people. But numerous works attest to the abandonment by TVA of its central planning function. As Norman Wengert, a TVA "loyalist" pointed out, TVA has been without comprehensive and systematic social and economic planning since 1938. In fact, TVA abandoned its planning function to non-TVA planning units throughout the states of the TVA system. This abandonment or divestiture of its planning function has led to a dysfunction of TVA's planning arm and atrophy to the point where power and power-related issues have become paramount within TVA.

Few people now remember that TVA was conceived in a spasm of anti-capitalism as represented in the industrial components of the depression. It was, for its time, a "radical" resolution of the woes of the day. In later years Gordon Clapp's dictum that when TVA ceased to be controversial it would be inconsequential were misunderstood entirely. The agency became controversial because in the idiom of post-industrial America it had become inconsequential.

In many respects TVA had the boldest mandate and the best area to practice it in. In socio-economic terms it failed its earlier mission. The authors feel that today, to restore a sense of mission, TVA must recapture its planning function in such a way as to override the limitations of geophysical determinism, and bring the regional areas that have too long suffered economic exclusion into the mainstream of the valley floor. This does not mean physical removal. It might entail the closest attention to the development of urban centers in non-metro rural areas, the direction the most recent of the Tennessee Appalachian Development Plans has taken. It undoubtedly directs attention to relief in place of the areas in the region most in need of development. It would be presumptuous of the authors to dictate specific policy beyond saying that the formulation of a remedial central plan should be within the reach of TVA's myriad of talents. If it is not, then perhaps the agency should assume the position of a utility and accept the consequences.

Aggregate figures, at least for the TVA region, generated by TVA economists, have observed the *malaise* of the uplands. TVA's economists have suggested that if people cannot survive in the uplands they should emigrate. But if people in the uplands follow the dictates of the market and move from the land to urban centers there is a great risk that they will not be economically absorbed, and will become a burden on the social services infrastructure that in inner cities is already stretched to the breaking point. Nor do people in the valley want to move. Their willingness to stay on the land is evidenced by the strength of part-time farming in the valley, which is an amenity and a system of values paid for by the wages of industry, tourism, and low level service jobs which many in the valley will drive 75 miles (one-way) to obtain in order to stay in their home place. In this situation there will be no return to the family farm except on a part-time basis. Despite the powerful attraction of the myth of Jeffersonian romanticism, the golden age of the yeoman farmer has long since turned to brass. The crisis in the Tennessee Valley uplands is not the disappearance of the family farm, it is a crisis of the sustainability of non-farm employment which is the one item that makes part time farming, often done at an economic loss, viable. Upland Tennesseans have a great pride of place and are a willing, capable work force. But

the jobs which sustain them *and* their tobacco and cattle operations are in great danger of being lost to overseas competition. If upland Tennessee had been in the past like one of Wallenstein's zones of dependence, attractive to industry with cheap, non-union labor, industry has found other, and more fertile zones in the third world. The problem of the Tennessee Valley uplands, and by extension, Appalachia, is, as Salim Kublawi says, a global one.

Programs must be devised which balance simultaneously sustainable industrial growth in the uplands with financially subsidized part-time farming. In Germany, France, Denmark and Austria government programs have intervened to underwrite part- time farming in order to prevent a hemorrhaging out of young people from rural to overcrowded urban areas.

Is there room for optimism in this? There is probably no easy answer. The fact that mountain folk like the rest of us have been submersed for generations in the cultural hegemony of mainstream American capitalism makes it difficult to mobilize people from the ground up. There may be good people, bad economy, and bad politics, but it will take more than good people to reverse trends over a century old in some cases. It will also take massive infusions of monies dedicated to truly regional planning, and not on the basis of TVA which has been bankrupt in the planning function since the end of the Depression and the dominance of David Lilienthal. An Appalachian regional authority, an Appalachian Regional Commission with money and very sharp teeth could perhaps do the job and allow a true regional entity to emerge. But the great "wedge" of economically disadvantaged which has emerged from Salim's excellent mapping study indicates just how far past Appalachia we have come, or put another way has "Appalachianized". The great wedge of citizens has become cojoined in losses of economic advantages and a sense of powerlessness. It suggests that a regionalism of those who have lost out economically, now much larger than geographic Appalachia, could become the basis of a new political populism whose sheer weight of numbers could make itself felt. Perhaps it is not counties which should be consolidated, but the whole region of dispossessed Americans.

Figure 1: EAST TENNESSEE



Rural Uplands: ⁘ Valley Counties: ////

Table 1

Percent School Years Completed in Population At Least 25 Years Old by County

	No School	Grades 1-8	High School	College (One Year or More)
Rural Upland:				
Bledsoe	7	72	20	6
Campbell	4	68	21	7
Carter	3	59	28	10
Cocke	4	68	22	6
Fentress	3	77	16	4
Grainger	4	74	17	5
Grundy	5	75	16	4
Monroe	4	67	21	8
Hancock	4	70	20.0	6.3
Average	3.7	70.0	20.0	6.3
Valley Floor:				
Sullivan	2	48	36	14
Greene	2	59	31	8
Bradley	2	58	31	9
Sevier	3	64	24	9
McMinn	2	61	28	9
Washington	2	51	33	14
Average	2.2	56.8	30.5	10.5

Source: Jacob Edwin Wiebe, "Effects of Investments in Water Resources on Regional Income and Employment" (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Tennessee, 1971).

Table 2

Median School Years, Persons 25 and Over in 1960 by Selected County Group

Rural Upland:	
Bledsoe	7.9
Campbell	7.7
Carter	8.5
Cocke	7.9
Fentress	7.3
Grainger	7.4
Grundy	8.0
Monroe	7.0
Hancock	7.2
Valley Floor:	
Sullivan	9.0
Greene	8.5
Bradley	8.5
Sevier	8.3
McMinn	8.4
Washington	8.9
State median	8.8
U.S. median	10.6

Source: Jacob Edwin Wiebe, "Effects of Investments in Water Resources on Regional Income and Employment" (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Tennessee, 1971).

Table 3

Total Personal Income, Transfer Payments, and Transfer Payments as a Percentage of Total Personal Income, 1981
By Selected County Group

	Total Personal Income	Transfer Payments (1981)	Transfer Payments As Percentage of Total Personal Income (1981)
Rural Upland:			
Bledsoe	48.6	10,977	22.6%
Campbell	213.9	64,038	29.9%
Carter	308.5	60,315	19.6%
Cocke	168.4	37,430	22.2%
Fentress	67.0	21,184	31.6%
Grainger	93.4	19,756	21.2%
Grundy	72.6	19,890	27.4%
Monroe	160.3	34,009	21.2%
Hancock	32.8	8,882	27.1%
Valley Floor:			
Sullivan	1,383.4	179,726	13.0%
Greene	374.6	19,890	5.3%
Bradley	539.2	73,468	13.6%
Sevier	307.1	48,008	15.6%
McMinn	303.4	53,027	17.5%
Washington	737.2	123,794	16.8%

1979 Poverty Threshold, Family of Four = $7,412

Source: Table 2.15, 60-62 Total Personal Income By County Of Residence, Selected Years (In Millions of Dollars), Table 2.18, 74-80, Transfer Payments By Type By County (Thousands of Dollars), 1981; Tennessee Statistical Abstract, 1983/84, Knoxville, CBER, 1983.

Table 4

Number of Physicians Reported in Appalachian Tennessee With Rates Per 1,000 Population By County (1972)

County	Number of Physicians Per Appalachian County	Rate Per 1,000 Population
Mountain Counties:		
Bledsoe	2	0.3
Campbell	13	0.5
Carter	19	0.4
Cocke	7	0.3
Fentress	6	0.5
Grainger	2	0.1
Grundy	1	0.1
Hancock	2	0.3
Monroe	9	9.4
Valley Floor Counties:		
Bradley	37	0.7
Greene	29	0.6
McMinn	27	0.8
Sevier	15	0.5
Sullivan	179	1.4
Washington	99	1.3

Total physicians reported in United States	348,328
Total number of physicians in Appalachian Tennessee	1,737
Total number of physicians in Tennessee	5,965
Rate of physicians per 1,000 population in United States	1.7
State rate of physicians per 1,000 population	1.2
Appalachian rate of physicians per 1,000 population	1.0
Appalachian rate of physicians per 1,000 population, excluding Sullivan, Washington, Knox, and Hamilton Counties	0.6
Appalachian number of physicians per 1,000 population, excluding Sullivan, Washington, Knox, and Hamilton Counties	586

Source: Appendix C, Table 17, Tennessee Appalachian Development Plan, prepared by the Department of Economic and Community Development and the Tennessee State Planning Office, 1973.

Table 5

Selected County Groups Dependancy Ratio in 1960

	Dependency Ratio
Rural Upland:	
Bledsoe	76.8
Campbell	74.1
Carter	63.3
Cocke	70.8
Fentress	81.3
Grainger	69.1
Grundy	80.1
Monroe	72.5
Hancock	73.5
Net	73.5
Valley Floor:	
Sullivan	61.3
Greene	62.3
Bradley	65.4
Sevier	65.3
McMinn	66.9
Washington	63.0
Net	64.0

Dependency ratio: Sum of population 14 and under plus those over 64 divided by the population 15 through 64 multiplied by 100. This equals the number of dependents supported by 100 working-age people.

Source: Charles L. Cleland, Selected Population and Agricultural Statistics for Tennessee Counties, University of Tennessee Agricultural Experiment Station, Bulletin No. 359, January 1963.

Table 6

1959 Median Family Income in Dollars and Percent of Family Income <$1,000 and >$10,000

	Median Family Income	Percent Family Incomes <$1,000	Percent Family Income >$10,000
Rural Upland:			
Bledsoe	1,984	34.4	1.1
Campbell	2,579	21.1	3.0
Carter	3,847	12.1	4.8
Cocke	2,504	22.1	3.5
Fentress	1,942	32.0	1.4
Grainger	2,473	21.0	1.1
Grundy	2,221	25.5	2.6
Monroe	1,442	37.0	3.7
Hancock	2,745	21.0	1.2
Valley Floor:			
Sullivan	5,115	8.5	10.7
Greene	3,128	16.3	3.7
Bradley	2,296	9.1	6.2
Sevier	2,890	17.0	3.3
McMinn	3,390	12.7	5.3
Washington	4,102	10.2	8.0
State	2,292	12.2	7.8
United States	3,161	5.6	15.1

Source: Derived from Ormond Corry: Personal Income Trends in Tennessee .

Table 7
Percentage of All Families with Incomes Below Poverty Level, 1979 by County

Rural Upland:	
Bledsoe	21.4
Campbell	21.1
Carter	14.8
Cocke	23.4
Fentress	29.7
Grainger	20.3
Grundy	21.2
Monroe	16.2
Hancock	39.5
Valley Floor:	
Sullivan	10.1
Greene	14.9
Bradley	11.0
Sevier	13.0
McMinn	13.9
Washington	10.5
1979 Poverty threshold,	
family of four	$7,412

Source: Table 2.17, Poverty Status of Families by County, 1979, Tennessee Statistical Abstract, 1983/1984. Knoxville, CBER, 1983.

Figure 2: Per Capita Income less than $6,000
1981 Values from Tennessee Statistical Abstract 1983/84



Figure 3: Percent of Income Derived from Services 1929-1967



Figure 4: Percent of Income Derived from Manufacturing 1929-1967



Figure 5: Percent of Income Derived from Government 1929-1967



Figure 6: East Tennessee Counties with 25% or more of its Manufacturing Employment in Textiles and Apparel



Figure 7: Increase in Textile Mill Products and Apparel as Percentage of County's Total Manufacturing, 1950-1970



Figure 8: Textile and Apparel Employment, 1960-1970
Counties which exceeded the 170 power counties' average increase of 35.97%



THE NEW APPALACHIAN NATIONAL FOREST: MULTIPLE - USE REVISITED

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Introduction

The economy of the Appalachian region has always been tied to the land and the resources on and below that land. Before industries arrives in the region, the economy depended upon the family farm (Eller, 1982). After the region was "discovered" by outsiders, coal and timber became its *raison d'être*.

The timber resources, however, made a much smaller contribution to the region's economy than did coal (Ford, 1962). Most of the timber in the region was removed during the period 1890 to 1920 (Eller, 1982) by methods which were very destructive to the land and waterways. Only the largest trees were removed and the remainder were rendered virtually unusable. Unlike the coal resource, no more trees were "discovered" to create another economic boom.

One result of this activity was the setting aside of lands under the administration of the Forest Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. In the next section, a discussion of these Appalachian national forests will be presented, followed by a discussion of the management of these forests and some of the conflicts which have led to the enactment of laws affecting national forest management. The paper will conclude with a discussion of the future management of the Appalachian national forests (using as an example the Nantahala and Pisgah National Forests in western North Carolina) and an evaluation of their role in the future of the economy of the region.

The Appalachian National Forests

The 397 counties in the 13 states which define the Appalachian region contain all or parts of 15 national forests (see Table 1 on page 116). These national forests contain a total of approximately 7,480,600 acres, of which approximately 6,441,500 lie within the Appalachian region. This area, however, is only about 3% of the total area covered by forests in the region (Appalachian Regional Commission, 1983) and, as a consequence, these Appalachian national forests have assumed a different role in the economy of the region than have the older and larger western national forests.

All of the national forests in the eastern United States were literally created from "lands nobody wanted" (Shands and Healy, 1977). They had been abused and mined, not unlike the coal resource of eastern Kentucky and West Virginia. The consequences of this abuse were economic deprivation and environmental disaster.

A more positive result of this activity was the passage of the Weeks Law in 1911, which authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to "examine, locate, and purchase such forested, cutover, or denuded lands within the watersheds of navigable streams as in his judgment may be necessary to the regulation of the flow of navigable streams or for the production of timber (USDA 1983). Land purchased under this law from the Vanderbilt family in western North Carolina became, in 1916, the first eastern (and first Appalachian) national forest---the Pisgah National Forest.

From the beginning, the purpose of the national forests was to be economic. The Organic Administration Act of 1897 which created the national forest system stated, "No national forest shall be established except to improve and protect the forest within the boundaries, or for the purpose of securing favorable conditions of water flows, and to furnish a continuous supply of timber for the use and necessities of citizens of the United States" (USDA, 1983, p. 6). This purpose was reinforced (implicitly) by the Weeks Law. The forests were managed to provide timber and protect navigable streams (the major arteries of commerce).

Young foresters (as potential forest managers) were trained in this purpose as part of their formal education. Davis (1966) described the forest manager as one who "needs to have the earthy and intimate forest understanding of the silviculturist, the long-range viewpoint of the planner, the skills of the administrator, and the alertness, flexibility, and all-round resourcefulness of a successful businessman (p. 1)." This role of the

Table 1. Proclaimed National Forests within the Appalachian Region, Date Established, and Acreage.

State	National Forest	Date Established	Total Acreage	Percent in Appal. Reg.
Alabama	Bankhead	1/15/18	179,365	100
	Talladega	8/31/36	368,957	100
Georgia	Chattahoochee	7/9/36	741,400	100
Kentucky	Daniel Boone	2/23/37	679,449	100
	Jefferson	4/21/36	961	100
Mississippi	Holly Springs	6/15/36	145,141	100
	Tombigbee	11/27/59	65,412	100
North Carolina	Cherokee	7/14/20	327	100
	Nantahala	1/29/20	517,436	100
	Pisgah	10/17/16	495,979	100
Ohio	Wayne	10/1/51	178,225	100
Pennsylvania	Allegheny	9/24/23	510,690	100
South Carolina	Sumter	7/13/36	357,599	12
Tennessee	Cherokee	7/14/20	626,748	100
Virginia	George Washington	5/16/18	965,883	25
	Jefferson	4/21/36	669,683	100
West Virginia	George Washington	5/16/18	100,006	100
	Jefferson	4/21/36	18,245	100
	Monongahela	4/28/20	859,092	100
	Total National Forest Acreage		7,480,598	
	Total Acreage in Appal. Region		6,441,499	

Source: Shands, W. E., and Healy, R. E. The Lands Nobody Wanted. Pages 265-267.

U.S. Department of Agriculture. Report of the Forest Service: Fiscal Year 1985. Table No. 19.

forest manager, first written in 1954, was already being challenged, particularly for the public forester managing the eastern national forest.

The eastern national forests have never had the same impact on their regional economies as have the western national forests. In 1985, for example, the national forests in the 13 states of the Southeastern Region of the Forest Service (Region 8) sold timber worth approximately $75 billion (USDA, 1986). In comparison, the forests in the state of California (Region 5) sold $89 billion, and the forests in Oregon and Washington (Region 6) sold $333 billion. Clearly, the eastern forests have a much broader purpose than timber production alone.

At the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, the role of the national forests became better defined. Their purpose was still economic in nature, but the economics of forest management was becoming broader. Duerr (1960) defined forestry economics as the field that "considers how forest lands and related human and industrial resources are allocated, or managed, to help satisfy people's wants (p. 10)." People's wants had now changed, and this led to a series of laws and events which will, in the long-run, change the future management of the national forest.

Multiple-Use Management

Although the national forests were created to "furnish a continuous supply of timber for the use and necessities of citizens of the United States" (USDA, 1983), other uses were recognized as being appropriate. Besides the protection of waterways, national forest systems land could be used for "the protection of game animals, birds, or fish" (Wildlife Game Refuges Act of 1916) and for the development of mineral resources (Mineral Resources on Weeks Law Lands Act of 1917). Multiple-use management of the national forests, however, was generally considered to be timber first and others as appropriate until the late 1950s, when the changing wants of the public forced a re-evaluation of national forest management.

The enactment of the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 (USDA, 1983) redefined the multiple uses which the public wanted from the national forests. It stated that "It is the policy of the Congress that the national forests are established and shall be administered for outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes." Multiple-use was defined as "the management of all the various renewable surface resources of the national forests so that they are utilized in the combination that will best meet the needs of the American people.....and not necessarily the combination of uses that will give the greatest dollar return or the greatest unit output" (USDA, 1983, pp. 156-157).

The concept of multiple-use fits well into the management of the Appalachian national forests. They had always been managed for timber and water, and hunting and fishing were a part of the Appalachian culture. The region had been discovered by tourists very early, leading to the creation of national parks such as the Great Smoky Mountains National Park in 1926 (Mastran and Lowerre, 1983). However, in applying the concept of multiple-use, problems arose from two sources: the imprecision of the definition of multiple-use and the pressures internal and external to the Forest Service.

Multiple-use means ".....making the most judicious use of the land for some or all of theses resources or related services over areas large enough to provide sufficient latitude for periodic adjustments in use to conform to changing needs and conditions;..." (USDA, 1983, p. 156). Does "areas large enough to provide sufficient latitude" mean one acre? Or 100 acres or more? Or an entire national forest? Faced with the difficulty of resolving these questions, national forest administrators attempted to ensure that all acres under their jurisdiction provided as many of the multiple uses as possible.

The national forests, however, still retained their economic reason for being. Pressures to produce more timber came from the forest products industry and from the Forest Service itself, in response to pressures from Congress and the National Administration (Frome, 1984). Multiple-use became a tool for *justification* of activities which in themselves were single-use. Timber harvesting, for example, could be justified because it provided for roads which provided access to the forests for hunters, fishermen, and recreational users.

The public, however, was becoming more concerned with the overall management of the National Forest System. This concern led to the enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 (USDA, 1983), the purpose of which was "to declare a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment: to promote the efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation; and to establish a Council on environmental Quality" (p. 271). Under this Act, the Forest Service not only had to identify the multiple uses which would result from any activity such as road construction or timber harvesting, but also to identify the

"impacts" on the environment of these activities.

Land Management Planning

The public's concern over the management of the national forests did not stop with the enactment of NEPA. Now they had another vehicle with which to challenge the Forest Service, and they did so in several court cases in the early 1970s. In 1973, for example, clearcutting as a harvest practice on the Monongahela National Forest was challenged in court (Frome, 1984). This led to the passage of two laws which significantly changed the application of multiple-use management on the national forests.

The first of these laws was the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act (RPA) of 1974 (USDA, 1983). This Act directed the Secretary of Agriculture to assess the entire nation's forests and rangelands every ten years and submit recommendations for long-range Forest Service programs, with updates every five years. The first of these was accomplished in 1975. In 1976, RPA was amended.

The National Forest Management Act (NFMA) of 1976 amended RPA and required the Secretary of Agriculture to "incorporate the standards and guidelines required by this section in plans for units of the National Forest system as soon as practicable...but no later than September 30, 1985 (USDA, 1983, p. 445). The Act also reinforced the commitment of Congress to the principle of multiple-use and the involvement of the public in the development of these plans.

It has been the public involvement in the land management planning process which has caused the most trauma for national forest planners and administrators. Prior to the passage of NEPA, RPA, and NFMA, forest administrators' contacts with the public were generally one-on-one or with small groups with specific complaints. After these laws were enacted, Forest Supervisors and Rangers found themselves deluged with complaints, requests for information, and public concerns about the way they (the administrators) were managing their (the public's) national forests. The process of land management planning served to provide a vehicle which increased this deluge.

In 1984, the Proposed Land and Resource Management Plan for the Nantahala and Pisgah National Forests was submitted for public review and comment. Over 1700 letters, petitions, and comments were received, of which over 90% were negative. According to the public, the National Forests in North Carolina were going to build too many roads, harvest too much timber (particularly by clearcutting), not provide enough "primitive" recreational opportunities, and adversely affect habitat for wildlife. The forest went "back to the drawing board" in 1985.

Forest planners collected new data on the status of existing roads on the forests; re-evaluated costs, benefits, and yields of resources, and redesigned the computer model of the forests to better portray the location of activities. The proposed plan which resulted not only more adequately addressed the public concerns for retaining more areas in a "roadless" condition, but also reduced the number of roads which would be constructed and the number of acres which would be harvested intensively. It also redefined the principle of multiple-use as it is applied on the forests.

The New Multiple-Use

Prior to the land management plan, the Nantahala and Pisgah national Forests had 860,520 acres managed under multiple-use (See Table 2 on pages 119 and 120.) All of these acres were managed for as many of the resources---timber, recreation, wildlife, water, and minerals---as possible without significantly impairing the land or adversely affecting another resource. Under the plan, multiple-use has been redefined, and areas are managed for specific uses. The principle of multiple-use is applied over the entire Forests, which is in keeping with the original intent of the 1960 Act.

Under the Plan, the Forests are divided into 18 Management Areas, with each area producing a specific "mix" of resources. Management Areas 1 through 5 are multiple-use areas, with Management Areas 2C, 4C, and 5 limited in the number of resources produced. These areas are not considered to be multiple-use areas during the period covered by the Land Management Plan (15 years), because they are not needed to meet the anticipated targets required by Congress. Management Areas 6 through 18 have been removed from multiple-use management by law or administrative action.

Management Areas 1B and 3B, for example, are the areas designated for primary timber production. These areas will require some road construction and will create conditions which favor certain wildlife species. Where roads are closed, turkey habitat will be enhanced. These areas are the most intensively managed for timber and will generally occur on areas of the two forests which are now roaded.

As the numbers designating the Management Areas increase, the future conditions of the forest generally will be more natural-appearing. Trees will be allowed to

Table 2. Management Areas, Descriptions and Acreages, Nantahala-Pisgah Proposed Land and Resource Management Plan (Continued).

Number	Acreage	Description
5	86,010	Manage for non-motorized recreation and bear. No road construction. All existing roads closed. No timber harvest within next 15 years.
6	15,230	Wilderness Study Areas. Currently 26,920 acres in this classification.
7	66,550	Wilderness.
8	12,520	Experimental Forests.
9	7,900	Roan Mountain.
10	1,460	Research Natural Areas.
11	6,540	Cradle of Forestry in America.
12	3,030	Developed Recreation Areas.
13	10,370	Special Interest Areas. Currently 10,250 acres in this classification.
14	12,450	Appalachian Trail and corridor.
15	2,050	Wild and Scenic River and corridor.
16	1,260	Administrative Areas.
17	3,880	Balds.
18	(101,530)	Riparian Areas.
Total	1,015,330	
Total Under Multiple-Use:	Currently (Management Area 0)	860,520 Ac.
	Planned (Management Areas 1-4D less 2C and 4C)	585,740 Ac.

Note: Areas currently managed are in Management Areas 0 and 6 through 18 (with acres in parentheses for Management Areas 6 and 13).

Source: U.S.Department of Agriculture. (Proposed) Land and Resource Management Plan for the Nantahala and Pisgah National Forests. Forest Service, National Forests in North Carolina, Asheville, North Carolina. 1986

Table 2. Management Areas, Descriptions and Acreages, Nantahala-Pisgah Proposed Land and Resource Management Plan.

Number	Acreage	Description
0	860,520	Current Direction Only. Manage for timber, recreation, wildlife, water, and minerals. Road construction, harvest by clearcutting.
1B	56,890	Manage for timber, motorized recreation, deer, and grouse. Road construction. Harvest by clearcutting, shelterwood in visually sensitive areas.
2A	42,070	Manage for motorized recreation, squirrel, and pileated woodpecker. Timber management modified for visual quality and wildlife. Road construction. Harvest by shelterwood.
2B	7,570	Manage for motorized recreation, deer, and grouse. Timber management modified for visual quality and wildlife. Road construction. Harvest by group selection.
2C	40,340	Manage for motorized recreation, squirrel, and pileated woodpecker. No timber harvest within next 15 years.
3B	279,050	Manage for timber, non-motorized recreation, and turkey. Road construction. Harvest by clearcutting, shelterwood in visually sensitive areas.
4A	23,510	Manage for non-motorized recreation and bear. Timber mananagement modified for visual quality and wildlife. Road construction. Harvest by shelterwood.
4B	9,690	Manage for non-motorized recreation and bear. Timber mananagement modified for visual quality and wildlife. Road construction. Harvest by group selection.
4C	160,000	Manage for non-motorized recreation and bear. No timber harvest within next 15 years.
4D	166,960	Manage for non-motorized recreation and bear. Timber mananagement modified for visual quality and wildlife. Road construction. Harvest by small clear cuts.

grow longer in Areas 2 and 4, and fewer roads will be built. Harvesting of timber will be accomplished by methods other than clearcutting (shelterwood and group selection) in order to preserve the visual quality and provide wildlife habitat for species with more restrictive requirements.

The total area selected for timber production in the Plan has been reduced from 860,520 acres to 585,740 (or a reduction of 274,780 acres). The intent of the Management Area designations is to better display to the public what is going to be produced and where it will be produced. Each Management Area is defined by a specific set of Standards which will be used by field personnel in planning future activities.

A survey of the published Plans of other Appalachian national forests indicates that all forests have more precisely defined the principle of multiple-use to more accurately reflect the differences in outputs and resources which different areas can be expected to provide. The result is a more realistic presentation of where outputs can be produced in the National Forest System.

Implications for the Economy of the Appalachian Region

The national forests impact the economies of their regions directly and indirectly. Direct impacts are the payments to local governments in lieu of taxes, employment, and income. Indirect impacts result from the creation of employment and income in non-forest related sectors as a result of the existence of the forests.

From 1981 to 1985, the Nantahala and Pisgah National Forests returned an average of $1,359,303 (in 1978 dollars) to the U.S. Government and $429,108 (in 1978 dollars) to the State of North Carolina (USDA, 1986). Most of this money came from the sale of timber, special use permits, and mineral leases. Under the Plan, these payments are expected to increase, $1,876,000 to the U.S. Government and $526,000 to the State of North Carolina.

Under the Plan, income and employment are expected to rise by 15% and 16%, respectively. Income and employment in the timber-oriented sectors alone are expected to rise by 9%. The total change in income and employment includes indirect and induced changes resulting from changes in the timber harvesting and road construction programs.

Not included in these estimates are the changes which would occur in the region impacted by the two forests on quality of life, real-estate values, and general living conditions. The population growth of western North Carolina in recent years has been the result of in-migration of retirees and others seeking a high quality environment. The changes which have been made in forest management are expected to accelerate this trend.

Under the assumption that most of the direct economic impact is related to changes in the timber harvesting program, the impacts from all national forests in the Appalachian Region should be similar to those anticipated in North Carolina. The planned timber harvests for all but two Appalachian national forests (the Cherokee and the Monongahela) are expected to increase over current harvests (See Table 3 below) and the total for the Region will increase by 11%.

Table 3. Average Annual Allowable Sale Quantity (in millions of board feet) under Current Direction and Preferred Alternative of the Forest Plan (10-15 year period)

National Forest	Average Annual Allowable Sale Quantity	
	Current MMBF	Planned MMBF
Alabama N.F.'s	72	75
Allegheny	64	95
Chattahoochee-Oconee	98	102
Cherokee	48	41
Daniel Boone	41	53
George Washington	36	49
Jefferson	33	36
Mississippi N.F.'s	234	254
Monongahela	46	42
Nantahala and Pisgah	70	64
Sumter	55	64
TOTAL	797	885

Source: USDA, Forest Service. Unpublished Reports. Timber Management, Washington Office.

Note: Data for Wayne National Forest not available. Data for Alabama and Mississippi includes forests outside the Appalachian region.

The direct and indirect economic impacts from other resources should also significantly increase because of the redefinition of multiple-use. Areas which are now roadless will remain so and will attract more visitors to the Forest. This should accelerate the trend toward more recreational use of the forests which began in the 1950s (Duerr, 1986).

Those areas which will not be managed for multiple-use under the Plan (Management Areas 2C, 4C, and 5) are not withdrawn from use in the same sense as a designated wilderness or a wild and scenic river. These areas are not suitable for timber production at present because of supply and demand considerations or the need to protect other resources. As the public wants become defined in the future, these lands will be re-evaluated as to their best use.

The focus of the redefinition of multiple-use under the Forest Plan is to reduce the areas of intensive timber management as much as possible to areas which are now roaded. This reduces overall management costs and, as conditions and public wants change, the decision as to how each area will be managed may also be changed. The Forest Service is required to re-evaluate the plans in 10 to 15 years, so future decisions have not been precluded by present decisions (Krutilla and Fisher, 1975).

Summary

The national forests in the Appalachian region will continue to be managed for many uses. To the casual observer, the future forests will look little different from the present forests. Timber will continue to be harvested, waterways will be protected, recreationists will continue to find opportunities for enjoyment, and wildlife will have abundant habitats.

There will be major differences, however. The timber which will be harvested will be restricted to areas which have been cutover in the past and which now have access roads. Wildlife will find certain areas of the forest more suitable than others. And recreationists will find more opportunities to experience the "natural" forest.

The professional foresters who will manage the new national forests will also change. The profession of forestry will be one of a set of specific fields with a common social theme (Duerr, 1986).

The future national forests in the Appalachian region will still be forests of many uses, providing employment, income, and a high quality environment. These multiple-uses, however, will be provided in a different "package."

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ORGANIZED LABOR IN CENTRAL APPALACHIA

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Introduction

Appalachia has long been the scene of some of the most bitter and bloody labor-management strife in the United States. From Matewan, West Virginia, to Harlan County, Kentucky, to the convict Labor Wars of east Tennessee, the experience in the hills and hollows has been bare-knuckled and hard-fought. This intensity crops up occasionally even today, witness the recent confrontation between the United Mine Workers and the A.T. Massey Coal Company in Kentucky and West Virginia. This confrontation erupted most violently in Pike County, Kentucky, where a non-union coal truck driver was shot dead and a union miner had her hand shot away. Appalachian labor struggle is like moonshine made in the hills, strong and with a powerful kick that lasts like a painful hangover lingering on and on.

This essay looks at labor in Appalachia through an eastern Kentucky lens, for that is the lens which I know best. I shall define eastern Kentucky as those counties lying in the Seventh and Fifth Congressional Districts. I do so because this closely conforms to the generally accepted definition of the region and because of the availability of data by Congressional District. While not precisely reflective of the whole, the eastern Kentucky experience does not stray far from that in the rest of Central Appalachia. Where it does differ, the difference is more of degree and dimension than of kind. For example, labor remains stronger in West Virginia than in eastern Kentucky, but in Kentucky it is stronger than in southwest Virginia or east Tennessee. And the principal unions, in the main, are similar throughout the area.

This essay is based upon the knowledge and experience of one who grew up in an eastern Kentucky coal camp and who, during the past decade, has held a variety of public policy and political positions involving very close association with organized labor. It reflects the bias of a friend of labor, one who respects and appreciates what unions have done to improve the life opportunities of their members and the members of the broader working class.

It is important for regional observers to know of labor's present-day status and to consider the prospects for the future, because labor has long been perhaps the single most progressive force in the mountains. Think of Appalachian history during the past half-century. Has any other entity, beyond government, done more to increase the wage scale and standard of living for all, fought for social welfare benefits for those in need, prodded for safe and healthful conditions in the workplace, supported progressive political candidates for elective office? And how much would or could government have done were it not for pressure from labor and the election of political leaders who had concern for the region? To my knowledge, those political leaders who have demonstrated the most interest in the needs of the Appalachian Region, at the state and national levels, have been candidates supported by Appalachian labor. And so, if you care about Appalachia, you have reason to care about the status of labor in the region.

The Unions in Eastern Kentucky

It is startling how little information is available about the numbers and location of organized labor in eastern Kentucky. The data presented here were gathered by voluntary means from the unions in the region by the Kentucky Labor Cabinet. The difficulty of such data-gathering necessarily cautions us to treat these data as close approximations rather than as precise facts. Nevertheless I believe they provide the most accurate description available of labor in the mountains.

A great diversity of international unions is represented today in eastern Kentucky.[1] The Seventh Congressional District has 47 different unions operating within its boundary. The Fifth Congressional District has 35 unions. These vary from large internationals such as the United Steelworkers, Teamsters, United Mine Workers, Communication Workers of America, Machinists, and United Food and Commercial Workers, to the small unions such as the Leather Workers, Locomotive Engineers, Furniture Workers and, Telegraphers.

The preponderance of international unions and membership is in the basic industries: coal, steel, garment and assorted manufacturing, and transportation industries. For example, of the 47 unions in the Seventh Congressional District, 30 are in basic industries, and 17 are either service or public employee unions. The Fifth Congressional District is similarly composed with 28 unions representing basic industries and only 7 in the service or public employee sectors.

In terms of membership figures, basic industry unions surpass even those in the public or service sectors. Ten international unions account for 78% of all union membership in the Seventh Congressional District; eight of these ten are in the basic industries and have 71% of the membership total. The remaining two, one public employee union and one service union, make up 6.5% of union membership in the district. Patterns in the Fifth Congressional District are very similar. Its top ten international unions account for 80% of all union membership in the district. Nine of these ten are in the basic industries and constitute 76% of total membership; a single service union has but 4% of the membership. Tables 1 and 2 chart the dominant unions in Congressional Districts 7 and 5, respectively (see page 125).

A glance at these tables demonstrates clearly the dominance by a few unions. It also illustrates the striking similarity among key unions and their relative importance in the Fifth and Seventh Congressional Districts. For example, in the Seventh District the largest union is the United Mine Workers, followed by the United Steel Workers. These two unions account for over 50% of union membership in this District. In third place stands the Teamsters. These three unions represent 57% of the union workforce.

The three leading unions in the Fifth Congressional District are precisely the same----Mine Workers, Steelworkers, and Teamsters. Together they constitute nearly 44% of organized labor in the district, although, unlike the unions in the Seventh District, these three in the Fifth have nearly the same size membership.

Table 3 represents the largest ten unions in eastern Kentucky. Nine of these ten are in the basic industries, thus illustrating how dependent the organized workforce is upon the basic industry sector of the Appalachian economy. Not surprisingly, the Mine Workers and Steelworkers rank first and second. Between them they account for 42.39% of organized labor in the region. If we include the Teamsters which rank third, these three unions represent nearly one-half of all union members in eastern Kentucky.

Unionization is concentrated geographically in certain parts of eastern Kentucky.[2] While every county has at least a scattering of members, the vast majority are centralized in a few counties. The Seventh Congressional District has 21 counties; ten of those counties account for approximately 90% of union members in the District. And the first five of these counties (Boyd, Pike, Floyd, Greenup, and Carter) represent approximately 75% of total membership. Thus, unions and their members are disproportionately concentrated in the counties surrounding heavily industrialized Ashland (Boyd, Greenup, and Carter) and in the coalfield counties (Pike, Floyd, Johnson). Although there exists greater dispersion in the Fifth Congressional District, the general pattern is similar. The coalfield counties of Harlan, Letcher, and Bell have the single greatest concentration. Pulaski County has over 4,000 union members working within it.

This distribution of membership indicates which counties in the region have been, and will be, most keenly affected by decline in the basic industries and the concurrent loss of union membership.

Transformation and Its Causes

The union composition of the American workforce is changing dramatically. This is a national trend that has been taking place for some time but has accelerated in recent years. Organized labor, in absolute numbers and in percentage of the workforce, is diminishing. This is well known and well documented. But to better appreciate this transformation, let us consider a few statistics.

In 1953 organized labor made up 32.5% of the national non-farm workforce; in Kentucky it accounted for 25.3% of this group.[3] This was labor's peak year. By 1960 the figure slipped to 28.6% nation-wide and to 25% in Kentucky. This held steady for fifteen years, with Kentucky's share at 24.6% and the nation's at 28.9% in 1975. A major drop occurred in the next five years. By 1980 only 20.7% of Kentucky's workforce and 23.2% of the nation's workers belonged to unions. Further loss occurred in the next two years, although the nation experienced greater slippage than Kentucky. In 1982 the national percentage was 21.9; Kentucky's was 20.4%. Organized labor's percentage of the nation's workers fell to 19.4 by 1984; no comparable data are available for Kentucky for this same year, but it is reasonable to expect that the trend has continued.

Comparable information is not available at this time for Federal Congressional Districts or Counties.[4] However, Kentucky Labor Cabinet data have been gathered and constructed in such a way as to provide some

Table 1

TOP 10 INTERNATIONAL UNIONS
FEDERAL CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT 7 - 1985

INTERNATIONAL	MEMBERSHIP	PERCENT*
United Mine Workers	9,051	26.93
Steelworkers	8,322	24.76
Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers	1,795	5.34
Food & Commercial Workers	1,467	4.36
Railway Carmen	1,301	3.87
Service Employees	970	2.88
Southern Labor Union	777	2.31
Carpenters	767	2.28
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers	743	2.21
Machinists	701	2.08
TOTAL	25,894	77.05

Table 2

TOP 10 INTERNATIONAL UNIONS
FEDERAL CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT 5 - 1985

INTERNATIONAL	MEMBERSHIP	PERCENT*
United Mine Workers	4,008	15.83
Steelworkers	3,610	14.26
Teamsters	3,402	13.44
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers	2,341	9.25
Laborers	1,900	7.50
Clothing & Textile	1,232	4.87
Sheet Metal Workers	1,000	3.95
Southern Labor Union	925	3.65
Garment Workers	675	2.67
Carpenters	588	2.32
TOTAL	19,681	77.74

Table 3

TOP 10 INTERNATIONAL UNIONS IN EASTERN KENTUCKY
FEDERAL CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS 5 AND 7 - 1985

INTERNATIONAL	MEMBERSHIP	PERCENT*
United Mine Workers	13,059	22.15
United Steel Workers	11,932	20.24
Teamsters	3,402	5.77
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers	3,084	5.23
Laborers	1,900	3.22
Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers	1,795	3.05
Southern Labor Union	1,702	2.89
United Food & Commercial	1,467	2.48
Railway Carmen	1,301	2.21
Clothing & Textile	1,232	2.09
TOTAL	40,874	69.34

*Percent of the Combined Total Union Membership in the Federal Congressional District(s)

SOURCE: ***Kentucky Labor Cabinet***

analysis and relevant findings.[5] Our data indicate that in 1980 the Seventh Congressional District had approximately 47,011 union members and the Fifth Congressional District had approximately 34,983 union members. By 1985 the Seventh District had dropped to approximately 37,327 members and the Fifth District had dropped to approximately 26,170 members. In just five years, the Seventh District had lost 20.6% of its members of organized labor, and the Fifth District had lost 25.1% of its members. This major decline demonstrates that the national reversal of union membership has been dramatically evident in Appalachia.

Why has this transformation taken place? What are the causes?

I shall briefly consider five contributing factors to labor's decline. First is the long-range change in the United States labor market from goods to service employment. Historically, the center of union strength has been in manufacturing, construction, transportation, and communications. The labor market change has devastated this sector of the economy, and with this employment decline, unions have also declined.

The second factor in union decline is international competition. Massachusetts Institute of Technology economist Lester Thurow says it is almost inaccurate to speak any longer of a national economy, so quickly are we becoming a single world economy. Foreign penetration of our economy is so extensive that ***The Wall Street Journal*** describes the development as "the de-Americanization of the American economy" which casts "an enormous shadow across the U.S. business scene."[6] Our automotive, steel, machine tool, electronics, garment, shoe, and other basic industries are under assault and losing. Even high-tech industries are feeling the pressure. The international trade imbalance is so severe that in only three years the United States has gone from the lofty position of being "the world's number one creditor---a position built up over two- thirds of a century--- to the number one debtor.....Americans owe foreigners nearly $200 billion more than they owe here."[7]

The "globalization of the economy" is a phrase that many workers may never have heard; yet it is putting them out of work. Simply stated, it means that the economies of the world are becoming integrated. It means that the decisions of Arab sheiks about the price of petroleum determine whether a Kentucky coal miner has a job or an unemployment check. The same can be said about South Korean industrialists in relation to garment workers in Somerset, Nippon executives in relation to steelworkers in Ashland.

The point is, the smokestack industries of Appalachia are not faring well in the world marketplace. They are in retreat. They have traditionally been among the most heavily organized of all sectors of the economy and have provided a large share of labor's jobs. With plant and mine closings, union membership has declined. It is doubtful that these basic industries will ever again employ the number of workers they once did.

A third cause of union decline is that machines are performing jobs that workers used to do. American industry has had to rely increasingly upon technological advancement to compete in the world marketplace where foreign companies pay Third World wages to workers, receive direct government subsidy, and are not burdened by workers' compensation, OSHA, or environmental laws. The implementation of new technology has rarely required an expanded workforce.

The juxtaposition of two Kentucky coal industry statistics for 1985 is instructive. In that year two records were established. The industry produced 174 million tons of coal, the most ever produced in a single year, and it did so with fewer than 50,000 coal miners--- the smallest workforce in modern times.[8]

A fourth cause is deregulation of previously regulated sectors of the economy. This has greatly affected the trucking, air, rail, and communication industries. While the national impact has probably been proportionately greater than in Appalachia, increased competition in trucking, rail, and communications has had an impact on the Teamsters, Communications Workers, and Rail Unions in eastern Kentucky.

The fifth contributing factor is employer opposition to unions and unionization drives. At no time since the 1930's have business interests fought so hard and effectively against unions. Corporate America explains its increasingly hostile stance as the result of market forces which require increased efficiency and productivity if business interests are to survive. Unions, they assert, do not allow them to be sufficiently competitive in the world marketplace. For their part, unions ascribe much of the growing corporate opposition to simple greed. The truth is probably somewhere in between.

Finally, we must frankly acknowledge that organized labor has not adapted well to a changing economy and work environment. The National AFL-CIO as much as acknowledged this in the 1985 report of its Committee on the Evolution of Work. This report, ***The Changing Situation of Workers and Their Unions***,[9] is a remarkable document because of the implicit self-criticism. Unions, quite simply, have been slow to change, preferring instead the safe haven of time-honored practices. But circumstances have grown so desperate that

many unions are now beginning to experiment, if slowly and cautiously. Several which have been aggressive in these efforts are the United Mine Workers, United Auto Workers, Seafarers, Communication Workers, United Steelworkers, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, and the United Postal Workers Union.

Implications

There are severe and even disturbing implications to labor's decline in the mountains. These implications are sweeping and powerful and are of an economic, political, and social nature. They are so broad-gauged, cut across so many boundaries, and are of such a substantive character as to signal a change in the Appalachian Kentucky economy. Let me explain.

Labor's erosion signals a broad retreat in earning power for a large class of people. This encompasses union members, but also includes many below the union scale whose wages were driven up by the union wage. Few coal miners, steelworkers, or railroad workers who have lost their jobs will ever again match their previous wages. And once the threat of organizing non-union workers is diminished, employers may be disinclined to match the pay and benefit package of the organized plant or mine.

As a consequence, the standard of living of many Appalachians has already eroded and will continue to erode. This loss will be most grievously felt by workers and their families. But it will also be keenly felt by local business, especially the small businesses, of the region. Retail stores, shopkeepers, gasoline stations and garages, doctors, dentists, and lawyers, all those dependent upon the income of workers, will be adversely affected. The decreased present and future income and earning power of blue-collar workers will drive down the economy of the entire region.

If we believe that the economic changes in our society are structural, that never again will the smokestack industries of the nation and of Appalachia regain their former eminence, and certainly never again employ the previous number of workers, then a difficult question is posed: What will happen to these displaced workers? Where will they work? What will they do?

These questions yield no easy answers.

During the last major economic downturn of the 1950s and 1960s, out-migration provided a safety valve. This was especially true for the young and ambitious and the educated and the skilled. But the factories of the industrial mid-west no longer need Appalachian migrants. Today, these factories are silent or murmuring at half-capacity. The once vibrant heartland of America has become the rust bowl, aging, decrepit, and itself in decline. Economists suggest that ours has become a bi-coastal economy, that the real economic growth taking place in the nation is from Boston to Miami and from Los Angeles to Mexico. Perhaps future Appalachians will flock to these coastal economies, but I doubt it.

There are those who suggest that eastern Kentucky faces the grim prospect of becoming what some commentators have called "the industrial trash heap" of post-industrial America. This means the return of great masses to unemployment and poverty, underdevelopment, and economic stagnation. This sad prognosis sees an entire generation of blue-collar workers and their families pushed aside by the transformation of our economy and relegated to a lesser quality of life. How many Letcher County coal miners or Pulaski County industrial workers are prepared to enter the workforce of the high-tech and information-based society if---and it certainly is a big *if*---such jobs were to become available to them? Under these dire circumstances, the Reagan "safety net" of social welfare programs---job training, food stamps, AFDC, and the entire spectrum of the public dole---- will be sorely tested.

Harry Caudill foresaw this grim scenario years ago and prophetically warned of its impending possibility. Perhaps the vision is too harsh, perhaps the possibility too remote. But consider this: What would become of Boyd, Greenup, and Carter Counties if ARMCO Steel closed its doors? If 4,000 high-paying industrial jobs were lost? If you think this cannot happen, then you are unaware of the past twelve-month history of heavy industry in Ashland and of the perilous condition of the steel industry. And this question posed about this steel mill could just as easily and accurately have been asked about dozens of other plants or coal mines in eastern Kentucky.

These grave economic problems make for difficult political decisions. But a deeper, more troublesome problem lies beyond these public policy considerations of high unemployment and economic downturn and how to deal with its implications.

In a pluralistic, free democratic society where issues are framed, agitated, and decided in the rough-and-tumble of the political process, what will become of the broad mass of working people, the blue-collar worker and below, if there is no longer an effective Labor Movement to champion their cause? If labor can no longer offer a countervailing force to the political muscle of corporate America, who will do so? If labor

continues its broad retreat across the economic and political landscape, is it realistic to believe that the blue-collar worker, who has become a member of the middle class based largely upon the economic gains secured by a powerful labor movement of bygone days, will continue in his present standard of living? Or will this middle class shrink, grow stagnant, and decline?

No one can answer these questions today with certainty, but history would suggest that times may grow more painful for the many people in our land, and especially those in eastern Kentucky, who are dependent directly or indirectly upon the basic industries. Thus we find that the economic issues we first considered become large social issues as well. And if the worst comes to pass, a generation of workers may be lost, a generation of families made to endure the hardship of falling backward off the social and economic ladder, and exposed to the tribulation of social disintegration.

With the help of organized labor, the working class became, in fact, part of the middle class; with the loss of organized labor, a major portion of the middle class may become not the working class, but a new dependent class. At the very least, a backward march by labor signals a real loss for workers in earning power and job security, a loss in the political power equation, and the loss of social status and prestige.

Prospects for the Future

Future prospects for labor in the mountains are grim. Given the reality of the present and the forces behind present conditions, it would be naive to suggest a reversal of this trend. A best possible scenario would be for labor to stand firm at present status, with no future loss in numbers and strength. But this is far from likely, given the extraordinary international and national economic pressures on our basic industries and eastern Kentucky's dependence upon these industries. Even if steel and coal were to retain their market share, they would do so with substantially fewer workers. And it will be recalled that these two industries account for a high proportion of union membership in the region. The successive years of backward march have eroded the spirits of some, causing them to adopt a "hunker-down and hope it passes" attitude. This is a strategy of despair and disintegration. It will not yield positive results.

There are reasons to be more hopeful, other factors that may enable labor to survive the present crisis and to build a brighter future.

First is the strong tradition of organized labor in the mountains. Union members take genuine pride in their affiliation. They are proud of being union men and union women. They remember and still reminisce about what it took to bring unionization to the region. In the more rural areas, and especially among the United Mine Workers, they often still address each other as Brother or Sister. This fervor has caused a sense of solidarity among union members that is not often equaled elsewhere in the nation. These men and women are literally willing to risk death for their union.

This tradition, this depth of commitment, and the relatively strong influence of unions in the area has enabled organized labor to retain a reasonably high degree of respectability among the general public. Nearly everyone has a family member who is or was a union member, and in eastern Kentucky, and throughout central Appalachia, family still means something. There is a near-general consensus that unions brought a better way of life to their members. And so, the respect accorded organized labor means that unions get a higher degree of sympathy from the average Appalachian than from the average American.

Thus, the corporate union-bashing which has become so widespread is not as readily acceptable in the mountains as it is in other parts of the nation. this greater public acceptance, the more positive attitude toward unions, is then a second factor favoring the future of labor.

Third is the fact that there is the potential for significant new organizing in eastern Kentucky. Public employees have been one group of the American workforce with which labor has enjoyed success in the past decade, and it is this very sector which has had negligible attention in the mountains. County and city workers, and support staff in the public schools, are a rich, untapped reservoir of new union members. This group would be especially valuable to organize in the non-coal counties of the region, since the schools and local governments are generally the largest employers in these rural counties. To organize these workers in these counties would give labor disproportionate power for the number of workers organized.

A fourth reason for optimism is that labor has exhibited a willingness to commit to a more cooperative relationship with management. The greater Ashland area has a Labor-Management Committee representing all the major employers and industrial unions. Somerset and Pulaski County likewise have such a group in the Fifth Congressional District. The Big Sandy region of Pike, Floyd, and Johnson Counties is about to establish such a functioning body. ARMCO Steel has initiated a Quality Plus Program, jointly organized and accepted by executives and steelworkers. The aim of this effort is to

cut costs, improve productivity and product quality, and save the huge mill, thereby offering job security. And a coal mine in Letcher County has an active Labor-Management Committee that has noticeably changed the work environment. These are but a few examples; others exist. The point is that many leaders of business and labor have recognized that it is in their mutual self-interest to work together in cooperative fashion and are actively seeking to do so.

Finally, there is the fact that the Mine Workers and Steelworkers are the two largest unions in the region and by happy coincidence, these two unions have bright and capable individuals as their International Presidents. Richard Trumka of the Mine Workers and Lynn Williams of the United Steelworkers are two of the most progressive Labor leaders on the national scene. If any International Presidents can stem the hemorrhage and revitalize their respective organization, these two can.

It is for these reasons that I still have some hope that organized labor in Appalachia can survive the present difficulties and become once again a major source of strength in the region. Unions remain today a force to be reckoned with; they have the power, if carefully nurtured and thoughtfully directed, to lead the nation's labor march in the days ahead.

But it will not be easy, the odds are not with them, and it *will* be a struggle.

Notes

[1] This information is taken from "1985-1986 Directory of Labor Organizations , Kentucky Labor Cabinet, Kentucky State Government, Frankfort, Kentucky, 1986.

[2] Our data are especially difficult to verify precisely on a county by county basis as reporting is given according to the location of the organized plant or mine. It should, therefore, be recognized that some members will live in the counties surrounding the county specified. However, despite these limitations, this is the best available source as there is presently no county by county membership breakdown.

[3] Data in this paragraph are from Leo Frank & Neil Sheflin, Union Sourcebook , First Edition, West Orange, N.J., IRDIS, 1985.

[4] Dr. Leo Frank reports that during 1987 he will compile county by county union membership data and add it to a new edition of Union Sourcebook . To my knowledge, this will represent the first such disaggregation of union membership ever published.

[5] This was taken from "1985-1986 Directory of Labor Organizations , op. cit.

[6] Alfred L. Malabre, Jr., "U.S. Economy Grows Ever More Vulnerable to Foreign Influences," p. 1, ***Wall Street Journal***, October 27, 1986.

[7] *Ibid.*

[8] Kentucky Department of Mines and Minerals, ***Annual Report 1986***, 120 Graham Ave., Lexington, Kentucky.

[9] ***The Changing Situation of Workers and Their Unions***, A Report by the AFL-CIO, Washington, DC, February 1985.

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